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ABSTRACT 
 
 
EXTRACTING BUSINESS VALUE OF IT AND IDENTIFYING IT INNOVATION IN LARGE 
INSTITUTIONAL SETTINGS UNDERGOING REGULATORY CHANGE 
 
BY 
 
JESSICA PYE 
 
December 5, 2017 
 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. Arun Rai 
 
Major Academic Unit: Center for Process Innovation & Department of Computer 
Information Systems 
 
While information technology (IT) has been established as a key element for firm 
performance, it is unclear how firms can use various IT capabilities to achieve a diverse 
set of often conflicting performance outcomes, as well as how firms can successfully 
encourage IT-enabled innovations in the context of a changing institutional environment.  
The objective of this three-essay dissertation is to develop an in-depth perspective of the 
business value of IT in large institutional settings with changing regulatory conditions.  
Drawing on a diverse set of theories, two of the essays, one situated in the U.S. electric 
utility context and the other situated in the U.S. healthcare context, investigate how firms 
use IT capabilities to achieve simultaneous outcomes that are in tension, while also 
experiencing significant change in their institutional environment.  The third essay, again 
situated in the U.S. healthcare context, focuses on identifying the influence of a cost 
aspiration shortfall on IT-enabled Clinical Process Management Innovativeness, and by 
identifying how the nature of this relationship changes based on the progression of a federal 
regulation.  For each of the three essays, multi-source archival databases were constructed 
for multiple years (2005-2014 for essay 1, 2008-2014 for essay 2, and 2007-2014 for essay 
3).  Multiple methods were also employed to analyze the data and test hypotheses 
(stochastic frontier analysis for essay 1, panel data analysis for essay 2, and multi-level 
modeling for essay 3).  All together, these three essays contribute to the IS literature by 
elaborating our understanding of the business value of IT – the impact of IT innovations, 
resources, and capabilities – under a changing institutional environment and suggests new 
directions for research in the antecedents and consequences of IT innovations, resources, 
and capabilities.   
 
 5 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
I have received tremendous support along the road to my PhD and there are far too 
many people to thank within the confines of this acknowledgement, but I will attempt to 
do so. 
It almost goes without saying that none of this would have happened without my 
incredible advisor, Dr. Arun Rai.  When I started out working for Dr. Rai as a graduate 
research assistant doing data coding, I had no idea what was in store for me. When I 
expressed an interest in pursuing a PhD, he was kind enough to sit down with me and really 
discuss what that would look like as well as help me figure out what I was passionate about. 
Almost every conversation we have had resulted in me coming away a bit wiser than before 
in life, in the IS field, in writing, in crafting an argument, in academia, in career planning, 
in everything. I am also deeply appreciative for the time that was carved out of a very busy 
schedule to talk about research, ideas, and career path (although Thursday evenings were 
usually reserved for my horseback riding). None of this would be possible without a 
superstar advisor and I am more than grateful to have found one in Dr. Rai. 
My committee members, Detmar Straub, Aaron Baird, and Chris Forman, also get 
a huge thank you for working with me. I thank you all for agreeing to be a part of my 
committee and supporting my work over the years. Your encouragement and excellent 
comments and suggestions ensure that my work is held to the highest standards. 
I also have to give a big thank you to Vanessa Brown, our administrator rock star. 
She has been a constant source of information (or if she doesn’t know she’ll track down 
the person who does) and entertainment. My time at GSU would not have been quite as 
smooth or fun if not for her. I thank her for all the laughs and sending free food my way.    
 6 
I also have to mention the many friends I made while in CEPRIN, Chaitanya 
Sambhara, Liwei Chen, Vitali Mindel, Zhitao Yin, and Yanran Liu. I very much enjoyed 
all our talks about life, the universe, and everything (including research) over the years. 
I’m not sure Dr. Rai ever had two of his PhD students have babies during their program, 
but I am forever grateful that I had Liwei to talk to about it. Thank you all for being great 
office mates as well as friends over the years. 
Last but not least, I have to thank my husband, Justin, and while he won’t remember 
much of it, my son, Ethan. I could write a whole bunch of thank yous here but it would fall 
short to how much you mean to me. Just know that you both keep me from being too much 
of a Type A personality by keeping me laughing and dancing like no one is watching. 
To everyone else that I forgot to mention, I thank you all too. 
 
 
 
 7 
Table of Contents 
1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 12 
1.1. Motivation .................................................................................................................................. 12 
1.2. Abstract of Essays ...................................................................................................................... 13 
1.2.1. Abstract of Essay 1 ............................................................................................................ 13 
1.2.2. Abstract of Essay 2 ............................................................................................................ 14 
1.2.3. Abstract of Essay 3 ............................................................................................................ 15 
1.3. Contribution ............................................................................................................................... 15 
2. How can IT enable the Simultaneous Pursuit of Green and Business Outcomes?: An 
Investigation of Smart Grid Technologies ................................................................................ 18 
2.1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 18 
2.2. Investigative Context .......................................................................................................... 22 
2.3. Theoretical Development .................................................................................................... 24 
2.3.1. Efficiency of Multiple Input Systems with Desirable and Undesirable Outputs ................... 24 
2.3.2. The Smart Grid ...................................................................................................................... 27 
2.3.3. Conceptualization of PDT and SMTs .................................................................................... 29 
2.3.4. Business Outcomes ................................................................................................................ 30 
2.3.5. Green Outcomes..................................................................................................................... 31 
2.3.6. Role of PDTs in Increasing Production Output While Controlling Costs ............................. 32 
2.3.7. Role of SMTs in Increasing Production Output While Containing Emissions ..................... 34 
2.3.8. Role of PDTs and SMTs in Increasing Production Output While Containing Costs and 
Emissions ................................................................................................................................................ 35 
2.4. Empirical Study................................................................................................................... 36 
2.4.1. Panel Dataset Construction .................................................................................................... 36 
2.4.2. Coding Scheme for PDT and SMT ........................................................................................ 37 
2.4.2.1. Scheme............................................................................................................................... 38 
2.4.2.2. Process ............................................................................................................................... 38 
2.4.3. Construct Operationalization ................................................................................................. 39 
2.5. Results .................................................................................................................................. 39 
2.5.1. Descriptive Statistics .............................................................................................................. 39 
2.5.2. Estimation Results ................................................................................................................. 40 
2.5.3. Meaningfulness of Effects ..................................................................................................... 42 
2.5.4. Robustness ............................................................................................................................. 45 
2.6. Discussion ............................................................................................................................. 46 
2.6.1. Theoretical Implications ........................................................................................................ 47 
2.6.2. Practical Implications............................................................................................................. 49 
2.6.3. Future Research and Limitations ........................................................................................... 50 
2.6.4. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 51 
2.7. References ............................................................................................................................ 52 
2.8. Appendix 2.A ....................................................................................................................... 57 
3. Health Information Technology in U.S. Hospitals: How Much, How Fast? ................. 59 
3.1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 59 
3.2. Theoretical Development .................................................................................................... 64 
3.2.1. IT Capabilities ........................................................................................................................ 64 
3.2.2. IT Complementarities ............................................................................................................ 65 
3.3. Conceptual Model ............................................................................................................... 66 
3.3.1. CPM Capability ..................................................................................................................... 67 
3.3.2. Patient-Oriented Capabilities ................................................................................................. 68 
 8 
3.3.3. Hospital Performance............................................................................................................. 69 
3.4. Research Model and Hypotheses ....................................................................................... 71 
3.4.1. CPM Capability Effect on Hospital Performance .................................................................. 71 
3.4.2. Moderating Effect of Patient Capabilities on Hospital Performance..................................... 72 
3.4.3. CPM Capability’s Non-Linear Effect on Hospital Performance ........................................... 74 
3.4.4. Moderating Non-Linear Effect of Patient Capabilities on Hospital Performance ................. 75 
3.5. Empirical Study................................................................................................................... 77 
3.5.1. Panel Dataset Construction .................................................................................................... 77 
3.5.2. Construct Operationalization ................................................................................................. 79 
3.6. Analysis and Results ........................................................................................................... 82 
3.6.1. Descriptive Statistics .............................................................................................................. 82 
3.6.2. Analysis Procedure and Model Specifications ...................................................................... 82 
3.6.3. Results .................................................................................................................................... 83 
3.6.4. Interaction Plots ..................................................................................................................... 87 
3.6.5. Economic Significance .......................................................................................................... 89 
3.6.6. Robustness Tests .................................................................................................................... 90 
3.7. Discussion ............................................................................................................................. 92 
3.7.1. Theoretical Implications ........................................................................................................ 94 
3.7.2. Implications for Practice ........................................................................................................ 95 
3.7.3. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 95 
3.8. References ............................................................................................................................ 97 
3.9. Appendix 3.A ..................................................................................................................... 103 
3.9.1. Robustness Checks for Endogeneity .................................................................................... 103 
3.10. Appendix 3.B ............................................................................................................. 109 
3.10.1. Further Robustness of Results ............................................................................................. 109 
4. How do Aspiration Shortfalls Interact with Regulatory Incentives to Drive HIT 
Innovativeness in U.S. Hospitals? ............................................................................................ 114 
4.1. Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 114 
4.2. Theoretical Background ................................................................................................... 118 
4.2.1. Clinical Process Management .............................................................................................. 118 
4.2.2. IT-Enabled Clinical Process Management........................................................................... 118 
4.2.3. Innovativeness of IT-enabled Clinical Process Management .............................................. 119 
4.2.4. Role of Aspiration Shortfall and Problemistic Search in Innovativeness ............................ 120 
4.2.5. Role of Institutional Regulation in Innovativeness .............................................................. 121 
4.3. Hypothesis Development .................................................................................................. 123 
4.3.1. IT-enabled Clinical Process Management Innovativeness as Problemistic Search ............. 123 
4.3.2. Moderating Role of Regulatory Intervention ....................................................................... 124 
4.4. Empirical Study................................................................................................................. 126 
4.4.1. Panel Data Construction ...................................................................................................... 126 
4.4.2. Measures .............................................................................................................................. 127 
4.5. Analysis and Results ......................................................................................................... 132 
4.5.1. Analysis Procedure and Model Specification ...................................................................... 132 
4.5.2. Descriptive Statistics ............................................................................................................ 132 
4.5.3. Regression Results ............................................................................................................... 135 
4.5.4. Interaction Plots and Economic Significance ...................................................................... 138 
4.5.4.1. All Hospitals in our Sample............................................................................................. 138 
4.5.4.2. Reference Groups ............................................................................................................ 138 
4.5.5. Robustness Tests .................................................................................................................. 140 
4.6. Discussion ........................................................................................................................... 142 
 9 
4.6.1. Theoretical Implications ...................................................................................................... 142 
4.6.2. Implications for Practice ...................................................................................................... 144 
4.6.3. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 145 
4.7. References .......................................................................................................................... 147 
4.8. Appendix 4.A ..................................................................................................................... 152 
4.9. Appendix 4.B ..................................................................................................................... 158 
4.10. Appendix 4.C ............................................................................................................. 170 
 
List of Figures 
 
Figure 2.1: Output Set ................................................................................................................... 26 
Figure 2.2a: Firm Efficiency Over Time – Good Output: Net Generation, Bad Outputs: CO2 & 
Operating Expense ................................................................................................................ 45 
Figure 2.2b: Firm Inefficiency Over Time – Good Output: Net Generation, Bad Outputs: CO2 & 
Operating Expense ................................................................................................................ 45 
Figure 3.1: Conceptual Model .......................................................................................................66 
Figure 3.2a: Interaction Effect of Extent of Use of CPM * PE on Pneumonia Readmission Rate
............................................................................................................................................... 87 
Figure 3.2b: Interaction Effect of Extent of Use of CPM * PE on Operating Expense................ 87 
Figure 3.2c: Interaction Effect of Extent of Use of CPM * PE * PT on Operating Expense ....... 87 
Figure 3.3a: Interaction Effect of Rate of Growth of CPM2 * PE on Pneumonia Readmission Rate
............................................................................................................................................... 88 
Figure 3.3b: Interaction Effect of Rate of Growth of CPM2 * PE on Operating Expense ........... 88 
Figure 3.3c: Interaction Effect of Rate of Growth of CPM2 * PE * PT on Pneumonia Readmission 
Rate ....................................................................................................................................... 88 
Figure 3.3d: Interaction Effect of Rate of Growth of CPM2 * PE * PT on Operating Expense ... 88 
Figure 4.1: Research Model ........................................................................................................ 123 
Figure 4.2: Timeline of the HITECH Act ................................................................................... 131 
Figure 4.3a: Interaction Plot of CPM Saidin on Cost Aspiration Shortfall - All Hospitals ........ 139 
Figure 4.3b: Interaction Plot of CPM Saidin on Cost Aspiration Shortfall - Teaching Hospitals
............................................................................................................................................. 139 
Figure 4.3c: Interaction Plot of CPM Saidin on Cost Aspiration Shortfall - Non-Profit Hospitals
............................................................................................................................................. 139 
Figure 4.3d: Interaction Plot of CPM Saidin on Cost Aspiration Shortfall - Rural Hospitals .... 139 
Figure 4.3e: Interaction Plot of CPM Saidin on Cost Aspiration Shortfall - System Hospitals . 139 
 
List of Tables 
 
Table 1.1: Summary of Dissertation Essays:  Research Contexts, Theoretical Perspectives, 
Methods, and Implications .................................................................................................... 17 
Table 2.1: Characteristics of Smart Grid ...................................................................................... 28 
Table 2.2: Coding Scheme for Smart Grid Technology Investments ........................................... 37 
Table 2.3: Operational Measures .................................................................................................. 39 
Table 2.4: Descriptive Statistics ................................................................................................... 40 
Table 2.5: Correlation Matrix ....................................................................................................... 40 
Table 2.6: Parameter Estimates from Stochastic Frontier Analysis ............................................. 44 
 10 
Table 2.7: Estimates of Efficiency and Inefficiency ..................................................................... 45 
Table 2.A1: Parameter Estimates from Stochastic Frontier Analysis with Lagged Independent 
Variables ....................................................................................................................................... 57 
Table 2.A2: Simultaneous Equations Model Specification .......................................................... 58 
Table 3.1: HIT Capabilities and their Associated Components .................................................... 69 
Table 3.2:  Operationalization of Measures .................................................................................. 78 
Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics ................................................................................................... 81 
Table 3.4: Correlation Matrix ....................................................................................................... 81 
Table 3.5: Extent of Use of CPM - Fixed Effects Estimation Results .......................................... 85 
Table 3.6: Rate of Growth of Use of CPM - Fixed Effects Estimation Results ........................... 86 
Table 3.7: Economic Significant for Extent of Use of CPM and Patient Engagement ................ 89 
Table 3.8: Economic Significance for Extent of Use of CPM, Patient Engagement, and Patient 
Transition .............................................................................................................................. 89 
Table 3.9: Economic Significant for Rate of Growth of Use of CPM and Patient Engagement .. 90 
Table 3.10: Economic Significance for Rate of Growth of Use of CPM, Patient Engagement, and 
Patient Transition .................................................................................................................. 90 
Table 3.11: Summary of Extent of Use of CPM and Rate of Growth of Use of CPM Fixed Effects 
Results and Lag Effects ........................................................................................................ 91 
Table 3.A1: Extent of Use - Fixed Effects Estimation Results Lag 1 & 2 Years ....................... 104 
Table 3.A2: Rate of Growth Fixed Effects Estimation Results – Lag 1 and 2 Years ................. 105 
Table 3.A3: Reverse Causality – Extent of Use of CPM ............................................................ 106 
Table 3.A4: Reverse Causality – Rate of Growth of Use of CPM ............................................. 107 
Table 3.A5: Rate of Growth Quadratic Instrumental Variable Regression Results ................... 108 
Table 3.B1: Falsification Test: Average Treatment Effects - Propensity Score Matching on Extent 
of Use of CPM .................................................................................................................... 110 
Table 3.B2: Falsification Test: Average Treatment Effects - Propensity Score Matching on Rate 
of Growth of Use of CPM ................................................................................................... 110 
Table 3.B3: Hausman Test: Extent of Use of CPM .................................................................... 110 
Table 3.B4: Hausman Test: Rate of Growth of Use of CPM ..................................................... 110 
Table 3.B5: Extent of Use of CPM Random Effects Estimation Results ................................... 111 
Table 3.B6: Rate of Growth of Use of CPM Random Effects Estimation Results .................... 112 
Table 3.B7: Rate of Growth of Use of CPM Higher Order Effects ............................................ 113 
Table 4.1: Definition of Key Constructs ..................................................................................... 122 
Table 4.2: Operationalization of Measures ................................................................................. 127 
Table 4.3: Total Facility Expense Categories ............................................................................. 129 
Table 4.4: Descriptive Statistics ................................................................................................. 133 
Table 4.5: Correlation Matrix ..................................................................................................... 134 
Table 4.6: Summary of Results ................................................................................................... 136 
Table 4.7: Fixed Effects Regression Results for Cost Aspiration Shortfall on CPM Saidin Index
............................................................................................................................................. 136 
Table 4.8: Fixed Effects Regression Results for Cost Aspiration Shortfall Interactions Comparison 
of Reference Groups ........................................................................................................... 137 
Table 4.9: Summary of Key Findings and Contributions ........................................................... 146 
Table 4.A1: Fixed Effects Regression Results for Cost Aspiration Shortfall on CPM Saidin Index 
(Aspiration Level to Reduce Hospital Cost by 10%).......................................................... 152 
 11 
Table 4.A2: Fixed Effects Regression Results for Cost Aspiration Shortfall Interactions 
Comparison of Reference Group on CPM Saidin Index (Aspiration Level to Reduce Hospital 
Cost by 10%)....................................................................................................................... 153 
Table 4.A3: Fixed Effects Regression Results for Cost Aspiration Shortfall on CPM Saidin Index 
(Aspiration Level to Reduce Hospital Cost by 15%).......................................................... 154 
Table 4.A4: Fixed Effects Regression Results for Cost Aspiration Shortfall Interactions 
Comparison of Reference Group on CPM Saidin Index (Aspiration Level to Reduce Hospital 
Cost by 15%)....................................................................................................................... 155 
Table 4.A5: Fixed Effects Regression Results for Cost Aspiration Shortfall on CPM Saidin Index 
(Aspiration Level to Reduce Hospital Cost by 20%).......................................................... 156 
Table 4.A6: Fixed Effects Regression Results for Cost Aspiration Shortfall Interactions 
Comparison of Reference Group on CPM Saidin Index (Aspiration Level to Reduce Hospital 
Cost by 20%)....................................................................................................................... 157 
Table 4.B1: Fixed Effects Regression Results for Cost Aspiration Shortfall on CPM Saidin Index 
(Clustered SE by HSA) ....................................................................................................... 158 
Table 4.B2: Fixed Effects Regression Results for Cost Aspiration Shortfall Interactions 
Comparison of Reference Group on CPM Saidin Index (Clustered SE - HSA) ................ 159 
Table 4.B3: Fixed Effects Regression Results for Cost Aspiration Shortfall (Above and Below 
Mean) Comparison of Reference Group ............................................................................. 160 
Table 4.B4: Fixed Effects Regression Results for Cost Aspiration Shortfall (Above and Below 
Mean) * Conceptualization Phase Comparison of Reference Group ................................. 161 
Table 4.B5: Fixed Effects Regression Results for Cost Aspiration Shortfall (Above and Below 
Mean) * Enactment Phase Comparison of Reference Group ............................................. 162 
Table 4.B6: Fixed Effects Regression Results for Cost Aspiration Shortfall (Above and Below 
Mean) * Enforcement Phase Comparison of Reference Group .......................................... 163 
Table 4.B7 Fixed Effects Regression Results for Cost Aspiration Shortfall on CPM Saidin Index 
(Lag 1 Year) ........................................................................................................................ 164 
Table 4.B8: Fixed Effects Regression Results for Cost Aspiration Shortfall Interactions 
Comparison of Reference Group on CPM Saidin Index (Lag 1 Year) ............................... 165 
Table 4.B9: Fixed Effects Regression Results for Cost Aspiration Shortfall on CPM Saidin Index 
(90th Percentile) ................................................................................................................... 166 
Table 4.B10: Fixed Effects Regression Results for Cost Aspiration Shortfall Interactions 
Comparison of Reference Group on CPM Saidin Index (90th Percentile) .......................... 167 
Table 4.B11: Hausman Test: Cost Aspiration Shortfall ............................................................. 168 
Table 4.B12: Random Effects Regression Results for Cost Aspiration Shortfall on CPM Saidin 
Index ................................................................................................................................... 168 
Table 4.B13: Random Effects Regression Results for Cost Aspiration Shortfall Interactions 
Comparison of Reference Group on CPM Saidin Index .................................................... 169 
Table 4.C1: Sub-Group Frequency Table ................................................................................... 170 
Table 4.C2: Fixed Effects Regression Results for Cost Aspiration Shortfall on CPM Saidin Index 
Sub-Group Analysis ............................................................................................................ 170 
Table 4.C3: Fixed Effects Regression Results for Cost Aspiration Shortfall Interactions on CPM 
Saidin Index - Sub-Group Analysis .................................................................................... 171 
Table 4.C4: Fixed Effects Regression Results for Cost Aspiration Shortfall Interactions on CPM 
Saidin Index - Sub-Group Analysis .................................................................................... 172 
 
 
 12 
1. Introduction 
1.1. Motivation 
While information technology (IT) is now recognized to be a critical factor in performance for 
an organization, it is unclear how firms can achieve the desired performance outcomes using IT 
capabilities and how they can effectively promote IT-enabled innovativeness in the context of their 
changing institutional environment.  Previous research on the impacts of IT has linked investment 
in IT as well as IT capabilities to various outcomes, such as firm output (Barua et al. 1995; 
Brynjolfsson and Hitt 1996; Rai et al. 2006; Santhanam and Hartono 2003; Zhu and Kraemer 
2002), market perspectives (Bharadwaj 2000; Bharadwaj et al. 1999; Brynjolfsson and Yang 1997; 
Dos Santos et al. 1993; Hitt and Brynjolfsson 1996; Weill 1992), and firm risk (Dewan and Ren 
2011). As the world is becoming increasingly complex, a single measure of economic achievement 
has become inadequate to evaluate a firm’s success (Chen et al. 2009). Indeed, the triple bottom 
line (people, planet, and profit) requires firms to address the various goals simultaneously rather 
than independently (Porter and Kramer 2006). Although some of these studies use multiple 
dimensions of firm performance, they all use measures of business performance.  However, there 
may be conditions under which it is possible to achieve multiple outcomes that may be in tension 
at the same time that have been overlooked in the IT-value literature. IT plays a crucial role in both 
the Electric Utility and Healthcare Industry in supporting the multiple objectives firms must meet, 
from the green and business outcomes in the electric utility industry to patient cost and quality of 
care in healthcare. Under this vein, there is an increasing need to understand how in particular IT 
can be used to effectively and efficiently meet the needs of these firms. See Table 1.1 for a 
summary of dissertation essays. 
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1.2. Abstract of Essays 
1.2.1. Abstract of Essay 1 
Sustainability has emerged as a key area of interest in response to a growing concern 
surrounding the adverse effects of pollution, such as climate change and health problems. Given 
these concerns, we expand the consideration of Information Technology (IT) value that can be 
realized by firms from traditional bottom line measures to sustainability measures. We differentiate 
between two types IT innovations—production/distribution technologies (PDTs) that are 
embedded in the production and distribution process to automate, connect, control, and coordinate 
the physical transformation processes of raw materials and the physical transport of goods/services 
within and across the firm to customers and sense-making technologies (SMTs) that are focused 
on the capture, transfer, and analysis of data and information that allows firms to have better 
visibility of their complex production and distribution processes.  We then evaluate how they and 
their combination allows firms to simultaneously achieve green and business outcomes. We situate 
our empirical study in the context of the U.S. Electric Utility Industry (EUI). Firms in this industry 
have been investing heavily in the Smart Grid over the past decade due largely in part to federal 
and state incentive regulations to improve efficiency and facilitate environmental sustainability. 
Our data set was constructed by collating data from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC), Energy Information Association (EIA), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 
It contains approximately 250 firms from 2004-2015, with approximately 40,000 investment 
decisions. We use stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) to demonstrate how firms can invest in PDTs 
and SMTs to simultaneously meet multiple outcomes both good (net generation) and bad (carbon 
dioxide (CO2) emissions and operating expense). We find that 1) PDTs can help expand net 
generation while holding operating expenses constant, 2) SMTs can help expand net generation 
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while holding CO2 emissions constant, and 3) it is the complementary nature of PDTs and SMTs 
that allow utilities to expand net generation while holding both CO2 emissions and operating 
expenses constant. Firms display a large variation in their efficiency levels in part because of the 
technologies they deploy. Our study contributes to the IT business value and IS environmental 
sustainability literatures by showing how two distinct types of IT (PDT and SMT) can be used to 
simultaneously achieve business and green outcomes and has the potential to inform policy 
discourse on smart grid technologies.  
1.2.2. Abstract of Essay 2 
Hospitals are now faced with delivering value-based care (high quality patient care at a 
reduced cost) rather than volume-based care. We draw on the IT capabilities perspective from the 
resource based view of the firm (RBV) and complementarities perspectives with a coordination 
focus to theorize how the impact of IT capabilities—specifically, (1) a hospital’s Clinical Process 
Management capability and (2) the hospital’s rate of growth of Clinical Process Management 
capability, conditioned on two patient capabilities (Patient Engagement and Patient Transition)—
affect hospital performance. We collated data from multiple sources for approximately 5,000 U.S. 
hospitals from 2008 – 2014 on the use of different HIT functionalities (which we use to proxy for 
IT-enabled capabilities), hospital characteristics, patient quality of care, specifically pneumonia 
readmission rate, and patient cost of care, operating expense. Our results suggest that hospitals 
should focus on the complementarities between their Clinical Process Management, Patient 
Engagement, and Patient Transition capabilities to reduce either pneumonia readmission rates or 
operating expense as well as adjust the pace of their Clinical Process Management capability 
conditional on the two patient capabilities to better improve outcomes. We reveal that the business 
value to IT in processes involving multiple stakeholders needing to coordinate their expertise in 
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delivering service is better understood through an integrated capabilities-complementarities 
perspective with a coordination lens than through any of them individually. We offer key 
theoretical and empirical insights related to the rate of development of IT capability and how the 
impacts of an IT capability are conditional on related IT capabilities. 
1.2.3. Abstract of Essay 3 
Strategic choices about information technology (IT) enabled process innovation are becoming 
increasingly relevant in the healthcare industry as hospitals are pushing to redesign their processes 
with the intent to decrease costs and increase efficiency. We draw on the Behavioral Theory of the 
Firm and Institutional Theory to theorize (1) the influence of aspiration shortfall of Cost of Care 
on IT-enabled Clinical Process Management Innovativeness and (2) how this relationship changes 
based on the progression of a regulatory intervention from Conceptualization to Enactment to 
Enforcement. Our empirical study is situated in the U.S. healthcare industry. We draw on multiple 
sources of data, including the American Hospital Association Annual Survey and IT Supplement 
as well as the Centers of Medicare and Medicaid, to construct a panel dataset of approximately 
5,000 hospitals from 2007—2014. Our results indicate that a cost aspiration shortfall increases 
hospital innovativeness for system-affiliated hospitals and that when a hospital experiences a cost 
aspiration shortfall it increases hospital HIT innovativeness more so when moving from the 
Conceptualization Phase to the Enactment Phase. These insights add to our understanding of how 
a hospital’s innovativeness can be influenced through incentives in the regulatory environment 
when experiencing an aspiration shortfall. 
1.3. Contribution 
The three-essay dissertation elaborates on the business value of IT and IT innovativeness 
in large institutional settings (the U.S. Electric Utility Industry and the U.S. Healthcare Industry) 
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with changing regulatory conditions.  Collectively, our findings contributes to the overall 
information systems literature as well as the business value of IT and IT capabilities by (1) drawing 
on production theory and the sense-making perspective to assess the performance of a firm in terms 
of the simultaneous increase in the production of a good output while keeping bad outputs steady, 
(2) adopting a coordination focus of IT capabilities and complementarities among capabilities to 
understand why it is not only the level of a capability but also the rate of its growth that affects 
business value and why the rate of growth can be too fast or too slow based on the level of 
complementary capabilities, and (3) integrating the behavioral theory of the firm and institutional 
theory’s problemistic search mechanism to understand how a cost aspiration shortfall can drive 
strategic IT choices. 
In a broader sense, IT is enabling firms in both the electric utility industry and the 
healthcare industry to meet multiple interdependent outcomes that may be in tension by facilitating 
better access to data and information as well as by enabling innovations in how interdependent 
tasks are controlled and coordinated. In the context of electric utilities, this mean better real-time 
demand-supply management, which improves efficiency, as well as better integration of 
distributed generation, which reduces reliance on greenhouse gas producing inputs.  In the context 
of healthcare, IT is being used to increase healthcare efficiency, i.e., streamline the healthcare 
process, as well as integrate patient information, which can improve healthcare quality. 
Accordingly, IT is playing a critical role in allowing the firms in these industries to meet the 
changing needs of their multiple stakeholders. 
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Table 1.1: Summary of Dissertation Essays:  Research Contexts, Theoretical Perspectives, Methods, and Implications 
  Essay 1 Essay 2 Essay 3 
Context 
Social context 
U.S. Electric Utility Industry – 
Smart Grid Innovations 
U.S. Healthcare Industry  U.S. Healthcare Industry 
Technological context 
Production/Distribution 
Technologies; Sense-Making 
Technologies 
HIT Capabilities IT-Enabled Innovativeness 
Interested Outcome Green and Business Outcomes Patient Quality and Cost of Care 
IT-Enabled Clinical Process 
Management Innovativeness 
Theory 
Informing Theoretical 
Perspectives 
Production Theory; Sense-making 
Perspective; Theory of 
Complementarities 
IT Capabilities; Theory of 
Complementarities 
Behavioral Theory of the Firm; 
Institutional Theory 
Method 
Data Sources 
Energy Information Association 
(EIA); Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC); 
Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) 
American Hospital Association 
(AHA) Annual Survey; AHA IT 
Supplement; Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid (CMS) 
AHA Annual Survey; AHA IT 
supplement; CMS 
Sample 
Panel Data of investor-owned 
electric utilities (N~250) from 
2004-2015 with ~40,000 
investment decisions 
Panel data of ~5,000 general 
surgical and medical hospitals 
from 2008 - 2014 
Panel data of ~5,000 general 
surgical and medical hospitals 
from 2007 - 2014 
Level of Analysis Firm Level  Firm Level 
Multi-Level: Firm Level and 
Regulatory Institutional Level  
Analysis Approach 
Stochastic Frontier Analysis – 
Multiple Output 
Panel Data Analysis Panel Data Analysis 
Implications 
Business Value of IT 
Move the discourse from business 
vs. sustainability to business and 
sustainability and furthermore, 
how both can be achieved 
Consideration of non-linear 
returns to IT capabilities 
development (Rate of Growth) 
Decision to innovate in IT as a 
means to address a cost aspiration 
shortfall is conditional on the 
regulatory environment 
Complementarities 
The combination of both 
technologies can simultaneously 
achieve the expansion of a good 
outcome while holding multiple 
bad outcomes constant 
Impact of an IT capability is 
conditional on a portfolio of 
interdependent IT capabilities 
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2. How Can IT Enable the Simultaneous Pursuit of Green and 
Business Outcomes?: An Investigation of Smart Grid 
Technologies 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Attention to sustainability issues has emerged as a key area of interest in recent years due 
to widespread public concern about the environment. This concern has risen in response to growing 
awareness of issues such as climate change and health effects that arise from pollution. For 
example, emissions, such as carbon dioxide (CO2), sulfur dioxide (SO2), and nitrogen oxide (NOx) 
are suggested to impair human health and the environment. In particular, these emissions when 
combined in the atmosphere form fine particles, which contribute to an “increased incidence of 
premature death, aggravation of respiratory and cardiovascular illness (which can lead to 
hospitalizations and emergency room (ER) visits for children and those with heart or lung disease), 
decreased lung function and symptomatic effects (including acute bronchitis, particularly in 
children and asthmatics), and increased work loss days, school absences, and emergency room 
visits” (EPA 2014). Furthermore, emissions contribute to acidic compounds, which harm lakes 
and streams (i.e., making it difficult for some fish and other aquatic species to survive, grow, and 
reproduce), as well as forests and trees (i.e., acid rain, which can chemically alter the soil) (EPA 
2014). Additionally, large amounts of nitrogen deposits can damage coastal water quality causing 
massive die-offs of marine plants and animals (EPA 2014). These effects are non-trivial. 
According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), federal funding for climate 
                                                 
 An earlier version was presented at AMCIS 2014 – Savannah, GA. Pye, J. and Rai, A. 2014. 
"How Can IT enable the Simultaneous Pursuit of Green and Business Outcomes?: An 
Investigation of Smart Grid Innovations" Proceedings from 20th Americas Conference on 
Information Systems, Savannah, GA. 
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change research has increased from $2.4 billion in 1993 to $11.6 billion in 2014, with an additional 
$26.1 billion for climate change programs and activities provided by the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009, focusing on three main categories: technology to reduce emissions, 
science to better understand climate change, and international assistance for developing countries. 
Yet this number does not account for the increased health costs that are associated with emissions, 
such as increased ER visits or incidence of asthma. Therefore, there is a vested interest in 
investigating sustainability.  
With “green” or “sustainable” outcomes becoming increasingly relevant, a single bottom 
line measure of economic achievement has become inadequate as a criterion to evaluate a firm’s 
success (Chen et al. 2009). Indeed, the triple bottom line (people, planet, and profit) requires firms 
to address the various goals simultaneously rather than independently (Porter and Kramer 2006). 
In an interview of CEO Muhtar Kent of Coca Cola, he sums up corporate social responsibility with 
regards to sustainability, “You cannot preserve and promote any sustainability efforts in the world 
today if they don’t have an economic benefit also” (Ignatius 2011). Therefore, to respond to the 
societal challenge of sustainability, firms need to simultaneously achieve business and green 
outcomes.  
In the past, most sustainability research has been focused around the factors that 
promote/inhibit sustainable business practices (Corbett and Kirsch 2001), the association between 
sustainable business practices and outcomes (Montabon et al. 2007), supply chains (Quak and 
Koster 2007), and green product development (Chen 2001). While the sustainability has gained 
increasing attention in the above areas, research in Information Systems (IS) examining how IT 
resources can help develop sustainability and green outcomes has been limited (Melville 2010; 
Watson et al. 2010). To date, most research on the impact of IT has focused on the link between 
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investment in IT to various economic outcomes, such as firm output (productivity (Brynjolfsson 
and Hitt 1996) and organizational performance (Barua et al. 1995; Rai et al. 2006a; Santhanam 
and Hartono 2003; Zhu and Kraemer 2002)), market perspectives (consumer welfare (Hitt and 
Brynjolfsson 1996), accounting profit (Bharadwaj 2000; Weill 1992), and market valuation 
(Bharadwaj et al. 1999b; Brynjolfsson and Yang 1997; Dos Santos et al. 1993)), and firm risk 
(Dewan and Ren 2011). Although some of these studies use multiple dimensions of firm 
performance, they all use measures of business performance.  However, there may be conditions 
under which it is possible to achieve both business and green outcomes at the same time that have 
been overlooked in the IT-value literature even though it may seem “logically impossible to 
maximize in more than one dimension at the same time unless the dimensions are monotone 
transformations of one another” (Jensen 2002). These outcomes are not independent but 
interdependent, requiring firms to re-consider how they can use IT to efficiently meet the needs of 
both green and business outcomes. 
We distinguish between two types of technologies: production/distribution and sense-
making. Production/distribution technologies (PDT) enable the physical transformation processes 
of raw materials and the physical transport of goods/services within and across the firm to 
customers. For example, in the Electric Utility Industry (EUI), supervisory control and data 
acquisition (SCADA) systems have replaced manual labor and processes to perform electric 
distribution tasks with automated equipment to maintain desired operating conditions. Whereas, 
sense-making technologies (SMT) enable a firm to turn an ongoing complex world into a “situation 
that is comprehended explicitly in words and that serves as a springboard into action” (Weick et 
al. 2005, p. 409). SMTs achieve this through the granular observation and analysis of behaviors in 
a system. For example, they can generate greater visibility of the physical stocks and flows, and 
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events/exceptions associated with the production process. Furthermore, they can be used to 
understand the end-to-end sourcing-production-distribution process, to improve awareness of how 
the process is actually executed versus how it is described, and to discern patterns of usage from 
large quantities of information. While prior research has revealed that IT can be used for sense-
making, e.g., enhance inter-organizational relationships (Im and Rai 2013) and explain pre- and 
post-adoptive usage behavior (Hseish et al. 2011), few studies have focused on the complementary 
nature of investments in production/distribution and sense-making technologies. If firms invest in 
both of these technologies then they can potentially maximize efficiency, reliability, resiliency, 
and stability, while at the same time being environmentally conscious, i.e., reducing emissions.  
As firms expand their relevant outcome set from business outcomes to include green 
outcomes, the opportunity for IT to build awareness and foster learning about how to produce and 
distribute goods and services more efficiently while meeting objectives related to green outcomes 
also increases. While we understand that creating value from IT resources requires investments in 
a mutually reinforcing system of technologies (Aral and Weill 2007; Rai and Tang 2010; 
Tanriverdi 2006),  it is important to uncover how PDTs and SMTs can simultaneously affect green 
and business outcomes, thereby addressing a key problem standing in the way of sustainability 
initiatives: the argument that these outcomes are in tension and cannot be effectively managed 
simultaneously. Our focus on investments directed at PDTs and SMTs, in contrast to the aggregate 
level of IT investments as in much IT impacts work and consistent with other recent studies, 
enables us to tease apart the nature of the interdependencies between these two classes of IT in 
achieving green and business outcomes. Thereby safeguarding against the deadly mistake in 
managing IT investments wherein complements and substitutes are conflated (Milgrom and 
Roberts 1995a; Rai and Tang 2010; Siggelkow 2001; Sinha and Van de Ven 2005). More 
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specifically, we are interested in how PDTs with SMTs can effectively achieve business and green 
outcomes simultaneously, since we have seen that IT can enable the process of learning, which 
gains importance when there is a greater level of interdependence between decision choices 
(Levinthal 1997). Motivated by these gaps, we focus on the following research question: How can 
SMTs and PDTs jointly optimize business and green outcomes?  
Our study is situated in the U.S. electric utility industry and we theorize and develop our 
hypotheses within this context. First, we introduce our investigative context. Second, we build a 
production model of efficiency for a multi-input system with multiple outcomes. Third, we 
elaborate how we think about technology, separating PDTs and SMTs. Finally, we build on both 
production theory and sense-making perspective to theorize how PDTs and SMTs can be used to 
meet multiple objectives.  We test our hypotheses by collating data from multiple sources for 
approximately 250 electric generating firms from 2004-2015. Our approach enhances our 
understanding of the link between IT, business value, and sustainability in the electric utility 
industry by investigating how PDTs and SMTs can be used to achieve green and business 
outcomes. 
2.2. Investigative Context 
We situate our study in the U.S. EUI. This is an ideal setting for our study as it enables us 
to control for product characteristics given that electricity is a unique commodity: it cannot be 
efficiently stored and its characteristics are standardized and differ only in the production location. 
Therefore, supply has to match demand at any time period to avoid shortages, i.e., production and 
consumption happen simultaneously. As a commodity, electricity can be traded in volume and can 
experience price volatility. Also, there are regulatory standards on service reliability (e.g., to 
safeguard against brownouts/blackouts) that must be adhered to. This industry is also the primary 
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source of greenhouse gas emissions (29 % in 2015) mostly due to the fact that approximately 67% 
of electricity comes from burning fossil fuels, mostly coal and natural gas (EPA 2017). 
The EUI has a three-stage linear value chain: power generation, transmission (long-haul 
transmission from generation facilities to distribution sites), and distribution (distribution sites to 
consumers). We focus on investor-owned power generation firms in the EUI. To position this 
choice in context, there are approximately 210 investor-owned electric utilities, 2009 publicly-
owned electric utilities, 883 consumer owned rural electric cooperatives and 9 Federal electric 
utilities. Total generating capacity was approximately 1,167 Gigawatts (2015) for the industry as 
a whole. In 2015, the annual revenue from electric operations from major U.S. investor-owned 
electric utilities was $243 billion (EIA 2011). Investor owned electric utilities represent 6% of the 
total number of electric utilities and approximately 36% of utility installed capacity, 39% of 
generation, 68% of customers, 53% of sales and 59% of revenue in the U.S., while publicly owned 
utilities represent about 61% of utilities, 11% of generating capacity, 10% of generation, 15% of 
customers, 15% of sales and 15% of revenue (EIA 2016). Thus, it is appropriate to focus on 
investor-owned firms as they represent the largest fraction of generation, sales, and revenue. 
The EUI is governed by various agencies. At the federal level, the Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) collects, analyzes, and publicizes energy information that promotes 
policymaking and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) regulates interstate 
transmission of natural gas, oil, and electricity. Interstate sales of electricity on the wholesale 
market and by public utilities (e.g., investor-owned utilities, power marketers, independent power 
producers, and non-exempt electric cooperatives) are subject to regulation by FERC. 
 24 
2.3. Theoretical Development 
Two major theoretical perspectives provide the foundation for this study. First, the theory 
of production suggests that if a firm implements a capital resource, such as technology, then it can 
help the firm improve efficiency, reduce costs, and produce more output for a given quantity of 
input (Anderson et al. 2011). In particular, we focus on the efficiency of a multiple input-output 
system with desirable and undesirable objectives. Second, we integrate the sense-making 
perspective to conceptualize two types of technologies that can be used to jointly optimize multiple 
outcomes.  
2.3.1. Efficiency of Multiple Input Systems with Desirable and Undesirable 
Outputs 
 Although there have been some studies that have examined the impact of IT on efficiency 
(Lee and Barua 1999; Shao and Lin 2002), they have not studied the impact of IT where there are 
multiple outcomes (good and bad) to be optimized. We draw on previous research that has 
attempted to model both good and bad outputs (Fare et al. 2005; Fernandez et al. 2002; Forsund 
2009) and explicitly model Smart Grid technologies as a non-separable production process in 
which good and bad outcomes are joint outputs. Here, outcomes are represented by the output set 
P(x) which denotes the set of good and bad outputs that can be jointly produced from the input 
vector x, 
𝑃(𝑥) = {(𝑦, 𝑏, 𝑐) ∶ 𝑥 𝑐𝑎𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒 (𝑦, 𝑏, 𝑐)}. 
In the context of our study, there is one good output, net generation of electricity (y), and two 
undesirable outputs, CO2 and operating expense (b and c, respectively). Inputs are denoted by x 
and include capital, labor, and technology. Furthermore, the production set P has the following 
properties: 
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Inputs are freely disposable so that an increase in inputs will not decrease output 
If 𝑥′ ≥ 𝑥 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑃(𝑥′) ⊇ 𝑃(𝑥) 
Good and bad outputs are weakly disposable, i.e., for given inputs x, bad outputs can be reduced 
if good outputs are reduced in proportion 
If (𝑦, 𝑏, 𝑐) ∈ 𝑃(𝑥) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 0 ≤ 𝜃 ≤ 1 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 (𝜃𝑦 , 𝜃𝑏 , 𝜃𝑐) ∈ 𝑃(𝑥). 
Free disposability of good output, i.e., if an observed good and bad output vector is feasible, then 
any output vector with less of the good output is also feasible 
If (𝑦, 𝑏, 𝑐) ∈ 𝑃(𝑥) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝑦′, 𝑏, 𝑐) ≤ (𝑦, 𝑏, 𝑐) 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 (𝑦′, 𝑏, 𝑐) ∈ 𝑃(𝑥). 
The good output must be accompanied by bad outputs because of null-jointness 
If (𝑦, 𝑏, 𝑐) ∈ 𝑃(𝑥) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑏 = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑐 = 0, 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑦 = 0. 
Figure 2.1 is an illustration of a typical output set satisfying the above conditions. Suppose we 
have two firms, both with given levels of inputs (x), one producing an output bundle of good and 
bad outputs at a and the other at b (note that our output set intersects both axes at zero and is thus 
consistent with null-jointness). From above, each input vector x produces an output set P(x), which 
consists of both good and bad outputs. By imposing the restriction that good and bad outputs are 
weakly disposable, we assume that a firm must forgo some production of good output if it wants 
to also reduce bad outputs. Thus, this restriction allows us to model the opportunity cost of 
reducing the bad outputs. 
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When there are multiple outputs, the preferred model is the directional output distance function as 
it does not require price or explicit behavioral expectations. Thus, we let g=(gy,gb,gc) be a 
directional vector which indicates the expansion of net generation in the direction of gy, the 
reduction of CO2 in the direction of gb, and the reduction of net operating expense in the direction 
of gc. The directional distance function can be defined as ?⃗? 𝑜(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑏, 𝑐; 𝑔𝑦 , −𝑔𝑏 , −𝑔𝑐) = max {𝛽 ∶
(𝑦 + 𝛼𝑔𝑦 , 𝑏 − 𝛼𝑔𝑏 , 𝑐 − 𝛼𝑔𝑐) ∈ 𝑃(𝑥). 
The above function aims to simultaneously maximize the reduction in bad outputs (b and 
c) and the expansion of good output (y). An advantage to using this approach is that the directional 
output distance function allows for one output to expand while the others are contracted. 
Furthermore, this function is also a measure of efficiency since it simultaneously accounts for 
emissions and cost reduction and improves net generation. The translog and quadratic functional 
forms can both be used to calculate the directional distance function. However, the translog form 
depicts simultaneously proportionate transformation of good and bad outputs. Whereas the 
quadratic form allows for the increase in the good output while decreasing the bad output at the 
same time. 
b 
a 
c 0 u(bad) 
y(good) 
P(x) 
Figure 2.1: Output Set 
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 First, we impose linear homogeneity conditions and rewrite the distance function 
D=f(x,y,b,c) as 𝐷𝑜𝑦1
−1 = 𝑓(𝑥, ?̃?) 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑦?̃? = (
𝑏
𝑦
,
𝑐
𝑦
). 
Then we take the log of both sides to obtain 𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑜–  𝑙𝑛𝑦 =  𝑙𝑛𝑓(𝑥, ?̃?). Then assuming the quadratic 
form of 𝑙𝑛𝑓(𝑥, ?̃?) we obtain 
𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑜–  𝑙𝑛𝑦 = 𝛽0 + ∑𝛽𝑘 ln 𝑥𝑗
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where ?̃?1 =
𝑏
𝑦
 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ?̃?2 =
𝑐
𝑦
 . We also impose symmetry restrictions: 𝛽𝑗𝑘 = 𝛽𝑘𝑗 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛾𝑚𝑙 = 𝛾𝑙𝑚 . The 
quadratic output distance function can be made stochastic by adding a two-sided noise term . 
Furthermore, denoting ln D00 by - and moving it to the right-hand side, we get an estimable 
equation in which the error term is  + . 
 In sum, this approach allows us to model a firm’s efficiency with the level of good and bad 
outputs relative to the specified inputs of capital, labor, and technology. 
2.3.2. The Smart Grid  
The official modernization of the U.S. EUI can be traced back to the Energy Independence 
and Security Act of 2007, which defined the Smart Grid based on the characteristics outlined in 
Table 2.1. This was the first major legislation that outlined policy for the implementation of a 
comprehensive Smart Grid. The Smart Grid consists of controls, computer automation, and new 
technologies and equipment working together (DOE 2013) to align supply and demand (i.e., 
disruptive technological innovations are not tolerated) as electricity cannot be easily stored. In 
short, the Smart Grid is a class of technology people are using to bring the utility electricity 
 28 
delivery systems into the 21st century, using computer-based remote control and automation (DOE 
2013) with the goal of maintaining reliability and infrastructure protection.   
Table 2.1: Characteristics of Smart Grid 
(1) Increased use of digital information and controls technology to improve reliability, 
security, and efficiency of the electric grid.  
(2) Dynamic optimization of grid operations and resources, with full cyber-security.  
(3) Deployment and integration of distributed resources and generation, including renewable 
resources.  
(4) Development and incorporation of demand response, demand-side resources, and energy-
efficiency resources.  
(5) Deployment of `smart' technologies (real-time, automated, interactive technologies that 
optimize the physical operation of appliances and consumer devices) for metering, 
communications concerning grid operations and status, and distribution automation.  
(6) Integration of `smart' appliances and consumer devices.  
(7) Deployment and integration of advanced electricity storage and peak-shaving technologies, 
including plug-in electric and hybrid electric vehicles, and thermal storage air conditioning.  
(8) Provision to consumers of timely information and control options.  
(9) Development of standards for communication and interoperability of appliances and 
equipment connected to the electric grid, including the infrastructure serving the grid.  
(10) Identification and lowering of unreasonable or unnecessary barriers to adoption of smart 
grid technologies, practices, and services. 
Source: Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 
 
Early investments in the Smart Grid included technologies for electronic control, advanced 
meter reading, and remote monitoring. However, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
of 2009 included provisions to further modernize the Smart Grid by allocating the Department of 
Energy (DOE) $4.5 billion.  Under the largest program, the Smart Grid Investment Grant, the DOE 
and the electric industry have jointly invested $8 billion in cost-shared projects to modernize the 
grid, improve interoperability, and collect data on Smart Grid operations. 
In sum, the electric utility Smart Grid context is ideal to conceptualize and measure a firm’s 
PDTs and SMTs for the production and distribution of electricity as well as also examining how 
these technologies can be used to improve good and reduce bad outcomes. 
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2.3.3. Conceptualization of PDT and SMTs  
Firms are challenged to develop and implement effective technologies that enable them to 
achieve multiple objectives that may be in tension. In particular, these technologies play a critical 
role because information provides the basis to manage physical process (e.g., production or 
distribution) in an organization (Ramaprasad and Rai 1996). Accordingly, we differentiate 
between the following Smart Grid technologies: production/distribution technology (PDT) and 
sense-making technology (SMT) that enables learning about PDT. In our context, the Smart Grid 
has become a network of interconnections supported by PDTs that manage electricity and SMTs 
that manage information about electricity. 
PDT technologies are concerned with the efficiency of physical processes, which consume 
energy. In the past, these technologies have been largely confined to labor substitution and 
automation, but Smart Grid PDTs are embedded in and used to automate, connect, and coordinate 
the production and distribution process across locations and firm boundaries.  They can include 
advanced hardware components and information technologies for control to improve efficiency. 
PDTs can range from a modular substation automation system that delivers intelligent electronic 
device station bus integration to an enterprise Energy Management or Distribution Management 
System which can improve efficiency through more advanced monitoring and control. 
Distinct from PDTs and drawing on the sense-making perspective, SMTs are purely 
informational and focus on the capture, transfer, and analysis of data and information. Historically, 
during the industrial age, organizations were primarily focused on production and distribution 
technologies, for example, even though steam engine technology was available to manufacturers, 
it was still cheaper to feed 500 horses than use it until the advent of a more energy-efficient steam 
engine (Greenwood 1999).  However, with the advent of the information age, contemporary 
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organizations focus more on sense-making which has broadly been described as the process of 
finding meaning from information (Weick 1995).  Certain information technologies have the 
potential to bring meaning to huge volumes of data and information (Waldrop 2003) and those that 
do, can be thought of as SMTs. Furthermore, SMTs allow organizations to not only capture and 
transfer data and information, but to also analyze it. In particular, these technologies allow the 
capture of information to support faster, more accurate responses for matching supply and demand, 
transfer of information to connect components to open architecture for real-time information and 
control, and inform actions based on the diagnosis and evaluation of the distribution and 
production system. For example, automatic meter reading or smart meters enable two-way 
communication between the meter and centralized power operator, which can allow for real-time 
power consumption data to be tracked for better load management as well as informing customers 
so they can better manage their energy consumption.  
Collectively, these Smart Grid technologies (PDTs and SMTs) could allow for more 
efficient transmission of electricity, quicker restoration of electricity after power disturbances, 
reduced operations and management costs for utilities, lower power costs for consumers, 
reduced peak demand (which will also help lower electricity rates), increased integration of large-
scale renewable energy systems, better integration of customer-owner power generation systems, 
including renewable energy systems, and improved security (DOE 2013).  
2.3.4. Business Outcomes 
Firms that are able to leverage their technological investments enjoy superior business 
outcomes by either increasing firm revenues and/or decreasing firm costs (Bharadwaj 2000). Value 
of IT with respect to various business financial outcomes has previously been studied extensively, 
such as ROA, Tobin’s Q, and Revenue (Bharadwaj 2000; Bharadwaj et al. 1999b; Devaraj and 
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Kohli 2003; Dewan and Ren 2011; McKeen and Smith 1993; Rai et al. 2006a). We have seen that 
operational measures of expense have also been used as an important dimension of business 
outcomes, such as total cost, operating expense, and operating cost efficiency ratio (Dedrick et al. 
2003; Harris and Katz 1991; McFarlane 1984).  
 However, a meaningful selection of a business outcome needs to be informed by the 
context in which IT business value is being studied. Given the regulated nature of the electric 
utility industry, which is the context of this study, decoupling or revenue caps were introduced as 
a way to determine the amount of revenues a utility should collect and to set an appropriate price 
to collect the target revenue (Shirley and Taylor 2009). Furthermore, since individual state 
commissions for electric utilities in the U.S. determine a utility’s revenue requirement, the revenue 
caps can vary from state to state. Therefore, for electric utilities, certain traditional measures of 
profitability (such as revenue) are not as meaningful in this context. However, given that the 
product electric utilities produce (electricity) is homogeneous and differs only in the location of 
production, firms also want to maximize how much electricity they actually produce or net 
generation. Therefore, in our context, the key measures of business success are the maximization 
of net generation and the minimization of operational expenses. 
2.3.5. Green Outcomes 
Thus far, there has been limited research in IS examining how IT can help firms meet green 
outcomes (Melville 2010; Watson et al. 2010), motivating us to include it along with business 
outcomes in our investigation. Green outcomes have been used extensively to measure the impact 
of a firm on the natural environment from inputs consumed to outputs generated, such as the usage 
of natural resources like coal or the emissions of pollutants (Russo and Pogutz 2009). In particular, 
researchers have conceptualized green outcomes using both indirect and direct indicators. Direct 
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indicators quantify consumption and the impact using measures such as the reduction of emissions 
from the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) published by the U.S. Environment Protection Agency 
(EPA) (Hart and Ahuja 1996; Montabon et al. 2007). Indirect indicators proxy for a firm’s impact 
on the environment, such as environmental awards or lawsuits (Klassen and McLaughlin 1996; 
Konar and Cohen 2001). 
 In the EUI, there are a variety of opportunities to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
associated with electricity generation, distribution, and transmission. For instance, electric utilities 
can reduce emissions by increasing efficiency of existing power plants by using advanced and 
improved technologies. For example, firms can change out old coal burning plants (which are the 
leading source of CO2 emissions) with cleaner alternative energy sources that pollute less, such as 
natural gas. The big push on electric or clean-burning diesel engines is also in response to reducing 
toxic air pollutants. While there are many greenhouse gases that affect our environment, such as 
methane, nitrous oxide, and fluorinated gases, we choose to focus on the minimization of carbon 
dioxide (CO2) as it accounts for approximately 81% of total emissions from human activities (EPA 
2017).  
2.3.6. Role of PDTs in Increasing Production Output While Controlling Costs  
 We expect that firms can use PDTs to improve production output relative to costs.  As we 
have seen in other industries, firms exhibit heterogeneity in their ability to embed IT into core 
production and distribution processes.  For example, in the airline industry, firms varied in their 
ability to develop computerized reservation systems to control their distribution channels 
(Christiaanse and Venkatraman 2002). Thus, variation in how PDTs are used can occur among 
firms in an industry.  
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 The DOE’s Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability published an extensive 
review of The Smart Grid and laid down the nature and opportunities for key Smart Grid 
technologies in terms of efficiency improvement (DOE 2008). Additionally, other research has 
shown that various embedded production and distribution technologies enable a more energy-
efficient supply chain (Erol-Kantarci and Mouftah 2011; Gungor et al. 2011; Molderink et al. 
2010). In particular, automation and coordination of the production and distribution process are 
the primary ways in which firms create a more energy-efficient supply chain (i.e., reducing 
production and distribution losses as well as transmission congestion, all of which maximizes the 
use of installed capacity of the system). For instance, the complete automation of all controllable 
equipment and functions in the distribution system as well as the interoperability between 
communication and control capabilities results in added functionality and improved efficiency 
(Gellings 2009). For example, a simple recovery steam generator can capture exhaust heat from a 
turbine that would otherwise escape through an exhaust stack and reuses it to create more steam, 
which in turn generates more electricity, thus improving efficiency by expanding output (more 
electricity) without increasing costs. Another example of a PDT is a Supervisory Control and Data 
Acquisition (SCADA) System. This is a control system that was developed as a means to remotely 
access a variety of control modules through standard automation protocols and can increase net 
generation by making real-time strategic decisions to regulate voltages, optimal power flows, 
and/or generation. Furthermore, several companies are currently attempting to demonstrate how 
the use of these production and distribution technologies can increase efficiency.  For example, in 
2010 the San Diego Gas & Electric started conducting a pilot scale proof-of-concept test of how 
advanced distributed energy management can increase asset utilization by allowing more power 
to be delivered through existing infrastructure (DOE 2010). As of 2016, they are continuing to 
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integrate and aggregate batteries, fuel cells, solar, generators, and other distributed energy 
resources for the enhanced reliability of microgrid energy management which improves overall 
net generation by displacing conventional generation with distributed alternative resources 
(SDG&E 2016). Thus, we expect investments in PDTs to increase production output while holding 
costs constant, which leads us to hypothesize: 
H1: PDT increases net generation while holding costs constant. 
2.3.7. Role of SMTs in Increasing Production Output While Containing 
Emissions 
We expect that firms can use SMTs to improve production output while containing 
emissions. Given the increasing push for cutting greenhouse gas emissions under policies such as 
the Clean Air Act, Clean Power Plan, and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, firm are 
increasingly expected to reduce their emissions.  Therefore, firms need to learn more about how 
they generate and produce electricity. Since sense-making technologies allow for the collection 
and analysis of data and information, they have the potential to increase the visibility of the 
production processes especially in an environment characterized by high interdependence between 
customers, the firm, and suppliers. In the EUI context, firms now need to coordinate production 
and distribution across a complex network of wholesale markets, regulators, and customers (QER 
2015), making learning and sense-making about this complex system very important. SMTs give 
organizations a more holistic view and therefore, more opportunities to learn about their 
production and distribution system with a focus on multiple objectives including increasing 
production output and limiting emission output. SMTs should allow firms to discover weaknesses 
and areas of improvement and learn how to produce more electricity efficiently while not adversely 
impacting emissions. For example, sensors can capture, store, and alert workers if operating 
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temperature falls below the sulfuric acid dew point ensuring that sulfuric acid is not created and 
can also reduce operating expense by eliminating the need for acid-resistant pumps/turbines. Past 
research has shown that technologies that provide more information about the production, 
distribution, and consumption process enable firm efficiency (DOE 2008; Gungor et al. 2011; Hu 
et al. 2014). For example, demand response systems can dynamically and continuously balance 
demand with supply-side resources ensuring load optimization, which reduces emissions due to 
over-generation. Additionally, companies have been attempting to demonstrate how certain sense-
making technologies can be used to reduce emissions.  For example, the Consolidated Edison 
Company of New York consolidated data from disparate systems and integrated and displayed 
them in a central control operator using decision support tools, thus helping operators to identify 
problem areas and prioritize actions that increase energy reliability and efficiency (DOE 2010). 
More recently, they have continued to develop and implement effective system monitoring and 
modeling to improve their information base and to better understand performance trends on 
specific asset classes (conEdison 2017). Therefore, we hypothesize: 
H2: SMT increases net generation while holding emissions constant. 
2.3.8. Role of PDTs and SMTs in Increasing Production Output While 
Containing Costs and Emissions  
 We expect that firms can use PDTs and SMTs together to improve production output while 
containing both emissions and costs. These technological investments are mutually reinforcing 
and firms can incur penalties in outcomes when they overlook interactions between two related 
technologies or mistake them for substitutes (Milgrom and Roberts 1995a; Rai and Tang 2010). In 
particular, certain resource combinations may have supper-additive value, i.e., the benefits of the 
combination of resources exceeds the sum of the resources individually (Milgrom and Roberts 
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1995b). Smart Grid technologies are relatively novel, making it important to focus not only on 
innovations in production and distribution but also on the ability to learn about how to effectively 
use these novel technologies that are implemented. For example, a demand response system (PDT) 
might automate a firm’s response to increased demand, but if the firm were to also implement 
demand-side management systems (SMT) in conjunction, then they would be able to anticipate 
demand spikes/slumps and ramp up/down production accordingly, thus containing costs and 
emissions. Additionally, electric utilities are continually attempting to manage a performance 
landscape with interdependent outcomes. Given the above arguments, we propose the following 
hypothesis: 
H3: PDT and SMT together increase net generation while holding both emissions and costs 
constant. 
2.4. Empirical Study 
2.4.1. Panel Dataset Construction 
Our dataset is comprised of firm-level data for approximately 250 firms with 26,341 
significant Smart Grid investments across all firms from 2004-2015. Firm-level data was collected 
from the Energy Information Administration (EIA), the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). From the EIA, we collated data from 
Form 923 which collects detailed electric power data on electricity generation and fuel 
consumption at the power plant and aggregated up to create a firm level variable. FERC requires 
all major electric utilities to file Form 1 annually. A major electric utility is defined as having (1) 
one million megawatt hours or more; (2) 100 megawatt hours of annual sales for resale; (3) 500 
megawatt hours of annual power exchange delivered; or (4) 500 megawatt hours of annual 
wheeling for others (deliveries plus losses) (FERC 2014). The firms who file Form 1 produce 
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approximately 80% of the electricity in the United States. Form 1 is a comprehensive financial and 
operating report. In this report, firms are required to disclose all major investments (defined as 
investments that are greater than 5% of the total construction-work-in-progress and greater than 
$100,000) undertaken by a firm in a given year. We extracted Form 1 data, financial and operating 
reports, filed with FERC from 2004-2015. While each firm is required to annually file Form 1, we 
found that there was little uniformity of investment descriptions. We clarified these discrepancies 
via phone interviews with various conformity officers at the various firms. Data was also collected 
from the Environmental Protection Agency. The EPA requires all fossil-fuel-fired steam electric 
generating units of more than 73 megawatts (MW) heat input rate (250 million British thermal 
units per hour (MMBtu/hr)) to report emission statistics (72 FR 32717, June 13, 2007). Data from 
the EIA allowed for the integration of this data across the three sources.  
2.4.2. Coding Scheme for PDT and SMT 
Our coding scheme is summarized in Table 2.2.  We now elaborate on the process to code 
the investments and validate the coding. 
Table 2.2: Coding Scheme for Smart Grid Technology Investments 
Type of 
Investment 
Decision Rule Applied to Investment Illustrative Technologies 
PDT 
Is the investment in an integrated 
system that automates, connects, 
controls, or coordinates the production 
and distribution process across 
locations and firm boundaries? If yes, 
the firm made the decision to invest in 
production and distribution technology 
to improve physical processes. 
• High voltage direct current 
• Distributed energy generation and storage 
devices 
• Supervisory control and data acquisition 
(SCADA) 
• Substation automation 
SMT 
Is the investment in an integrated 
system that allows for the capture, 
transfer, and analysis of data and 
information within and across the firm 
boundaries? If yes, the firm made the 
decision to invest in sense-making 
technology to finding meaning from 
information. 
• Advanced microprocessor meters (smart 
meter) 
• Time-of-use and real-time pricing tools 
• Remote monitoring 
• Demand-side management 
• Customer information systems 
• Energy management systems 
• Simulators for operational training 
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2.4.2.1. Scheme 
A coding criterion was developed to determine if an investment was directed at a PDT, 
SMT, maintenance (i.e., those investments which supported the maintenance of the grid and 
evolved incrementally meaning they did not shift the capabilities of the grid), or other (investments 
that cannot be categorized due to lack of available information). These categories are mutually 
exclusive and collectively exhaustive in describing all firm investments.  
2.4.2.2. Process 
To facilitate the coding process, keywords were developed from the existing data. By 
examining the current data set as a whole, certain action words were repeated and thus selected as 
keywords. These keywords are appropriate as they are derived from the firm’s reported pattern of 
actions. Therefore, while the researchers may have selected the keywords, the nature of the 
reported investment (self-reported line entries) reduces the selection bias. 
One of the researchers randomly selected 5 companies over 3 years (2008-2010) to test the 
validity of the coding scheme. Any discrepancies found were discussed by both researchers. We 
then trained another coder, a graduate student in information systems, on the classification rules 
and randomly assigned her 5 companies over 3 years (approximately 200 investments). The initial 
interrater reliability for the coded 2004-2006 data was 80.1%, which was unacceptable. After 
clarifications, two more iterative rounds of sample coding were done with different randomly 
assigned companies (i.e., a different set of 5 firms over 3 years) with interrater reliability increasing 
from 83.4% to and acceptable rate of 95.8% (Neuendorf 2002). The remainder of the coding was 
allocated to the graduate student. To ensure the validity of the coding, we randomly inspected 
approximately 20% of the coded data once the coding was complete and detected only a few 
discrepancies, which were resolved by consulting the literature and through discussion.  
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2.4.3. Construct Operationalization 
Table 2.3 presents the operationalization of measures.  
Table 2.3: Operational Measures 
Variables 
Descriptions Source 
Name Type 
Net Generation  
Good 
Output 
Firm aggregated net generation, exclusive of 
plant use (MWh) in a given year 
FERC 
Operating Expense  Bad Output 
Total utility operating expense by a firm in a 
given year 
CO2 Bad Output 
Firm aggregated carbon dioxide emissions (tons) 
in a given year 
EPA 
SMT Technology 
Dollar amount spent by a firm in a given year on 
technologies that capture, transfer, and analyze 
information derived from the grid 
FERC 
PDT Technology 
Dollar amount spent by a firm in a given year on 
technologies that are integrated in the production 
and distribution process that automate, connect, 
control, or coordinate across locations and firm 
boundaries 
Fuel Usage – Coal Capital 
Total consumption of coal in million British 
thermal unit (MMBtus) in a given year 
EIA 
Fuel Usage – 
Natural Gas 
Capital 
Total consumption of natural gas in million 
British thermal unit (MMBtus) in a given year 
Employees Labor 
Firm aggregated number of employees in a given 
year 
FERC 
 
2.5. Results 
2.5.1. Descriptive Statistics 
We present the descriptive statistics in Table 2.4 and pairwise correlation matrix in Table 
2.5. There is considerable variation in our sample with the top 10% of firms in terms of PDT and 
SMT investments having twice the mean. We also see variation in our outcome variables, net 
generation, CO2, and total utility operating expense as well as decreased emissions and increased 
operating expense over the years. There is also a decline in fuel usage of coal and a corresponding 
increase in natural gas, which is consistent with the increased availability of natural gas (decreased 
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price) and renewable power. We also see high variance in SMT and PDT as these can be huge 
capital investments. 
Table 2.4: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Net Generation (MWh) 1535 13,255,453 7,208,894 17,865,398 (132,491) 118,641,464 
CO2 (tons) 820 11,020,545 4,756,061 14,368,368 0 95,969,744 
Total Utility Operating 
Expense 
2524 $1,190,095,662 $512,457,600 $1,839,554,348 $(844,873) $15,030,585,344 
Total Fuel – Coal 
(MMBtus) 
831 146,744,504 113,000,000 135,834,909 0 896,000,000 
Total Fuel – Natural Gas 
(MMBtus) 
1122 28,522,732 9,550,373 59,865,079 0 636,000,000 
Employees 1228 654 345 834 1 4,897 
PDT 1674 $43,275,369 $10,100,000 $108,080,825 $20 $1,490,000,000 
SMT 1443 $15,712,675 $3,883,027 $42,618,903 $1,000 $626,000,000 
  
Table 2.5: Correlation Matrix 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 Net Generation (MWh) 1       
2 CO2 (tons) 0.858* 1      
3 
Total Utility Operating 
Expense 
0.672* 0.460* 1     
4 
Total Fuel – Coal 
(MMBtus) 
0.858* 0.961* 0.608* 1    
5 
Total Fuel – Natural Gas 
(MMBtus) 
0.566* 0.299* 0.452* 0.095* 1   
6 Employees 0.866* 0.771* 0.633* 0.730* 0.310* 1  
7 PDT 0.283* 0.226* 0.382* 0.312* 0.088* 0.254* 1 
8 SMT 0.312* 0.241* 0.350* 0.185* 0.184* 0.301* 0.279* 
Note: * p<0.05 
 
2.5.2. Estimation Results 
 The Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) parameter estimates are presented in Table 2.6, 
efficiency and inefficiency estimates are summarized in Table 2.7, and efficiency and inefficiency 
estimates over time are shown in Figure 2.2a-b. The directional distance function gives us the 
maximum expansion of the good output (net generation) and the contraction of the bad outputs 
(emissions and cost), which serves as a measure of inefficiency. In the equations below, we include 
the good and both bad outcomes (𝑦1, ?̃?2, and ?̃?3, respectively), and built out the following 
equations: Model A includes capital (x1 and x2) and labor (x3) without PDT (x4) or SMT (x5); 
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Model B includes capital, labor, and PDT; Model C includes capital, labor, and SMT; Model D 
includes capital, labor, PDT, and SMT.  
−𝑙𝑛𝑦1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑥1 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑥2 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝑥3 + 𝛾2𝑙𝑛?̃?2 + 𝛾3𝑙𝑛?̃?3 +
1
2
[𝛽11𝑙𝑛𝑥1
2 + 𝛽22𝑙𝑛𝑥2
2 +
𝛽33𝑙𝑛𝑥3
2] + 𝛽12𝑙𝑛𝑥1𝑙𝑛𝑥2 + 𝛽13𝑙𝑛𝑥1𝑙𝑛𝑥3 + 𝛽23𝑙𝑛𝑥2𝑙𝑛𝑥3 +
1
2
[𝛾22𝑙𝑛?̃?2
2 + 𝛾33𝑙𝑛?̃?3
2] +
𝛾23𝑙𝑛?̃?2𝑙𝑛?̃?3 + 𝛿12𝑙𝑛𝑥1𝑙𝑛?̃?2 + 𝛿22𝑙𝑛𝑥2𝑙𝑛?̃?2 + 𝛿32𝑙𝑛𝑥3𝑙𝑛?̃?2 + +𝛿𝟏𝟑𝑙𝑛𝑥1𝑙𝑛?̃?3 +
𝛿23𝑙𝑛𝑥2𝑙𝑛?̃?3 + 𝛿33𝑙𝑛𝑥3𝑙𝑛?̃?3  
Model A 
  
−𝑙𝑛𝑦1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑥1 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑥2 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝑥3 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑛𝑥4 + 𝛾2𝑙𝑛?̃?2 + 𝛾3𝑙𝑛?̃?3 +
1
2
[𝛽11𝑙𝑛𝑥1
2 +
𝛽22𝑙𝑛𝑥2
2 + 𝛽33𝑙𝑛𝑥3
2 + 𝛽44𝑙𝑛𝑥4
2] + 𝛽12𝑙𝑛𝑥1𝑙𝑛𝑥2 + 𝛽13𝑙𝑛𝑥1𝑙𝑛𝑥3 + 𝛽14𝑙𝑛𝑥1𝑙𝑛𝑥4 +
𝛽23𝑙𝑛𝑥2𝑙𝑛𝑥3 + 𝛽24𝑙𝑛𝑥2𝑙𝑛𝑥4 + 𝛽34𝑙𝑛𝑥3𝑙𝑛𝑥4 +
1
2
[𝛾22𝑙𝑛?̃?2
2 + 𝛾33𝑙𝑛?̃?3
2] + 𝛾23𝑙𝑛?̃?2𝑙𝑛?̃?3 +
𝛿12𝑙𝑛𝑥1𝑙𝑛?̃?2 + 𝛿22𝑙𝑛𝑥2𝑙𝑛?̃?2 + 𝛿32𝑙𝑛𝑥3𝑙𝑛?̃?2 + 𝛿42𝑥4𝑙𝑛?̃?2 + 𝛿𝟏𝟑𝑙𝑛𝑥1𝑙𝑛?̃?3 + 𝛿23𝑙𝑛𝑥2𝑙𝑛?̃?3 +
𝛿33𝑙𝑛𝑥3𝑙𝑛?̃?3 + 𝛿43𝑙𝑛𝑥4𝑙𝑛?̃?3  
Model B 
  
−𝑙𝑛𝑦1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑥1 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑥2 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝑥3 + 𝛽5𝑙𝑛𝑥5 + 𝛾2𝑙𝑛?̃?2 + 𝛾3𝑙𝑛?̃?3 +
1
2
[𝛽11𝑙𝑛𝑥1
2 +
𝛽22𝑙𝑛𝑥2
2 + 𝛽33𝑙𝑛𝑥3
2 + 𝛽55𝑙𝑛𝑥5
2] + 𝛽12𝑙𝑛𝑥1𝑙𝑛𝑥2 + 𝛽13𝑙𝑛𝑥1𝑙𝑛𝑥3 + 𝛽15𝑙𝑛𝑥1𝑙𝑛𝑥5 +
𝛽23𝑙𝑛𝑥2𝑙𝑛𝑥3 + 𝛽25𝑙𝑛𝑥2𝑙𝑛𝑥5 + 𝛽35𝑙𝑛𝑥3𝑙𝑛𝑥5 +
1
2
[𝛾22𝑙𝑛?̃?2
2 + 𝛾33𝑙𝑛?̃?3
2] + 𝛾23𝑙𝑛?̃?2𝑙𝑛?̃?3 +
𝛿12𝑙𝑛𝑥1𝑙𝑛?̃?2 + 𝛿22𝑙𝑛𝑥2𝑙𝑛?̃?2 + 𝛿32𝑙𝑛𝑥3𝑙𝑛?̃?2 + 𝛿52𝑙𝑛𝑥5𝑙𝑛?̃?2 + 𝛿𝟏𝟑𝑙𝑛𝑥1𝑙𝑛?̃?3 + 𝛿23𝑙𝑛𝑥2𝑙𝑛?̃?3 +
𝛿33𝑙𝑛𝑥3𝑙𝑛?̃?3 + 𝛿53𝑙𝑛𝑥5𝑙𝑛?̃?3  
Model C 
  
−𝑙𝑛𝑦1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑥1 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑥2 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝑥3 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑛𝑥4 + 𝛽5𝑙𝑛𝑥5 + 𝛾2𝑙𝑛?̃?2 + 𝛾3𝑙𝑛?̃?3 +
1
2
[𝛽11𝑙𝑛𝑥1
2 + 𝛽22𝑙𝑛𝑥2
2 + 𝛽33𝑙𝑛𝑥3
2 + 𝛽44𝑙𝑛𝑥4
2 + 𝛽55𝑙𝑛𝑥5
2] + 𝛽12𝑙𝑛𝑥1𝑙𝑛𝑥2 + 𝛽13𝑙𝑛𝑥1𝑙𝑛𝑥3 +
𝛽14𝑙𝑛𝑥1𝑙𝑛𝑥4 + 𝛽15𝑙𝑛𝑥1𝑙𝑛𝑥5 + 𝛽23𝑙𝑛𝑥2𝑙𝑛𝑥3 + 𝛽24𝑙𝑛𝑥2𝑙𝑛𝑥4 + 𝛽25𝑙𝑛𝑥2𝑙𝑛𝑥5 + 𝛽34𝑙𝑛𝑥3𝑙𝑛𝑥4 +
𝛽35𝑙𝑛𝑥3𝑙𝑛𝑥5 + 𝛽45𝑙𝑛𝑥4𝑙𝑛𝑥5 +
1
2
[𝛾22𝑙𝑛?̃?2
2 + 𝛾33𝑙𝑛?̃?3
2] + 𝛾23𝑙𝑛?̃?2𝑙𝑛?̃?3 + 𝛿12𝑙𝑛𝑥1𝑙𝑛?̃?2 +
𝛿22𝑙𝑛𝑥2𝑙𝑛?̃?2 + 𝛿32𝑙𝑛𝑥3𝑙𝑛?̃?2 + 𝛿42𝑙𝑛𝑥4𝑙𝑛?̃?2 + 𝛿52𝑙𝑛𝑥5𝑙𝑛?̃?2 + 𝛿𝟏𝟑𝑙𝑛𝑥1𝑙𝑛?̃?3 + 𝛿23𝑙𝑛𝑥2𝑙𝑛?̃?3 +
𝛿33𝑙𝑛𝑥3𝑙𝑛?̃?3 + 𝛿43𝑙𝑛𝑥4𝑙𝑛?̃?3 + 𝛿53𝑙𝑛𝑥5𝑙𝑛?̃?3  
Model D 
 
Where y1 is net generation, ?̃?2 is emissions divided by net generation, ?̃?3 is operating expense 
divided by net generation, x1 is coal fuel usage, x2 is natural gas fuel usage, x3 is total employees, 
x4 is PDT, and x5 is SMT. We also estimated three variations of the above directional distance 
function models (A-D): (1) with one bad output, CO2, (2) with the second bad output, operating 
expense, and (3) with both bad outputs. 
When we evaluate one good output, net generation, and one bad output, operating expense, 
we find a negative and significant coefficient on PDT (4=-0.452, p<0.10).  Although this 
coefficient is negative, the left-hand side of our equation is also negative, therefore a 1% increase 
in PDT increases net generation by 0.452%, while holding operating expense constant.  Therefore, 
we find support for H1. When we evaluate one good output, net generation, and the other bad 
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output, CO2, we find a negative and significant coefficient on SMT (5=-0.262, p<0.10). Thus, a 
1% increase in SMT leads to an increase in net generation of 0.262%, while holding CO2 emissions 
constant. Therefore, we find support for H2.  When we evaluate one good output, net generation, 
and both bad outputs, CO2 and operating expense, we find a negative and significant coefficient 
on PDT*SMT (45=-0.007, p<0.10), which indicates that a 1% increase in PDT*SMT leads to an 
increase in net generation of 0.007%, while holding CO2 emissions and operating expense 
constant. Thus, we find support for H3. 
2.5.3. Meaningfulness of Effects 
 When ?⃗? 𝑜(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑏, 𝑐; 1, −1,−1)̂ = 0, the firm operates on the frontier of P(x). When we 
evaluate operating expense as the only bad output and only add PDT into the model, inefficiency 
drops from 0.083 (Model A) to 0.058 (Model B), reducing operating expense by $12,813,131 on 
average across all firms.  The mean estimate of inefficiency indicates that net generation could be 
expanded by 0.058 * 7,208,894= 421,408 MWh, while operating expense could be contracted by 
0.058 * $512,457,600= $29,956,580 if firms were to operate efficiently.  When we evaluate CO2 
as the only bad output and only add SMT into the model, inefficiency drops from 0.153 (Model 
A) to 0.138 (Model C), reducing CO2 emissions by 69,809 tons on average across all firms.  The 
mean estimate of inefficiency indicates that net generation could be expanded by 0.138 * 
7,208,894= 995,327 MWh, while CO2 emissions could be contracted by 0.138 * 4,756,061 = 
656,666 tons if firms were to operate efficiently. When we add SMT in Model D for both bad 
outputs, inefficiency drops from 0.143 (Model B) to 0.130 (Model D), reducing CO2 emissions by 
61,829 tons and operating expense by $6,661,949 on average across all firms. The mean estimate 
of inefficiency indicates that net generation could be expanded by 0.130 * 7,208,894 = 937,156 
MWh, while CO2 could be contracted by 0.130 * 4,756,061 = 618,288 tons and operating expense 
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could be reduced by 0.130 * $512,457,600 = $66,619,488 if firms were to operate efficiently. 
Overall, our estimates of inefficiency indicate that CO2 emissions and operating expense could be 
significantly reduced by firms adopting the best practice methods of the frontier firms.  
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Table 2.6: Parameter Estimates from Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
 
Good Output: Net Generation 
Bad Output: Operating Expense 
Good Output: Net Generation 
Bad Output: CO2 
Good Output: Net Generation 
Bad Output: CO2 & Operating Expense 
Model A Model B Model C Model D Model A Model B Model C Model D Model A Model B Model C Model D 
Coal 
-0.253 0.084 0.953* 1.057** -0.239 1.223*** -1.403*** -0.339 -0.890* 1.308** -1.530** -0.272 
(0.550) (0.537) (0.553) (0.543) (0.419) (0.412) (0.485) (0.487) (0.547) (0.514) (0.626) (0.610) 
NG 
-0.771*** -0.462** -0.421** -0.466** -0.316** -0.305*** -0.307** -0.403*** -0.388** -0.175 -0.307* -0.351** 
(0.216) (0.228) (0.206) (0.223) (0.129) (0.116) (0.135) (0.126) (0.154) (0.145) (0.162) (0.158) 
Employees 
0.130 -0.475 -0.843 -1.046* -0.509 -1.168*** 0.372 0.113 -0.407 -1.689*** 0.079 -0.510 
(0.579) (0.604) (0.583) (0.601) (0.362) (0.345) (0.388) (0.372) (0.508) (0.472) (0.528) (0.512) 
PDT 
 -0.452*  -0.234  0.072  0.026 
 
-0.068 
 
0.009 
 (0.269)  (0.273)  (0.142)  (0.156) 
 
(0.208) 
 
(0.255) 
SMT 
  -0.322 -0.502*   -0.262* -0.329** 
  
-0.289 -0.468** 
  (0.258) (0.28)   (0.161) (0.152) 
  
(0.216) (0.230) 
(Coal)2 
-0.130*** -0.158*** -0.181*** -0.208*** -0.102*** -0.179*** -0.021 -0.091*** -0.086** -0.211*** -0.028 -0.119*** 
(0.025) (0.026) (0.028) (0.029) (0.032) (0.031) (0.036) (0.036) (0.034) (0.033) (0.038) (0.038) 
(Coal) * (NG) 
0.073*** 0.043*** 0.047*** 0.041*** 0.035*** 0.029*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.038*** 0.022** 0.035*** 0.032*** 
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.01) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010) 
(Coal) * (Employees) 
0.028 0.047* 0.045 0.059** 0.08*** 0.101*** 0.020 0.029 0.082*** 0.139*** 0.036 0.066** 
(0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.026) (0.028) (0.027) (0.031) (0.029) (0.031) (0.030) 
(Coal) * (PDT) 
 0.054***  0.047***  -0.006  0.002 
 
0.007 
 
0.008 
 (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.011)  (0.013) 
 
(0.013) 
 
(0.015) 
(Coal) * (SMT) 
  0.035** 0.028**   0.002 0.012 
  
0.011 0.017 
  (0.015) (0.015)   (0.011) (0.011) 
  
(0.013) (0.011) 
(NG)2 
-0.031*** -0.031*** -0.026*** -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.027*** -0.022*** -0.025*** -0.024*** -0.026*** -0.022*** -0.023*** 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
(NG) * (Employees) 
-0.048*** -0.01 -0.024* -0.013 -0.002 0.003 -0.014 -0.013 -0.010 0.003 -0.015 -0.012 
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.009) (0.009) (0.01) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) 
(NG) * (PDT) 
 0.001  -0.001  0.007**  0.005* 
 
0.008*** 
 
0.005* 
 (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.003) 
(NG) * (SMT) 
  -0.006 -0.002   0.001 0.004 
  
-0.001 0.002 
  (0.004) (0.005)   (0.003) (0.004) 
  
(0.003) (0.003) 
(Employees)2 
-0.056* -0.013 -0.050 -0.029 -0.126*** -0.091*** -0.085** -0.065** -0.117*** -0.098*** -0.077** -0.06* 
(0.034) (0.035) (0.037) (0.037) (0.034) (0.032) (0.034) (0.032) (0.035) (0.032) (0.034) (0.032) 
(Employees) * (PDT) 
 -0.058***  -0.049***  -0.002  0.001 
 
-0.018 
 
-0.009 
 (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.011)  (0.012) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.013) 
(Employees) * (SMT) 
  -0.011 0.002   0.010 0.004 
  
-0.002 -0.005 
  (0.017) (0.017)   (0.012) (0.011) 
  
(0.013) (0.012) 
(PDT)2 
 -0.013  -0.016**  0.000  -0.003 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.005 
 (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
(PDT) * (SMT) 
   0.000    -0.007* 
   
-0.007* 
   (0.006)    (0.004) 
   
(0.004) 
(SMT)2 
  0.000 0.003   0.009 0.005 
  
0.008 0.003 
  (0.008) (0.008)   (0.006) (0.006) 
  
(0.006) (0.006) 
(Coal) * (CO2)  
    -0.011 0.065** -0.098*** -0.038 -0.022 0.090*** -0.098*** -0.017 
    (0.032) (0.030) (0.033) (0.032) (0.033) (0.031) (0.035) (0.034) 
(Coal) * (Operating Expense) 
0.153*** 0.098 0.063 0.022     0.073** 0.037 0.017 0.027 
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.050)     (0.035) (0.032) (0.037) (0.040) 
(NG) * (CO2)  
    -0.018 -0.003 -0.020 -0.007 -0.013 0.005 -0.022* -0.005 
    (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) 
(NG) * (Operating Expense)  
0.026** 0.027* 0.029** 0.038***     0.011 -0.006 0.012 0.004 
(0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014)     (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
(Employees) * (CO2)  
    -0.047 -0.116*** 0.049 -0.012 -0.059* -0.160*** 0.034 -0.053 
    (0.033) (0.030) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.031) (0.034) (0.033) 
(Employees) * (Operating 
Expense) 
0.042 0.112** 0.130** 0.178***     -0.023 0.024 0.021 0.039 
(0.055) (0.054) (0.052) (0.052)     (0.038) (0.034) (0.037) (0.035) 
(PDT) * (CO2) 
     0.089***  0.080*** 
 
0.084*** 
 
0.089*** 
     (0.014)  (0.016) 
 
(0.013) 
 
(0.015) 
(PDT) * (Operating Expense) 
 -0.014  -0.023     
 
0.002 
 
-0.002 
 (0.020)  (0.020)     
 
(0.015) 
 
(0.018) 
(SMT) * (CO2) 
      -0.013* -0.026*** 
  
-0.020*** -0.035*** 
      (0.007) (0.009) 
  
(0.007) (0.008) 
(SMT) * (Operating Expense) 
  -0.048** -0.021     
  
-0.003 -0.005 
  (0.020) (0.022)     
  
(0.017) (0.016) 
(CO2)/(Net Generation) 
    1.968*** -0.574 3.205*** 1.183** 2.830*** -0.275 3.822*** 1.475** 
    (0.385) (0.471) (0.499) (0.578) (0.501) (0.541) (0.650) (0.655) 
(Operating Expense)/(Net 
Generation) 
-4.377*** -3.603*** -2.696*** -2.33***     -1.337** -1.119** -0.672 -1.150* 
(0.735) (0.739) (0.721) (0.718)     (0.627) (0.579) (0.639) (0.679) 
(CO2)2 
    0.028*** 0.003 0.035*** 0.021*** 0.022*** -0.005 0.037*** 0.019*** 
    (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) 
(CO2) * (Operating Expense) 
        -0.148*** -0.119*** -0.088** -0.101*** 
        (0.046) (0.038) (0.046) (0.038) 
(Operating Expense)2 
0.195*** 0.209*** 0.238*** 0.226***     -0.014 0.062 0.021 0.085 
(0.052) (0.053) (0.053) (0.055)     (0.058) (0.061) (0.061) (0.071) 
Constant 
9.191 6.928 -3.906 -1.672 0.058 -12.144*** 9.934*** 1.728 9.198* -8.556* 13.520** 5.050 
(6.136) (6.222) (6.082) (6.174) (3.099) (3.143) (3.732) (3.797) (5.130) (4.670) (5.844) (5.513) 
u sigmas         
    
Deregulation 
-0.721*** -0.866**  -1.341 -0.520* -0.773** -0.479 -0.967*** -0.394 -0.632** -0.285 -0.770** 
(0.267) (0.443)  (1.917) (0.298) (0.306) (0.327) (0.369) (0.288) (0.301) (0.317) (0.340) 
Constant 
-1.199** -1.525** -13.223 -2.790* -3.149*** -3.131*** -3.364*** -3.327*** -3.184*** -3.253*** -3.493*** -3.407*** 
(0.533) (0.700) (615.944) (1.519) (0.189) (0.158) (0.207) (0.186) (0.176) (0.153) (0.212) (0.171) 
v sigmas         
    
Constant 
-2.682*** -2.727*** -2.768*** -2.845*** -4.296*** -4.880*** -4.608*** -4.884*** -4.463*** -4.984*** -4.703*** -5.100*** 
(0.068) (0.071) (0.060) (0.068) (0.163) (0.203) (0.195) (0.205) (0.165) (0.191) (0.194) (0.203) 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10; standard errors in parentheses; time variables and interactions are not reported for brevity 
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Figure 2.2a: Firm Efficiency Over Time – Good 
Output: Net Generation, Bad Outputs: CO2 & 
Operating Expense 
Figure 2.2b: Firm Inefficiency Over Time – Good 
Output: Net Generation, Bad Outputs: CO2 & 
Operating Expense 
 
2.5.4. Robustness 
We conducted a variety of robustness checks to strengthen the validity of our findings by 
examining our stochastic frontier analysis using lagged independent variables as well as evaluating 
a simultaneous equations model specification. Both of these findings support our hypothesis that 
it is the combination of PDT and SMT that can be used to meet multiple goals.  
 Lag Effects: We lagged the input variables in the distance function for one year (See Appendix 
Table 2.A1). The parameters are statistically significant, yet slightly smaller than in the original 
model. This indicates that firms exhibit temporal stability with respect to efficiency over time. 
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Table 2.7: Estimates of Efficiency and Inefficiency 
Models 
Efficiency Inefficiency 
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev 
Good Output: Net Generation 
Bad Output: CO2 
Model A 0.865 0.073 0.153 0.100 
Model B 0.866 0.082 0.151 0.111 
Model C 0.876 0.068 0.138 0.090 
Model D 0.879 0.073 0.135 0.098 
Good Output: Net Generation 
Bad Output: Operating Expense 
Model A 0.927 0.081 0.083 0.105 
Model B 0.947 0.065 0.058 0.079 
Model C 0.999 0.000 0.001 0.000 
Model D 0.983 0.028 0.018 0.030 
Good Output: Net Generation 
Bad Output: CO2 & Operating 
Expense 
Model A 0.867 0.074 0.151 0.102 
Model B 0.873 0.078 0.143 0.105 
Model C 0.882 0.065 0.131 0.086 
Model D 0.883 0.073 0.130 0.098 
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Alternative Model Specification: We check the robustness of our results by setting up simultaneous 
equations for CO2 emissions and total operating expense (See Appendix Table 2.A2). We find 
significance for PDT*SMT for both CO2 emissions and total operating expense.  In particular, 
PDT*SMT reduces CO2 emissions by 0.079% (375,729 tons) and operating expense by 0.027% 
($13,836,355). Overall, our estimates of using simultaneous equations are generally consistent 
with our SFA findings. 
2.6. Discussion 
Driven by the increasing focus on meeting both green and business outcomes, we 
considered multiple outputs, both good and bad, and look at efficiency from a multi-objective 
efficiency perspective. In developing our contributions, we were cognizant of the unique 
characteristics of electricity by theorizing in the electric utility industry.  Though traditional 
research has focused on aggregated IT investments (Bharadwaj 2000; Bharadwaj et al. 1999a; 
Brynjolfsson and Hitt 1996; Hitt and Brynjolfsson 1996), one cannot overlook that technologies 
can be meaningfully classified (Aral and Weill 2007).  Furthermore, firms must now meet the 
triple bottom line (people, planet, and profit) simultaneously rather than independently (Porter and 
Kramer 2006). Therefore, responding to the societal challenge of sustainability, firms need to 
simultaneously achieve business and green outcomes. Thus, this study sought to expand our 
scholarly understanding how two types of technology – PDTs and SMTs – can be used to meet 
both business and green outcomes. 
Drawing on an extensive panel dataset of approximately 250 firms from 2004-2015, with 
approximately 40,000 investment decisions, our analysis revealed 1) PDTs help utilities meet their 
business outcomes, 2) SMTs help utilities meet their green outcomes, and 3) it is the combination 
of PDTs and SMTs that allow utilities to meet both business and green outcomes. Our findings 
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support our first two hypotheses as well as our third hypothesis that it is the marginal return to 
business and green outcomes from PDT increases with complementary increases in SMT. Of most 
interest was the meaningfulness of our results, as this translates our findings into real world results, 
i.e., increasing net generation while holding CO2 emissions and operating expense constant.  Our 
results have further implications for our understanding about the creation of value (business and 
green) from PDTs and SMTs, which we discuss below. 
2.6.1. Theoretical Implications   
By surfacing how two technologies can impact multiple interdependent outcomes (both 
good and bad), we contribute to the business value of IT literature (Barua et al. 2004a; Barua et al. 
1995; Brynjolffson and Hitt 2000; Brynjolfsson and Hitt 1996; Dedrick et al. 2003; Dewan and 
Min 1997; Melville et al. 2004). We extend past research that has demonstrated that firms can 
leverage IT to impact various business outcomes, such as ROA, Tobin’s Q, and Revenue 
(Bharadwaj 2000; Bharadwaj et al. 1999b; Devaraj and Kohli 2003; Dewan and Ren 2011; 
McKeen and Smith 1993; Rai et al. 2006a) by expanding our consideration to business and green 
outcomes. Furthermore, there has been limited research in IS on how IT can help firms to meet 
green outcomes (Melville 2010; Watson et al. 2010).  Research in sustainability has been largely 
directed at the impact of the firm on the environment, such as the emissions of pollutants or 
environmental lawsuits filed (Hart and Ahuja 1996; Klassen and McLaughlin 1996; Konar and 
Cohen 2001; Montabon et al. 2007; Russo and Pogutz 2009). Thus, we move the discourse from 
business vs. sustainability to business and sustainability and furthermore, how both can be 
simultaneously achieved. 
Additionally, we extend past work that has shown how capabilities create business value 
(Barua et al. 2004b; Bharadwaj et al. 2007; Rai et al. 2006b) by surfacing how IT resources and 
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capabilities can help with the attainment of both business and green outcomes. Our results reveal 
that PDTs which are used to automate, connect, and coordinate the production and distribution 
process across locations and firm boundaries can be best utilized to increase net generation while 
holding operating expenses constant.  Whereas, SMTs, which are focused on the capture, transfer, 
and analysis of data and information, increase net generation while holding CO2 emissions 
constant. These findings suggest that a firm could strategically deploy either PDT or SMT to target 
efficiency with respect to operating expenses or CO2 emissions, respectively. However, our results 
further reveal that it is the complementary nature of PDTs and SMTs that can be leveraged to allow 
firms to increase net generation while holding both operating expenses and CO2 emissions 
constant. Thus, we expand the IT complementarities literature (Aral et al. 2012; Tambe et al. 2012) 
by showing how the combination of both PDT and SMT can simultaneously achieve the expansion 
of the good outcome while holding multiple bad outcomes constant.  
 Our last contribution is the use of stochastic frontier analysis which complements similar 
econometric approaches used in earlier IT business value studies (Chang and Gurbaxani 2013; 
Fare et al. 2005) and allows us to gauge performance in terms of simultaneous increases in the 
production of good outcomes (net generation) and the reduction of undesirable outcomes 
(emissions and operating expense). The directional output distance function and SFA estimation 
technique is applicable to a broad range of environmental issues.  For instance, at a country level, 
the Kyoto protocol had countries commit to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by at least 
18% below 1990 levels in the eight-year period from 2013 to 2020 (UN 2017).   
In sum, our study highlights the importance of two types of Smart Grid technologies in 
improving business and green outcomes, which in turn, has implications for social and consumer 
welfare, which we elaborate below. 
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2.6.2. Practical Implications 
 Our study suggests that utilities can use 1) PDTs to increase net generation while holding 
operating expenses constant, 2) SMTs to increase net generation while holding CO2 emissions 
constant, or 3) PDTs and SMTs together to increase net generation while holding both CO2 
emissions and operating expenses constant. Consequently, firms should first evaluate if they need 
to target one bad outcome (operating expense or emissions) or both bad outcomes with their good 
outcome then strategically deploy PDTs or SMTs to meet their targeted needs. Given the potential 
of both of these technologies, firms need to allocate investments in both in order to reap the benefits 
of improving efficiencies, i.e., increasing good outputs and decreasing bad outputs. 
Furthermore, regulatory commissions were historically designed to protect the interest of 
the public with the goal of eliciting socially optimum outcomes. While they would sometimes 
promote certain technologies, these commissions are mainly focused on the cost structure and 
pricing of utilities. As the electric utility industry is undergoing various institutional changes, it is 
prudent for regulatory authorities to consider how the deployment of new technologies can be 
encouraged to meet multiple goals. Here, policy makers could benefit from knowing how much 
emissions reductions could be met from enhanced efficiency from using certain sets of 
technologies. In particular, policy makers can advocate that utilities not just maintain the grid, but 
also adopt new technologies that provide greater environmental benefit or at the least impose a 
smaller environmental cost while still maintaining current levels of generation. Moreover, policy 
makers can push the argument that utilities can further reduce costs through the use of these 
technologies by improving efficiency. The reduction in costs could then translate to increased 
consumer welfare via lower prices. This may be even more relevant to utilities operating in states 
without retail choice (i.e., competition) as they are not driven to achieve high levels of efficiency.  
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2.6.3. Future Research and Limitations 
 As this is one of the few studies on IT value for multiple good and bad outputs, there are 
several ways to extend this study.  First, given the highly regulated nature of the electric utility 
industry at both the federal and state level, future studies can take a multi-level perspective on how 
specific state level regulations (such as varying electricity prices or retail choice) can impact the 
implementation of PDTs and SMTs or how the value proposition of these Smart Gird technologies 
can change under varying regulatory environments.  Second, we mainly focus on how PDTs and 
SMTs enable utilities to be more efficient, as this effect is relatively straightforward and 
quantifiable.  However, future research may want to see whether these Smart Grid technologies 
are fundamentally changing the nature of the electric utility industry. For example, the integration 
of many renewable and distributed energy resources is enabling firms to be more lean and agile 
with more timely responses to supply and demand of electricity which is contrary from the 
historical approach utilities have taken to electricity generation. Third, a more nuanced 
examination of how Smart Grid technologies have changed the interrelationships between 
suppliers and buyers in terms of contracting (short/long term) and rates would be very interesting. 
In sum, future research can further explore the role of IT in the electric utility industry with a focus 
on both business and green outcomes. 
 We acknowledge some limitations to our research. We considered one green outcome and 
recognize that other measures of emissions such as methane, nitrous oxide, and fluorinated gases 
are meaningful to consider. We do not include the price premiums for the inputs being used to 
generate our good and bad outputs.  This is mainly due to the fact that firms do not buy inputs 
(e.g., coal and natural gas) on the open market, but contract in bulk ahead of time on price. We do 
not account for the fact that utilities are able to buy excess electricity via a spot market when 
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demand exceeds their supply and that this can inflate costs while not necessarily increasing that 
particular firm’s emissions. 
2.6.4. Conclusion 
Our study offers insights into how firms can manage good and bad interdependent 
outcomes through the use of two key technologies, PDTs and SMTs. Drawing on production 
theory and sense-making perspective, we specified a model with a technology set for the joint 
production of good and bad outputs. This model allowed us to gauge the performance of a utility 
in terms of simultaneous increase in the production of the good output and the reduction of the bad 
outputs. Our results revealed that 1) PDTs can help expand net generation while holding operating 
expenses constant, 2) SMTs can help expand net generation while holding CO2 emissions constant, 
and 3) it is the complementary nature of PDTs and SMTs that allow utilities to expand net 
generation while holding both CO2 emissions and operating expenses constant. These insights 
expand our understanding of how a firm can combine investments in IT to automate, connect, and 
coordinate production and distribution activities within and across firm boundaries and in IT to 
capture, transfer, and analyze data and information in complex networks to simultaneously achieve 
business and green outcomes.  
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2.8. Appendix 2.A 
Table 2.A1: Parameter Estimates from Stochastic Frontier Analysis with Lagged Independent Variables 
 Good Output: Net Generation 
Bad Output: CO2 
Good Output: Net Generation 
Bad Output: Operating Expense 
Good Output: Net Generation 
Bad Output: CO2 & Operating Expense  
Model A Model B Model C Model D Model A Model B Model C Model D Model A Model B Model C Model D 
Coal 
2.293*** 3.275*** 2.750*** 3.351*** -0.320 -0.056 0.498 0.692 1.513* 2.758*** 2.276*** 3.117*** 
(0.603) (0.606) (0.596) (0.600) (0.587) (0.527) (0.559) (0.550) (0.851) (0.858) (0.854) (0.901) 
NG 
-0.594*** -0.535*** -0.441** -0.526*** -0.404* -0.055 -0.064 0.118 -0.466** -0.429* -0.093 -0.159 
(0.184) (0.187) (0.182) (0.186) (0.247) (0.229) (0.218) (0.243) (0.229) (0.238) (0.232) (0.248) 
Employees 
-1.520** -2.408*** -1.438** -1.928*** 0.536 0.061 -0.049 -0.379 -0.717 -2.177** -1.804** -2.858*** 
(0.642) (0.664) (0.640) (0.623) (0.650) (0.623) (0.620) (0.643) (0.894) (0.903) (0.877) (0.906) 
PDT 
 
0.589** 
 
0.843*** 
 
-0.798** 
 
-0.670** 
 
0.024 
 
-0.046  
(0.241) 
 
(0.257) 
 
(0.308) 
 
(0.338) 
 
(0.308) 
 
(0.368) 
SMT 
  
-0.723*** -0.950*** 
  
-0.315 -0.549* 
  
-0.054 -0.101   
(0.228) (0.232) 
  
(0.292) (0.314) 
  
(0.306) (0.330) 
(Coal)2 
-0.277*** -0.290*** -0.336*** -0.323*** -0.103*** -0.139*** -0.143*** -0.178*** -0.220*** -0.291*** -0.287*** -0.339*** 
(0.047) (0.050) (0.049) (0.050) (0.024) (0.025) (0.029) (0.031) (0.051) (0.053) (0.052) (0.055) 
(Coal) * (NG) 
0.061*** 0.053*** 0.051*** 0.053*** 0.044*** 0.019 0.021 0.006 0.049*** 0.048*** 0.029* 0.034** 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) 
(Coal) * (Employees) 
0.136*** 0.135** 0.139*** 0.109** 0.008 0.027 0.010 0.034 0.078 0.126** 0.114** 0.138** 
(0.050) (0.054) (0.050) (0.051) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.055) (0.055) (0.054) (0.054) 
(Coal) * (PDT) 
 
-0.042** 
 
-0.054** 
 
0.064*** 
 
0.058*** 
 
-0.007 
 
-0.002  
(0.020) 
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.018) 
 
(0.019) 
 
(0.020) 
 
(0.024) 
(Coal) * (SMT) 
  
0.048*** 0.061*** 
  
0.035** 0.032** 
  
0.027 0.035**   
(0.016) (0.016) 
  
(0.017) (0.016) 
  
(0.017) (0.017) 
(NG)2 
-0.024*** -0.028*** -0.023*** -0.025*** -0.029*** -0.030*** -0.026*** -0.025*** -0.021*** -0.027*** -0.020*** -0.025*** 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
(NG) * (Employees) 
-0.033** -0.015 -0.020 -0.015 -0.017 0.017 0.007 0.021 -0.021 -0.011 0.000 -0.001 
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
(NG) * (PDT) 
 
0.001 
 
0.001 
 
-0.003 
 
-0.004 
 
0.001 
 
0.001  
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
(NG) * (SMT) 
  
-0.005 -0.003 
  
-0.005 -0.001 
  
-0.009** -0.007   
(0.005) (0.006) 
  
(0.005) (0.005) 
  
(0.005) (0.005) 
(Employees)2 
-0.065 -0.024 -0.083 0.003 -0.065* -0.009 -0.060 -0.025 -0.002 0.004 -0.018 0.014 
(0.065) (0.073) (0.068) (0.070) (0.037) (0.039) (0.041) (0.041) (0.067) (0.068) (0.066) (0.067) 
(Employees) * (PDT) 
 
0.027 
 
0.034 
 
-0.067*** 
 
-0.059*** 
 
0.003 
 
0.009  
(0.021) 
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.018) 
 
(0.019) 
 
(0.020) 
 
(0.021) 
(Employees) * (SMT) 
  
-0.009 -0.019 
  
-0.005 0.002 
  
-0.005 -0.015   
(0.018) (0.018) 
  
(0.018) (0.018) 
  
(0.017) (0.018) 
(PDT)2 
 
0.002 
 
0.001 
 
-0.007 
 
-0.008 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.002  
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
(PDT) * (SMT) 
   
-0.002 
   
-0.002 
   
-0.011*    
(0.006) 
   
(0.006) 
   
(0.006) 
(SMT)2 
  
-0.003 -0.001 
  
-0.003 0.002 
  
0.004 0.011   
(0.010) (0.010) 
  
(0.008) (0.009) 
  
(0.009) (0.010) 
(Coal) * (CO2)  
0.157*** 0.182*** 0.161*** 0.153*** 
    
0.140*** 0.175*** 0.170*** 0.181*** 
(0.032) (0.035) (0.033) (0.034) 
    
(0.032) (0.034) (0.031) (0.033) 
(Coal) * (Operating 
Expense) 
    0.183*** 0.128** 0.130** 0.078 0.059 0.021 0.079 0.032 
    (0.055) (0.051) (0.053) (0.054) (0.059) (0.058) (0.061) (0.063) 
(NG) * (CO2)  
-0.075*** -0.060*** -0.044** -0.045*** 
    
-0.058*** -0.056*** -0.026 -0.030* 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
    
(0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) 
(NG) * (Operating 
Expense)  
    0.015 0.012 0.015 0.013 -0.004 -0.010 -0.004 -0.007 
    (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) 
(Employees) * (CO2)  
-0.098** -0.134*** -0.114** -0.108** 
    
-0.117*** -0.132*** -0.123*** -0.125*** 
(0.041) (0.046) (0.044) (0.045) 
    
(0.042) (0.044) (0.042) (0.044) 
(Employees) * 
(Operating Expense) 
    -0.058 0.011 0.004 0.055 -0.069 0.013 0.009 0.089 
    (0.057) (0.056) (0.055) (0.056) (0.060) (0.062) (0.060) (0.063) 
(PDT) * (CO2) 
 
0.106*** 
 
0.114*** 
     
0.078*** 
 
0.075***  
(0.023) 
 
(0.026) 
     
(0.022) 
 
(0.026) 
(PDT) * (Operating 
Expense) 
     0.023  0.021  0.030  0.047** 
     (0.022)  (0.024)  (0.021)  (0.024) 
(SMT) * (CO2) 
  
0.016 0.002 
      
-0.001 -0.007   
(0.011) (0.011) 
      
(0.010) (0.010) 
(SMT) * (Operating 
Expense) 
      -0.052** -0.021   -0.073*** -0.072*** 
      (0.022) (0.024)   (0.023) (0.026) 
(CO2) / (Net 
Generation) 
-0.008 -2.052*** -0.575 -2.087***     0.851* -1.349** -0.476 -2.053*** 
(0.347) (0.539) (0.405) (0.553)     (0.501) (0.687) (0.567) (0.762) 
(Operating Expense) / 
(Net Generation) 
    -4.343*** -4.095*** -3.324*** -3.223*** -1.615 -2.387** -1.708 -2.583** 
    (0.894) (0.790) (0.764) (0.776) (1.065) (1.140) (1.059) (1.222) 
(CO2)2 
0.012* -0.001 -0.004 -0.005 
    
0.006 -0.001 -0.008 -0.009 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
    
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
(CO2) * (Operating 
Expense) 
        -0.144*** -0.044 -0.048 0.021 
        (0.054) (0.056) (0.055) (0.059) 
(Operating Expense)2 
    
0.238*** 0.256*** 0.326*** 0.292*** 0.211** 0.323*** 0.270*** 0.368***     
(0.058) (0.055) (0.057) (0.059) (0.089) (0.101) (0.090) (0.110) 
Constant 
-18.358*** -29.524*** -18.423*** -26.870*** 5.597 7.336 -3.110 1.335 -10.934 -15.999* -16.390** -17.307 
(4.286) (4.620) (4.352) (4.786) (7.257) (6.344) (6.145) (6.424) (8.325) (8.655) (8.374) (9.539) 
u sigmas 
Deregulation 
0.912** -1.090** -2.025 -4.966 2.495 2.097* -1.217 -1.596 4.463** 5.142** -5.40 1.452 
(0.357) (0.545) (7.442) (14.207) (3.347) (1.217) (0.596) (1.599) (2.047) (2.379) (5.099) (15.524) 
Constant 
-3.327*** -0.534 -4.449 -7.248*** -3.766 -3.200 -13.499 -0.297 -3.533 -3.619 0.026 -8.400 
(0.415) (1.202) (16.147) (2.716) (5.535) (2.012) (761.645) (2.556) (2.700) (2.566) (67.028) (29.678) 
v sigmas 
Constant 
-3.525*** -3.290*** -3.323*** -3.437*** -2.580*** -2.694*** -2.689*** -2.780*** -3.324*** -3.455*** -3.523*** -3.611*** 
(0.182) (0.091) (0.085) (0.089) (0.112) (0.076) (0.062) (0.071) (0.081) (0.085) (0.085) (0.138) 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10; standard errors in parentheses; time variables and interactions are not reported for brevity 
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Table 2.A2: Simultaneous Equations Model Specification  
CO2 Emissions Operating Expense 
 Model A Model B Model C Model D Model A Model B Model C Model D 
PDT 
 
0.207*** 
 
1.481** 
 
-0.004   0.420*  
(0.063) 
 
(0.583) 
 
(0.030) 
 
(0.233) 
SMT 
  
-0.011 1.295** 
  
0.054** 0.481**   
(0.060) (0.589) 
  
(0.022) (0.235) 
PDT*SMT 
   
-0.079** 
   
-0.027*    
(0.037) 
   
(0.015) 
Maintenance 
0.062 0.025 0.064 0.028 0.057 0.051 0.023 0.038 
(0.090) (0.086) (0.105) (0.097) (0.037) (0.038) (0.039) (0.040) 
Other 1 
0.000 -0.014 -0.008 -0.005 -0.008 -0.006 -0.003 0.006 
(0.058) (0.056) (0.062) (0.058) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) 
Other 2 
0.053 0.009 0.064 0.023 -0.036 -0.038* -0.043** -0.046** 
(0.055) (0.053) (0.057) (0.053) (0.022) (0.023) (0.021) (0.022) 
Other 3 
0.048 0.013 0.046 0.004 0.014 0.015 -0.007 -0.001 
(0.059) (0.057) (0.063) (0.058) (0.025) (0.026) (0.024) (0.025) 
Other 4 
0.036 0.023 0.038 0.070 0.031 0.039 0.042 0.059** 
(0.068) (0.066) (0.072) (0.067) (0.028) (0.028) (0.026) (0.027) 
Efficiency 
-5.096*** -4.562*** -5.623*** -5.668*** -0.921* -0.915 -0.754 -0.854 
(1.315) (1.258) (1.472) (1.326) (0.557) (0.573) (0.564) (0.566) 
Total Fuel Coal 
1.024*** 0.894*** 1.090*** 1.041*** 0.123 0.142 0.128 0.128 
(0.230) (0.223) (0.257) (0.230) (0.091) (0.094) (0.092) (0.091) 
Total Fuel Natural Gas 
0.137** 0.095 0.135** 0.091 0.158*** 0.162*** 0.148*** 0.158*** 
(0.066) (0.064) (0.068) (0.063) (0.030) (0.030) (0.028) (0.028) 
Fuel Cost Coal 
    
0.156*** 0.152*** 0.153*** 0.171***     
(0.054) (0.055) (0.051) (0.051) 
Fuel Cost Natural Gas 
    
-0.069*** -0.064** -0.051** -0.050*     
(0.026) (0.032) (0.025) (0.029) 
Electric Production 
Payroll 
    0.069 0.067 0.075 0.063 
    (0.051) (0.054) (0.048) (0.049) 
Net Generation 
0.621*** 0.668*** 0.630*** 0.614*** 0.558*** 0.553*** 0.521*** 0.495*** 
(0.176) (0.169) (0.191) (0.175) (0.094) (0.096) (0.089) (0.090) 
Firm Age 
0.675 0.982 0.736 0.840 -0.329 -0.339 -0.335 -0.432 
(1.079) (1.026) (1.120) (1.026) (0.426) (0.433) (0.406) (0.407) 
Firm Age2 
-0.107 -0.145 -0.120 -0.131 0.043 0.043 0.041 0.056 
(0.155) (0.147) (0.162) (0.149) (0.061) (0.062) (0.059) (0.059) 
2010 
0.231 0.026 0.218 0.077 -0.201 -0.182 -0.242 -0.258 
(0.496) (0.471) (0.510) (0.458) (0.264) (0.270) (0.251) (0.250) 
2012 
0.127 -0.061 0.140 -0.010 -0.150 -0.128 -0.143 -0.199 
(0.498) (0.474) (0.520) (0.465) (0.257) (0.262) (0.246) (0.247) 
2014 
-0.549 -0.809* -0.530 -0.704 -0.076 -0.070 -0.084 -0.127 
(0.501) (0.480) (0.518) (0.467) (0.260) (0.267) (0.246) (0.247) 
Deregulation 
-0.108 -0.117 -0.095 -0.137 0.470*** 0.460*** 0.407*** 0.405*** 
(0.229) (0.216) (0.243) (0.217) (0.099) (0.100) (0.095) (0.093) 
Constant 
4.254 1.868 4.486 -18.275* 10.351*** 10.477*** 10.576*** 3.931 
(2.704) (2.650) (2.820) (9.766) (1.266) (1.368) (1.215) (3.860) 
R-Squared 0.669 0.714 0.657 0.735 0.914 0.907 0.917 0.921 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10; standard errors in parentheses 
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3. Health Information Technology in U.S. Hospitals: How Much, 
How Fast? 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Health Information Technology (HIT) has been touted as a way to “improve quality and 
convenience of patient care, increase patient participation in their care, improve accuracy of 
diagnoses and health outcomes, improve care coordination, and increase practice efficiencies and 
cost savings” (ONC 2013). With the rising cost of healthcare (13.8% of U.S. GDP in 2000 to 
17.8% of U.S. GDP in 2015, (CMS 2016)) over the past decade and the promise of HIT to reduce 
such costs (and improve health benefits) (Hillestad et al. 2005), the U.S. government passed the 
Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act, a component 
of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Obama 2016). The Office of the 
National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONC), created under the HITECH Act, 
allocated billions of dollars in incentives through the Centers of Medicare & Medicaid Services 
(CMS) to hospitals and physicians to adopt Electronic Medical Records (EMRs)/Electronic Health 
Records (EHRs) (Blumenthal and Tavenner 2010). These incentives have resulted in a drastic 
increase in HIT use throughout the U.S. (DesRoches et al. 2013; Wright et al. 2013).  
We seek to contribute to the growing literature on the impact of HIT in hospitals. In the 
past, we have seen that information technologies in various industries have reduced the costs of 
coordination, communication, and information processing (Bartel et al. 2007; Bloom et al. 2012; 
                                                 
 An earlier version was presented at ICIS 2014 – Auckland. Pye, J., Rai, A., and Baird, A. 2014. 
"Health Information Technology in U.S. Hospitals: How Much, How Fast?," Proceedings from 35th  
International Conference on Information Systems, Auckland, New Zealand. This paper received the 
Best Research-in-Progress Award at ICIS 2014 – Auckland. 
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Brynjolffson and Hitt 2000; Marshak and Hubbard 2003). Yet, healthcare represents a unique 
environment to study the value of IT. In this context, the consumer (i.e., patient) of the service 
(i.e., healthcare), is a key element in the value creation processes. Value-based care is defined as 
delivering the highest quality of patient care at the lowest possible cost (Porter 2009; Porter and 
Lee 2013). Furthermore, patients are distinct and require a specific set of tasks, which may entail 
varying levels of information management and care coordination. Therefore, we propose that the 
healthcare industry provides an excellent context in which to study the complexities of value 
creation in a multi-stakeholder environment where the consumer of the service is integral to the 
process. Overall, our research seeks to significantly contribute to IT business value, IT capabilities, 
and HIT research. Of particular interest are questions as to how HIT capabilities within hospitals 
are impacting patient care outcomes. 
While several studies have systematically reviewed the impacts of HIT on the cost and 
quality of patient care at many levels (e.g., hospital level, within hospital unit, and how specific 
technologies effect work flow and communication) (e.g., Appari et al. 2013; Buntin et al. 2011; 
Chaudhry et al. 2006; Jamal et al. 2009), variations in significance and direction of effects have 
been observed and debated. It has been suggested that these effect discrepancies may be dependent 
on HIT implementation practices and contexts of use (Jones et al. 2014). Other variations in HIT 
impact findings might be associated with connecting very broad considerations of HIT use to 
organizational level performance measures rather than seeking to conduct more fine-grained 
analyses that examine effects associated with more specifically defined portfolios of HIT 
capabilities. Some studies have looked at quality using broad measures such as mortality rates 
(Amarasingham et al. 2009; Devaraj and Kohli 2000; Devaraj and Kohli 2003) while others have 
focused on similarly broad measures of cost efficiency and financial performance (Ayal and 
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Seidmann 2009; Menon and Lee 2000). An article in Health Affairs reported that earlier estimates 
of potential HIT cost and efficiency gains (Hillestad et al. 2005) had to be revised significantly 
downward due to initially slow HIT adoption rates, complications associated with usage factors, 
,and a lack of complementary process reengineering when adopting HIT (Kellermann and Jones 
2013).  
Similar trends have been observed in information systems (IS) business value research that 
have focused on the impact of IT investment on firm performance (Bharadwaj et al. 1999; 
Brynjolffson 1996; Brynjolffson and Hitt 2000; Santhanam and Hartono 2003). Such studies often 
lumped IT spending under a single coarse category, such as IT capital or IT investment, 
represented in dollars (Devaraj and Kohli 2000). Although these are useful measures, they do not 
separate the impact of specific IT resources/functionalities and capabilities nor do they enable 
investigation of how they can be effectively combined. More comprehensive models often link IT 
capabilities to organizational performance in a more granular fashion by elaborating the IT 
capabilities in a given context (e.g., Melville et al. 2004; Rai and Tang 2010). We adopt this focus 
of differentiating between IT capabilities to understand how the utility of a capability changes 
because of other capabilities.   
In line with Kohli and Grover (2008), we conceptualize a hospital’s HIT capability as being 
derived from the use of HIT resources/functionalities to execute a hospital’s core obligation. The 
use of such base functionalities is tightly connected to the resource base of the firm. Thus, the 
degree to which these functionalities are embedded and used in a hospital will vary because 
hospitals are unique in their resource base. We expand on the concept of HIT capabilities in the 
context of clinical process management or "healthcare-related activities performed for, on behalf 
of, or by a patient” (AHRQ 2014). Following Rai et al. (2012), we define an HIT capability as “the 
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ability to use [H]IT assets (or [H]IT functionalities) in combination with other resources to execute 
[clinical and related patient care] processes.”  
In particular, questions remain as to the portfolios of HIT capabilities that can improve 
hospital outcomes related to patient care. Previous research has shown that there are substantial 
variations in return to IT across firms (Brynjolffson and Hitt 2000) and that the presence or absence 
of complementary resources can be a factor in explaining these differential returns (Ray et al. 
2005). These complementarities represent an enhancement of one value in the presence of another 
resource (Milgrom and Roberts 1995). While individual resources may be duplicated across firms, 
context-specific configurations are more difficult to reproduce. In particular, we describe a 
situation in which we can test the fit among key capabilities of interest (Venkatraman 1989). Thus, 
in our context, we expect HIT capabilities to significantly impact outcomes based on whether 
complementary HIT capabilities are established.  
We identify three HIT capabilities based on clinical care functionalities considered central 
to achieving beneficial healthcare outcomes: (1) how clinical processes are executed (Clinical 
Process Management); (2) how patients are engaged to inform the clinical care process and make 
clinical care patient-centric (Patient Engagement); and (3) how patients and their information are 
transferred from one provider or facility to another (Patient Transition).  
Motivated by this background and the identified research gaps, we ask the following 
question:  
RQ1. How does a hospital’s Clinical Process Management capability, individually and 
in combination with two patient capabilities – Patient Engagement and Patient 
Transition – affect hospital performance? 
 
However, the capabilities perspective does not consider the rate of growth of a capability. The 
rate of growth of a capability serves as a proxy for incremental vs. radical change. Although there 
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has been a long history of research on organizational change, whether or not a new technology is 
a departure from existing practice (Ettlie et al. 1984) and the rate of innovation in the technology 
industry (Kazanjian 1988; Stuart 2000), there has been limited study of the rate of growth of IT 
capabilities. Therefore, while systematic reviews on the impact of HIT use on outcomes have been 
conducted (Jones et al. 2014), there has been a critical lack of research regarding how hospital 
performance is impacted by the rate of growth of an HIT capability. Thus, we ask: 
RQ2. How does the rate of growth of a hospital’s Clinical Process Management 
capability, individually and in combination with two patient capabilities – 
Patient Engagement and Patient Transition – affect hospital performance? 
 
This empirical study is set in the context of the U.S. healthcare industry and is based on 
multiple sources of archival data from 2008-2014 covering approximately 5,000 hospitals. 
Leveraging these longitudinal datasets, we empirically assess the impacts of HIT capabilities on 
U.S. hospital performance at both the process level and at the organizational (hospital) level. We 
isolate three types of HIT capabilities that enable a hospital to target performance: clinical process 
management, patient engagement, and patient transition. By examining HIT capabilities, we seek 
to contribute to the literature on capabilities and complementarities by developing a more nuanced 
view of how IT capabilities impact outcomes. Our data also gives us the unique opportunity to 
observe these impacts before and after a government intervention, thereby representing a quasi-
natural experiment. Our approach enhances our understanding of the link between IT capabilities 
and business value in the patient care context by investigating the extent to which and pace with 
which specific HIT capabilities need to be simultaneously developed to achieve multiple 
outcomes.  
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3.2. Theoretical Development 
Two major theoretical perspectives provide the foundation for this study. The IT 
capabilities from the resource based view of the firm (RBV) combined with a complementarities 
perspective offers the theoretical lens for the impact of HIT-enabled process capabilities on 
hospital performance. The IT capabilities view contends that IT-based resources are carefully 
chosen and bundled to meet business needs (Bharadwaj 2000; Melville et al. 2004). We 
particularly focus on the coordination need in hospitals because hospitals organize a multitude of 
complex patient care activities between two or more participants to facilitate the most efficient and 
appropriate care. As such, we look at those HIT capabilities that are concerned with the 
coordination of patient care. The perspective on complementarities discusses how these 
capabilities by themselves are unlikely to explain all the variation in outcomes and furthermore, 
that the marginal value of one capability may be conditional on another (Milgrom and Roberts 
1995). By adopting a coordination focus on capabilities and complementarities among capabilities, 
we theorize how HIT can affect hospital performance.  
3.2.1. IT Capabilities  
A key tenant of RBV considers that heterogeneous resource distribution across firms 
accounts for the varying degrees of performance. Building on this assertion, the IT capabilities 
literature adopts the view that various IT resources can be combined in unique ways that will 
enhance firm performance (Melville et al. 2004). Elaborating, IT capabilities are defined as “the 
ability to mobilize and deploy IT-based resources in combination or co-present with other 
resources and capabilities” (Bharadwaj 2000). This definition further posits that IT capabilities are 
established over time by combining non-IT and IT assets through practices and competencies (Aral 
and Weill 2007; Milgrom and Roberts 1995). For example, a stand-alone system may be valuable 
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within an organization, but in and of itself, it would not be a strategic advantage. While IT 
resources may be generic in nature, especially prior to implementation, IT capabilities are 
embedded within the firm and it is the use with other resources that make IT capabilities valuable 
(Aral et al. 2012; Bharadwaj 2000; Rai and Tang 2010; Zhu and Kraemer 2002). Moreover, IT-
resources may even be more interdependent as some resources may have little to no value without 
another (Clemons and Row 1991). Therefore, IT resources are the tools that are designed to support 
business processes while IT capabilities refer to the ability to execute business processes (use). 
In particular, we focus on IT-enabled coordination capabilities. Coordination refers to the 
way of connecting various work units to jointly accomplish a set of tasks (Andres and Zmud 2002). 
Organizations are highly complex systems that need to manage information flows between and 
across people who can take on a variety of roles within and across firm boundaries. Therefore, 
coordination can be seen as a way to overcome difficulties in information sharing (Tsai 2002) and 
also an important aspect for realizing parsimony in organizing IT capabilities (Pavlou 2002). 
Furthermore, IT-enabled coordination capabilities enable organizations to share information and 
facilitate workflows. For example, in hospitals, HIT-enabled clinical process management can 
enable monitoring and quality control through the use of methods and tools for discovering, 
modeling, analyzing, measuring, improving, and optimizing direct and indirect care processes 
(Carter 2015).  In our context, HIT coordination capabilities are defined as a hospital’s capacity to 
deploy HIT resources/functionalities to better assist and coordinate patient care. 
3.2.2. IT Complementarities  
 Drawing from the theory of complementarities, certain resource combinations may have 
supper-additive value, i.e., the benefits of the combination of resources exceeds the sum of the 
resources individually (Milgrom and Roberts 1995). These complementary resources are 
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interdependent, mutually reinforcing, and tend to be adopted together. We have previously seen 
that IT can be used to improve processes through coordination (Dedrick et al. 2003; Tanriverdi 
2005) and thus, we suggest that there are complementarities between a hospital’s IT-enabled 
coordination capabilities as hospitals have complex task interdependencies. For example, the 
healthcare process requires coordination from multiple parties to actively exchange information 
about the patient, physician orders, and medications for the successful treatment of a patient. 
Integrating various IT-enabled coordination capabilities can potentially facilitate these interactions 
and effectively complement information sharing and workflow process. Furthermore, 
complementary changes between capabilities are critical for generating benefits of new 
technologies (Brynjolffson and Hitt 2000). Thus, independent development of IT capabilities 
cannot succeed in isolation (Aral et al. 2012; Brynjolffson and Hitt 2000; Milgrom and Roberts 
1995; Ray et al. 2005; Tambe et al. 2012).  
3.3. Conceptual Model 
Our theoretical framework describes how a hospital’s IT-enabled coordination capabilities 
impact its performance. Figure 3.1 provides an illustration of the constructs in our model as well 
as the proposed relationships between them. We elaborate these HIT capabilities below. Table 3.1 
lists the associated components of these HIT capabilities. 
 
Patient-Oriented Capabilities 
Clinical Process Management 
Capability 
Hospital Performance 
Figure 3.1: Conceptual Model 
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3.3.1. CPM Capability 
We focus on those HIT resources that are related to clinical and patient care processes as 
we are interested in the specific processes that affect hospital performance. Clinical processes are 
defined as what and how care is delivered to patients. As we have seen in other industries, being 
able to manage specific processes can streamline services and procedures, thus making the whole 
organization more cost efficient (Benner and Tushman 2002). Thus, clinical process management 
(CPM) consists of a set of methods and tools used by clinicians for discovering, modeling, 
analyzing, measuring, improving, and optimizing direct and indirect care processes (Carter 2015). 
Past research has shown that CPM can enhance organization effectiveness (e.g., doing the right 
thing for the patient in terms of diagnosis and treatment) and efficiency (e.g., delivering care 
efficiently in terms of patient cost of care) (Goldzweig et al. 2009; Hillestad et al. 2005; Kuperman 
and Gibson 2003). Moreover, CPM resources, such as computerized physician order entry 
(CPOE), clinical decision support rule, or patient problem list, can address heterogeneous patient 
needs, reduce clinical errors, eliminate preventable healthcare-acquired conditions, improve the 
diagnosis and treatment of acute and chronic conditions, eliminate unnecessary testing, generate 
reminders, and increase patient safety. Therefore, improving CPM resources should be an 
important strategic task for all healthcare providers. However, these individual CPM resources 
may have little to no value without each another as it is the combination and use with other CPM 
resources that make them valuable. Therefore, CPM resources are the tools designed to support 
the clinical care process while a CPM capability refers to those CPM resources that are combined 
for the use of clinical care of patients.  
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3.3.2. Patient-Oriented Capabilities 
We identified two patient-oriented factors that can support a hospital’s CPM capability. 
Due to the nature of healthcare, patient capabilities are critical for coordinating patient engagement 
and transition in order to align CPM functionalities within and across providers.  
A Patient Engagement (PE) capability can empower patients through patient-facing 
functionalities, which can provide technological means for patients to actively participate and 
coordinate their care (Baird et al. 2012; Baird et al. 2013; Emont 2011). This is necessary to 
facilitate the involvement of patients and their families in the healthcare decision making process 
as well as to promote patient management of their own health. PE resources, such as patient access 
to electronic health record or electronic capture of patient information, allows hospitals to capture 
and act on patient-reported information, such as preferences, desired outcomes, and experiences 
with healthcare, as well as improve patients’ understanding of their health and related conditions  
so they can take a more active role in their care. Patients who are well informed about their medical 
condition are more likely to comply with their recommended course of treatment and are also 
better able to communicate important health information to their providers.  
A Patient Transition (PT) capability allows for the continuity of patient care, which 
manages patient information while transitioning inside and outside of a hospital and can reduce 
miscommunications and enhance coordination, especially when considering a health information 
exchange (Furukawa et al. 2013; Walker et al. 2005). PT resources, such as medication 
reconciliation or transition of care summaries, help maintain patient care continuity as well as 
facilitate information exchange across medical practices and settings, such as the initiating, 
communicating, tracing of referrals, and consultations. 
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The two patient-centric capabilities identified here are valuable in that they have the 
potential to enhance a hospital’s CPM capability. Based on the notion of complementarities, we 
emphasize that hospitals need to consider how the combination of patient capabilities with their 
CPM capability can improve the coordination of healthcare, and thereby affect hospital 
performance. Therefore, the more these capabilities can be integrated and the more patient 
information that can be centrally located, the more hospitals should see enhanced value derived 
from these capabilities working together.  
Table 3.1: HIT Capabilities and their Associated Components 
HIT Capability HIT Associated Components  
Clinical Process 
Management 
(CPM) 
CPOE, Medication Allergy List, CDS Rule, Drug Interaction Checks, 
Record Demographics, Maintain Problem List, Record Vital Signs, e-
Prescribing, Record Smoking Status, Active Medication List, Clinical 
Quality Measures, Drug Formulary Checks, Clinical Lab Test Results, 
Patient List, Patient Reminders 
Patient Engagement 
(PE) 
Electronic Copy of Health Information, Clinical Summaries, Patient 
Electronic Access, Patient Specific Education Resources 
Patient Transition 
(PT) 
Electronic Exchange of Clinical Information, Medication 
Reconciliation, Transition of Care Summary 
 
3.3.3. Hospital Performance  
Hospital performance has been conceptualized in numerous ways in the existing healthcare 
literature. However, in the past decade, it has become increasingly important to face the lasting 
challenges of rising costs and poor quality of care (Agarwal et al. 2010; Devaraj and Kohli 2000; 
Yeow and Goh 2015). We conceptualize hospital performance on two dimensions: efficiency and 
conformance quality. 
There are several ways in which HIT could impact hospital efficiency. For example, the 
use of a clinical decision support system enables better diagnostic tools for physicians or an EHR 
can allow for better patient tracking for better communication and continuity of care especially for 
patients that need more targeted care (Atasoy et al. 2017; Chaudhry et al. 2006; McCullough et al. 
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2016). Furthermore, HIT can reduce hospital operating costs by delivering more rapid and reliable 
care, decreasing medical errors through better coordination between providers, eliminating 
redundant and unnecessary tests, and systematically streamlining delivery of care. 
The second dimension of hospital performance is conformance quality – level of a 
hospital’s adherence to predefined standards (Sharma et al. 2016). Conformance quality can be 
seen as an internal component of total process quality (Meirovich et al. 2007) that is a tangible and 
measurable quality component of healthcare as it deals with objective phenomena. For example, 
one standard of care states that pneumonia patients should receive antibiotics within six hours of 
arrival in a hospital. Publicly reporting these measures also increases the transparency of hospital 
care, can provide useful information to consumers in choosing their care, and assist hospitals in 
their own quality improvement efforts (CMS 2015). We conceptualize conformance quality as the 
readmission rate of a hospital. Hospital readmission can be seen as a consequence of suboptimal 
coordination of patient care and can manifest in varying diagnoses (Lindenauer et al. 2010). The 
assumption being that providers did or left something undone during a patient’s stay which led to 
the need for the patients’ re-admittance. Furthermore, the fact that one-quarter of readmissions 
occur within 30 days of discharge suggests that there is indeed room for improvement in quality 
of patient care (Boulding et al. 2011). Additionally, readmission measures also fall under Hospital 
Readmission Reduction Program (HRRP), part of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), which 
mandates the reduction of reimbursement payments to hospitals for excess readmissions after 
2012. This program was an important aspect of the ACA that further links payments to the quality 
of hospital care.  
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3.4. Research Model and Hypotheses 
Drawing on the theoretical perspectives above, we theorize that 1) a hospital’s CPM 
capability combined with the two patient capabilities affect hospital performance and 2) 
furthermore, the rate of growth of a hospital’s CPM capability needs to be conditioned on the two 
patient capabilities to affect hospital performance. Theoretical arguments for the proposed 
relationships are developed below.  
3.4.1. CPM Capability Effect on Hospital Performance 
We expect that a hospital’s CPM capability leads to value creation through the effective 
coordination of patient care. CPM functionalities can be seen as the resources or tools that are 
designed to support the clinical care process. Whereas, a hospital’s CPM capability represents the 
hospital’s ability to use these functionalities to provide care for its patients, in terms of what care 
is provided and how it is done, to achieve desired outcomes. CPM functionalities can range from 
adhering to the mapped processes to addressing heterogeneous patient needs to diagnosing and 
treating acute and chronic conditions and can have a broad effect. For example, an electronic 
documentation system (e.g., physician notes and consultation reports) can coordinate workflows 
between multiple specialists and high-risk patients or a clinical decision support system could 
include checklists for procedures (e.g., the pneumococcal vaccination) which can improve the 
quality of patient care (Jones et al. 2011).  
We argue that a hospital’s CPM capability can positively affect hospital efficiency and thus 
reduce operating expense.  The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) did an 
extensive review on the impact of HIT on the medication management process and found that 
several studies showed that over time a net benefit was accrued based on cost reductions stemming 
from lower adverse drug events, drug costs, and laboratory test usage (McKibbon et al. 2011). 
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Additionally, other research has shown that various CPM functionalities can enhance effectiveness 
and efficiency (Goldzweig et al. 2009; Hillestad et al. 2005; Kuperman and Gibson 2003). For 
example, a clinical decision support system reduced unnecessary blood transfusions (Perez et al. 
2007) or a CPOE can allow the integration of various clinical functions within the hospital which 
can lead to faster information flows and improved responsiveness (Sharma et al. 2016). Therefore, 
we hypothesize: 
H1: Hospital performance is positively associated with CPM capability.  
3.4.2. Moderating Effect of Patient Capabilities on Hospital Performance 
While a hospital’s CPM capability is core to the effective coordination of patient care, we 
should not lose sight that hospitals ultimately serve its patients. Healthcare providers not only 
execute clinical processes to provide care to patients, but must also engage with patients as well 
as transition their care to other healthcare providers. Furthermore, patient capabilities allow 
hospitals to add additional functionalities that may not hold value on their own but when combined 
with CPM capability can yield positive results. For example, various patient engagement 
functionalities allow hospitals to provide a technological means for patients to actively participate 
in their care (Baird et al. 2012; Baird et al. 2013; Emont 2011). A hospital’s PE capability allows 
it to capture and act on patient-reported information, such as preferences, desired outcomes, and 
experiences, as well as improve patients’ understanding of their health and related conditions so 
that they can take a more active role in their care. Patients who are well informed of their medical 
condition(s) are more likely to comply with their recommended course of treatment and are better 
able to communicate important health information with their providers. By integrating a PE 
capability with a CPM capability, it allows hospitals to have better visibility of their patients. 
Under these circumstances, using both of these capabilities together can ease coordination of care 
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and improve information flows between patient and provider which can ultimately lead to better 
and more efficient patient care. Therefore, we hypothesize:  
H2a: The marginal return to hospital performance from a hospital's CPM capability increases with 
increases in PE capability. 
Likewise, value for patients is also generated when transitions of care provide useful 
information to patients (and caregivers) about how to continue patients’ care after leaving the 
hospital or transferring between departments/wards (Coleman et al. 2005; Kripalani et al. 2007). 
A hospital's PT capability allows for continuity of care, which can reduce miscommunications and 
enhance coordination, especially when considering health information exchange functionalities 
(Furukawa et al. 2013; Walker et al. 2005). In particular, PT capability facilitates the coordination 
and communication of medical information from one provider or facility to another. This PT 
capability combined with a hospital’s CPM capability helps maintain patient continuity as well as 
facilitate information exchange across medical practices and settings, such as the initiating, 
communicating, tracing of referrals, and consultations. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
H2b: The marginal return to hospital performance from a hospital's CPM capability increases 
with increases in PT capability. 
As we have seen before, a hospital’s CPM capability provides the hospital with the ability 
to control and coordinate interdependent tasks in the clinical care process (Hillestad et al. 2005). 
However, patient capabilities – PE and PT – can also enable a hospital to effectively integrate 
patient information and incorporate coordination functionalities for transitioning. Access to more 
patient information and coordinating with transition facilities supports the clinical care process by 
allowing a more holistic view of a patient (Coleman 2003; Mueller et al. 2012). Therefore, 
developing PE and PT capabilities in combination with a hospital’s CPM capability can (1) 
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improve information flows between patients and providers for improved patient care and (2) ease 
transitional coordination costs. Thus, a hospital’s Patient Engagement capability and Patient 
Transition capability can complement CPM capability and increase hospital performance. Given 
these arguments, we propose the following hypothesis: 
H2c: The marginal return to hospital performance from a hospital's CPM capability increases with 
increases in both PE and PT Capabilities.  
3.4.3. CPM Capability’s Non-Linear Effect on Hospital Performance 
The previous hypotheses have posited a linear effect of CPM capability on hospital 
performance and the moderation of this linear effect by PE and PT. However, beneficial outcomes 
associated with rapid rates of implementation may have different impacts on short-term and long-
term outcomes than incremental rates (Fichman 2000; Orlikowski 1993). Therefore, we are 
motivated to hypothesize the rate of growth of a hospital’s CPM capability on hospital 
performance. 
Changes in complementary functionalities are critical for generating benefits from the use 
of new technology (Brynjolffson and Hitt 2000). By slowing down the rate of growth of a CPM 
capability, hospitals can reap the benefits by getting accustomed to the use of various 
functionalities and improved workflows, thus increasing the efficiency of clinical processes. Many 
of the CPM functionalities cannot be used “out of the box” and clinicians must carry out a variety 
of activities (many of which are complex, costly, and time-consuming) to complement the new 
technologies as capability building occurs (Miller and Sim 2004). However, if a hospital has no 
CPM capability one year and then rapidly develops this capability the next year, it could be 
potentially dangerous for patients. Specifically, if CPM functionalities are deployed too rapidly, 
then patient quality of care can suffer due to increased inefficiency in the clinical care process. 
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Furthermore, clinicians take on many roles and are assigned tasks which are multifaceted, 
expensive, and laborious, so if a hospital ramps up their CPM capability too fast without other 
supporting resources, then patients may suffer from increased inefficiencies like medication errors 
and miscommunications, which could lead to higher readmissions (Westbrook et al. 2010). 
Additionally, by slowing down or ramping up the rate of growth of use of CPM capability, 
hospitals could see benefits in streamlining their processes (i.e., decreased costs by standardizing 
procedures, saving time locating results, and reducing errors) or escalation of costs due to 
overburdening of staff with new systems and functionalities (i.e., redundancy of tests and time 
wasted on the new systems instead of treating patients). This leads us to hypothesize the curvilinear 
relationship between the rate of growth of use of CPM capability and hospital performance, where 
the performance decreases at first then increases. 
H3: Hospital performance has a curvilinear (U-shaped) relationship with the rate of growth of a 
hospital’s CPM capability.  
3.4.4. Moderating Non-Linear Effect of Patient Capabilities on Hospital 
Performance 
A hospital’s CPM capability is core to the clinical care process and value creation and 
previously, we argued that CPM capability is the extent to which CPM functionalities are being 
used and theorized how it is likely to impact hospital performance. However, it is not just about 
having a CPM capability, but the rate of growth of a hospital’s CPM capability, individually and 
in combination with PE and PT capabilities. 
The goal of a PE capability is to allow patients to take a more active role in their healthcare, 
such as being able to receive and keep better track of their recommended care, which in turn 
reduces costs as patients’ health outcomes may improve as a result. Traditional explanations for 
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increased hospital performance have pointed to improved clinical processes combined with more 
patient information (Bates and Bitton 2010; Paulus et al. 2008). However, this provides only a 
partial explanation and overlooks the speed at which hospitals deploy their CPM capability. 
Hospitals with high usage of patient engagement have a lot of information being generated for, 
about, and with the patient. As a hospital ramps up their CPM capability, it runs the risk of 
overwhelming clinicians and increasing miscommunications and wasted time, thereby reducing 
hospital performance (Sittig and Singh 2012). We therefore hypothesize the following:  
H4a: The curvilinear (U-shaped) relationship between the rate of growth of a hospital’s CPM 
capability and hospital performance is strengthened with increases in PE capability. 
As seen before, PT capability facilitates the communication and coordination of patient 
information across boundaries (within a hospital and/or across facilities involving multiple 
providers). Conventional reasons for increased hospital performance suggest that better processes 
(more CPM functionalities) combined with better handoffs (more PT functionalities) decreases 
miscommunication and increases coordination of patient care (Coleman et al. 2004; Heart et al. 
2017). Yet, that explanation does not consider the rate of growth of a hospital’s CPM capability. 
If a hospital goes slow in developing their CPM capability and at the same time has patient 
transition functionalities in place, then increased efficiencies from increased information flows for 
careful transitioning could indeed increase hospital performance. However, transitioning a patient 
involves complex coordination from many different parties (Bodenheimer 2008; O’Malley et al. 
2010). If a hospital’s CPM capability is ramped up too fast, hospitals run the risk of overburdening 
clinicians and potentially introducing miscommunications, mismanagement of patients, and 
clinical errors, all of which decrease hospital performance. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
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H4b: The curvilinear (U-shaped) relationships between the rate of growth of a hospital’s CPM 
capability and hospital performance is strengthened with increases in PT capability. 
 We also expect that the rate of growth of a hospital’s CPM capability will interact with 
both PE and PT capabilities to affect hospital performance. Our rationale is that while there are 
greater benefits to be gained from the complementarities of the rate of growth of a hospital’s CPM 
capability with PE and PT capabilities, there are also greater learning and change management 
costs associated with using HIT functionalities across three diverse processes. On the benefits side, 
the more PE and PT capabilities, the greater marginal benefits from the rate of growth of a 
hospital’s CPM capability because of the synergies in coordinating across these related processes 
(Hervas-Oliver et al. 2017; Lindbeck and Snower 2000). However, there is the tension of “too 
much” change that sets in when there are high PE and PT capabilities and CPM capability is 
ramped up that will decrease the marginal benefits. In sum, the curvilinear relationship between 
the rate of growth in CPM capability and hospital performance will be reinforced.  
H4c: The curvilinear (U-shaped) relationship between the rate of growth of a hospital’s CPM 
capability and hospital performance is strengthened with increases in PE and PT capabilities. 
3.5. Empirical Study 
3.5.1. Panel Dataset Construction 
We test our hypotheses using a merged, multi-source, longitudinal dataset of approximately 
5,000 U.S. hospitals from 2008 to 2014. From the AHA Annual Survey IT Supplement, we have 
the use of HIT functionalities including: electronic clinical documentation, results viewing, 
computerized provider order entry, decision support, bar coding, patient viewing, secure 
messaging, summary of care transitions, electronic discharge instructions, and more. From the 
AHA Annual Survey we have data covering hospital demographics, organizational structure, 
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hospital expenses, and staffing. From the CMS, we have data on readmission rates of hospitals. 
The datasets were joined using National Provider Identifiers (NPIs). Taken together, our data spans 
before and after a major government intervention, providing a unique opportunity to assess how 
the extent of development and the resulting impacts of HIT capabilities changed over time across 
hospitals.  
Table 3.2:  Operationalization of Measures 
Construct Operationalization Measure Source 
Hospital 
Performance 
Pneumonia 
Readmission Rate 
Risk-standardized, all-cause 30-day 
readmission (defined as readmission for any 
cause within 30 days from the date of 
discharge of the index admission) rate for 
patients discharged from the hospital with a 
principal discharge diagnosis of pneumonia in 
a given year 
CMS 
Operating Expense 
Total operating expense (payroll expenses, 
employee benefits, depreciation expense, 
interest expense, supply expense) of hospital 
in a given year 
AHA 
CPM 
Capability 
Extent of Use of 
CPM 
Extent of use of HIT functionalities for CPM 
of hospital in a given year 
AHA 
Rate of 
Growth of 
CPM 
Capability 
Rate of Growth of 
Use of CPM  
Extent of use of HIT functionalities for CPM 
at time t minus extent of use of HIT 
functionalities for CPM at time t-1 divided by 
extent of use of HIT functionalities for CPM 
at time t-1 of hospital in a given year 
Patient 
Engagement 
Capability 
Extent of Use of PE  
Extent of use of HIT functionalities for PE of 
hospital in a given year 
Patient 
Transition 
Capability 
Extent of Use of PT  
Extent of use of HIT functionalities for PT of 
hospital in a given year 
 
Note: Control for hospital size, hospital ownership, system, trauma level, nursing intensity, 
percent Medicare days, rural, and year dummies. 
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3.5.2. Construct Operationalization 
Table 3.2 presents the operationalization of constructs. We further elaborate below. 
Pneumonia Readmission Rate: We measured pneumonia readmission rate as the risk-standardized, 
all-cause 30-day readmission (defined as readmission for any cause within 30 days from the date 
of discharge of the index admission) rate for patients discharged from the hospital with a principal 
discharge diagnosis of pneumonia (CMS 2010) in a given year.  
Operating Expense: We measured a hospital’s patient cost of care as the total operating expense 
(payroll expenses, employee benefits, depreciation expense, interest expense, and supply expense) 
of the hospital in a given year.  
Development of Extent of Use and Rate of Growth of Clinical Process Management: We first 
averaged 36 items capturing electronic clinical documentation, results viewing, computerized 
physician order entry, clinical decision support, bar coding, and other. Each item was measured on 
a 4-point scale, where 1=Not in place and not considering implementing and 4=fully implemented 
across all units. To calculate rate of growth of use of CPM, we took the difference between extent 
of use of CPM in time t and time t-1 and divided it by extent of use of CPM at time t-1.1
Development of the Extent of Use of Patient Engagement and Patient Transition: Patient 
engagement and patient transition are aggregated measures of 18 and 9 items, respectively. These 
items were measured on a 2-point scale, where 0=no functionality and 1=yes functionality. 
Measures for Control Variables: We specified several variables, such as hospital characteristics, 
as controls and describe them next. We measured (a) system as a binary variable if the hospital 
was part of a healthcare system such as Kaiser, (b) trauma level as a binary variable if the hospital 
                                                 
1 Following Kazanjian 1988 and Stuart 2000, we alternatively specified rate of growth as the extent of use 
of CPM in time t divided by the extent of use of CPM at time t-1 and found the results to be robust. 
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was a level 1 trauma center, (c) firm size as the natural log of total facility admissions, (d) hospital 
ownership status as a binary variable if the hospital had non-profit status, (e) nursing intensity as 
the natural log of the total number of nurses (full time registered nurses and advanced practice 
nurses) divided by the total number of inpatient days, (f) percent Medicare days as total number 
of Medicare days divided by the total number of inpatient days, (g) rural as a binary variable if the 
hospital was located in a rural region, and (h) year dummy variables.
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Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics 
 Variable 
Hospital-Year 
Observations 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Pneumonia Readmission Rate 4,090 18.11 1.57 13.00 27.60 
Operating Expense* 6,304 $ 124,723 $ 221,545 $ 213 $ 4,530,463 
Extent of Use of CPM 2,586 2.77 0.89 1.00 4.00 
Rate of Growth of Use of CPM 2,586 0.10 0.32 -0.75 2.97 
Extent of Use of PE 3,346 0.44 0.33 0.00 1.00 
Extent of Use of PT 3,405 0.66 0.37 0.00 1.00 
System 6,327 0.59 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Non-Profit 4,733 0.66 0.47 0.00 1.00 
Admissions 6,304 5,958 8,664 1.00 146,388 
Trauma Level 1 3,847 0.22 0.41 0.00 1.00 
Nursing Intensity 4,161 0.02 0.61 0.00 68.00 
Specialist Physicians 3,696 30.42 108.51 0.00 1,957.00 
Percent Medicaid Days 6,304 0.47 0.24 0.00 5.89 
Rural 6,304 0.19 0.40 0.00 1.00 
Notes: * indicates that the numbers are in thousands 
 
Table 3.4: Correlation Matrix 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 Pneumonia Readmission Rate 1             
2 Operating Expense 0.079* 1            
3 Extent of Use of CPM -0.087* 0.481* 1           
4 Rate of Growth of Use of CPM -0.003 -0.098 0.211 1          
5 Extent of Use of PE -0.063* 0.303* 0.516* 0.015 1         
6 Extent of Use of PT -0.037* 0.325* 0.631* 0.131 0.415* 1        
7 System -0.002 0.196* 0.157* -0.032 0.141* 0.082* 1       
8 Non-Profit -0.068* 0.331* 0.300* -0.004 0.186* 0.222* -0.156* 1      
9 Trauma Level 1 0.178* 0.384* 0.141* -0.045 0.063* 0.084* 0.102* 0.105* 1     
10 Total Admissions 0.152* 0.882* 0.401* -0.097 0.251* 0.283* 0.210* 0.228* 0.314* 1    
11 Nursing Intensity -0.090* 0.137* 0.254* 0.011 0.181* 0.183* -0.012 0.147* 0.058* 0.038* 1   
12 Medicare Days -0.014* -0.145* 0.033* 0.016 0.047* 0.028* 0.048* -0.112* -0.194* -0.027* 0.277* 1  
13 Rural -0.038* -0.421* -0.151* 0.084 -0.092* -0.103* -0.200* 0.152* -0.202* -0.407* 0.037* 0.063* 1 
Notes: * p < 0.05 
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3.6. Analysis and Results 
3.6.1. Descriptive Statistics 
We present the descriptive statistics in Table 3.3 and the correlation matrix in Table 3.4. 
We observe that the variables of interest – pneumonia readmission rate, operating expense, extent 
of use of CPM, rate of growth of use of CPM, extent of use of PE, and extent of use of PT – exhibit 
reasonable variance. 
3.6.2. Analysis Procedure and Model Specifications 
We specify and estimate the following panel model specifications: 
𝒚𝑖𝑡 = 𝐶𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝑃𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (1) 
𝒚𝑖𝑡 = 𝐶𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝐶𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝑃𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (2) 
𝒚𝑖𝑡 = 𝐶𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝑃𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝐶𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (3) 
𝒚𝑖𝑡 = 𝐶𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝑃𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝐶𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝐶𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝐶𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝑖𝑡 +
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
(4) 
𝒚𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝐶𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑡 + (R𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ CPM)𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝑃𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (5) 
𝒚𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝐶𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝑃𝑇𝑖𝑡 + (𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ CPM)𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝐶𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑡 ∗
𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 + (𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ CPM)𝑖𝑡
2 ∗ 𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
(6) 
𝒚𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝐶𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝑃𝑇𝑖𝑡 + (𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ CPM)𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝐶𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑡 ∗
𝑃𝑇𝑖𝑡 + (𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ CPM)𝑖𝑡
2 ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
(7) 
𝒚𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝐶𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝑃𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝐶𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 +
𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝐶𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝑖𝑡 + (𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ CPM)𝑖𝑡
2 + (𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ CPM)𝑖𝑡
2 ∗ 𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 +
(𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ CPM)𝑖𝑡
2 ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝐶𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝑖𝑡 +
(𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ CPM)𝑖𝑡
2 ∗ 𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
(8) 
 
where yit represents a vector of pneumonia readmission rate and operating expense, CPM 
represents the extent of use of CPM, Rate of Growth CPM represents the rate of growth of use of 
CPM, PE and PT represents the extent of use of PE and PT, Controls represents a vector of control 
variables, i represents the hospital, t represents the year, αi represents unobserved fixed factors 
associated with a hospital, and ε represents the error term. Equations 1-4 build out the CPM 
capability hypotheses (H1 and H2a/b/c, respectively). Equation 5 includes the (CPM)2 (rate of 
growth of use of CPM) (H3), equations 6 and 7 includes the interactions (CPM)2*PE and 
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(CPM)2*PT (H4a and H4b), respectively, and equation 8 includes the three-way rate of growth 
interaction (CPM)2*PE*PT (H4c). 
The square term in equation 5 is used to test the curvilinear relationship between the rate 
of growth of use of CPM capability and hospital performance. The interaction between PE and PT 
and the square term of CPM are used to test the moderating effect of PE and PT capabilities on 
hospital performance. We follow the residual-centering approach (Lance 1988; Xue et al. 2011) to 
reduce the correlation between the variables of interest. This approach reduces the correlation 
between the singular terms, square terms, and interaction terms and addresses the issue of 
multicollinearity which provides for a better interpretation of the main and interaction effects. 
We chose a fixed effects specification to control for any differences across hospitals that 
are not observed. All variance inflation factors (VIF) and condition indices were well below their 
respective recommended thresholds of 10 and 30 (Greene 2007), with the highest inflation factor 
observed to be 3.47. 
3.6.3. Results 
 We present the extent of use of CPM and the rate of growth of use of CPM fixed effects 
estimation results in Table 3.5 and 3.6, respectively. In the extent of use of CPM interaction effects 
model, we find CPM*PE to be (1) negatively associated with pneumonia readmission rates (β=-
0.193, p<0.10) and (2) positively associated with operating expense (β=0.040, p<0.10). We also 
find that CPM*PE*PT is positively associated with operating expense (β=0.118, p<0.05). The 
results also indicate the variance explained in pneumonia readmission rates is approximately 0.119 
and operating expense is 0.907 across the extent of use of CPM models. In the rate of growth of 
use of CPM interaction effects model, we find CPM2*PE to be (1) negatively associated with 
pneumonia readmission rates (β=-0.852, p<0.01) and (2) positively associated with operating 
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expense (β=0.107, p<0.01). We also find that CPM2*PE*PT is (1) negatively associated with 
pneumonia readmission rates (β=-1.505, p<0.10) and (2) positively associated with operating 
expense (β=0.329, p<0.01).  Additionally, the results of the rate of growth analysis indicate that as 
the interaction effects are added to the model, explained variance modestly increases from 0.116 
to 0.131 for pneumonia readmissions rates and 0.880 to 0.916 for operating expense. This indicates 
that the HIT capabilities show good and mediocre explanations on explaining the variance in 
operating expense than pneumonia readmission rates, respectively.
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Table 3.5: Extent of Use of CPM - Fixed Effects Estimation Results 
  Pneumonia Readmission Rate Operating Expense 
 Model A Model B Model C Model A Model B Model C 
CPM 
-0.345*** -0.242*** 0.049 0.100*** 0.078*** 0.068** 
(0.043) (0.073) (0.118) (0.006) (0.013) (0.028) 
PE 
-0.269*** 0.385 0.840 0.041*** -0.092 0.286** 
(0.077) (0.398) (0.674) (0.011) (0.073) (0.145) 
PT 
0.129 0.110 0.085 -0.027*** -0.024** 0.225** 
(0.085) (0.085) (0.558) (0.010) (0.010) (0.107) 
CPM*PE  
-0.193* -0.278  0.040* -0.100** 
 (0.115) (0.220)  (0.021) (0.047) 
CPM*PT  
0.110 -0.064  0.013 -0.075** 
 (0.106) (0.180)  (0.016) (0.035) 
PE*PT   
-1.238   -0.341* 
  (0.991)   (0.185) 
CPM*PE*PT   
0.392   0.118** 
  (0.300)   (0.057) 
System 
-0.053 -0.053 -0.054 -0.021 -0.022* -0.022* 
(0.084) (0.084) (0.084) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Non-Profit 
-0.053 -0.053 -0.058 0.215*** 0.214*** 0.211*** 
(0.128) (0.128) (0.128) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) 
Trauma level 1 
0.392*** 0.392*** 0.393*** 0.108*** 0.108*** 0.109*** 
(0.096) (0.096) (0.096) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Total Admissions (LN) 
0.236*** 0.235*** 0.235*** 0.741*** 0.741*** 0.741*** 
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Nursing Intensity (LN) 
-0.089* -0.088* -0.087* 0.097*** 0.097*** 0.096*** 
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) 
Percent Medicare 
Days 
0.212 0.212 0.205 -0.055 -0.056 -0.056 
(0.186) (0.187) (0.186) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
Rural 
0.423*** 0.423*** 0.422*** -0.128*** -0.127*** -0.127*** 
(0.115) (0.115) (0.115) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
Year 2011 
0.089** 0.089** 0.089** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.038*** 
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Year 2012 
0.208*** 0.207*** 0.208*** 0.102*** 0.103*** 0.104*** 
(0.056) (0.057) (0.057) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Year 2013 
-0.702*** -0.702*** -0.695*** 0.147*** 0.148*** 0.149*** 
(0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Year 2014 
-0.651*** -0.653*** -0.663*** 0.200*** 0.203*** 0.203*** 
(0.071) (0.073) (0.074) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Constant 
15.70*** 15.74*** 15.59*** 12.46*** 12.41*** 12.30*** 
(0.418) (0.456) (0.526) (0.176) (0.176) (0.182) 
R-Squared 0.119 0.119 0.120 0.907 0.907 0.907 
Number of Hospitals 4,131 4,131 4,131 4,577 4,577 4,577 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 3.6: Rate of Growth of Use of CPM - Fixed Effects Estimation Results 
Variables 
Pneumonia Readmission Rate Operating Expense 
Model A Model B Model C Model A Model B Model C 
CPM 
0.055 -0.440** -0.636* -0.009 0.072*** 0.110** 
(0.062) (0.195) (0.367) (0.007) (0.026) (0.046) 
PE 
0.040 -0.404*** -0.644** -0.005 0.071*** 0.035 
(0.101) (0.108) (0.282) (0.009) (0.012) (0.028) 
PT 
-0.082 -0.088 -0.259 0.001 0.010 -0.010 
(0.101) (0.107) (0.211) (0.008) (0.010) (0.021) 
(CPM)2 
-0.055 0.140 -0.438 0.001 -0.015 0.111** 
(0.059) (0.204) (0.413) (0.006) (0.027) (0.050) 
CPM*PE 
 -0.285 -0.158  -0.048 -0.084 
 (0.270) (0.780)  (0.032) (0.078) 
CPM*PT 
 1.018*** 1.299**  -0.084** -0.132* 
 (0.309) (0.573)  (0.037) (0.068) 
(CPM)2*PE 
 -0.852*** 0.297  0.107*** -0.148* 
 (0.269) (0.695)  (0.034) (0.081) 
(CPM)2*PT 
 0.431 1.269*  -0.058 -0.238*** 
 (0.329) (0.649)  (0.038) (0.077) 
PE*PT 
  0.308   0.044 
  (0.336)   (0.034) 
CPM*PE*PT 
  -0.166   0.034 
  (0.980)   (0.099) 
(CPM)2*PE*PT 
  -1.505*   0.328*** 
  (0.910)   (0.111) 
System 
0.045 -0.179 -0.174 -0.012 0.026 0.026 
(0.175) (0.189) (0.189) (0.013) (0.018) (0.018) 
Non-Profit 
0.412 0.787 0.781 0.026 -0.047 -0.041 
(0.597) (0.622) (0.651) (0.039) (0.040) (0.038) 
Trauma Level 1 
0.152 0.202 0.201 0.020 0.000 0.003 
(0.241) (0.275) (0.276) (0.019) (0.023) (0.023) 
Total Admissions (LN) 
0.315 1.336*** 1.338*** 0.226*** 0.071 0.070 
(0.279) (0.298) (0.299) (0.046) (0.049) (0.049) 
Nursing Intensity (LN) 
-0.054 -0.282** -0.275** 0.032** 0.068*** 0.067*** 
(0.131) (0.114) (0.115) (0.015) (0.020) (0.020) 
Percent Medicare Days 
-0.185 -0.198 -0.196 0.057 0.044 0.043 
(0.269) (0.243) (0.246) (0.047) (0.052) (0.052) 
Rural 
0.279 0.284 0.261 -0.007 0.002 0.000 
(0.234) (0.209) (0.208) (0.027) (0.036) (0.037) 
Year = 2011 
0.066 0.065 0.061 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.035*** 
(0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Year = 2012 
0.190*** 0.193*** 0.189*** 0.093*** 0.093*** 0.094*** 
(0.065) (0.065) (0.066) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Year = 2013 
-0.692*** -0.685*** -0.686*** 0.127*** 0.127*** 0.127*** 
(0.080) (0.080) (0.080) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Year = 2014 
-0.679*** -0.666*** -0.675*** 0.175*** 0.174*** 0.174*** 
(0.085) (0.086) (0.086) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Constant 
14.90*** 14.68*** 14.80*** 18.48*** 18.49*** 18.51*** 
(2.396) (2.387) (2.391) (0.433) (0.436) (0.422) 
R-Squared 0.116 0.130 0.131 0.880 0.915 0.916 
Number of Hospitals 3,111 3,111 3,111 3,401 3,401 3,401 
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses  
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3.6.4. Interaction Plots  
After reviewing the regression results, we plotted the significant interactions (See Figure 
3.2a-c). We performed a simple slope test for each regression line to test if the slopes were 
significantly different than zero and found further support for our interaction plots (Aiken and 
West 1991). We observe increases in the extent of use of CPM negatively impacts pneumonia 
readmission rates when PE is high (Figure 3.2a). In contrast, increases in the extent of use of CPM 
positively impacts operating expense when PE is high (Figure 3.2b). When PT is introduced in the 
models, we now find that if a hospital increases the extent of use of CPM, when PE and PT are 
high then operating expenses increase (Figure 3.2c). 
  
Figure 3.2a: Interaction Effect of Extent of Use 
of CPM * PE on Pneumonia Readmission Rate 
Figure 3.2b: Interaction Effect of Extent of Use 
of CPM * PE on Operating Expense 
 
 
Figure 3.2c: Interaction Effect of Extent of Use 
of CPM * PE * PT on Operating Expense 
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To better understand the quadratic relationships, we plotted the significant interactions (See 
Figure 3.3a-d). We observe increases in the rate of growth of use of CPM negatively impacts 
pneumonia readmission rates when PE is high (Figure 3.3a). In contrast, increases in the rate of 
growth of use of CPM positively impacts operating expense when PE is high (Figure 3.3b). When 
PT is introduced in the models, we now find that if a hospital increases the rate of growth of use 
of CPM, when PE and PT are high then pneumonia readmission rates increase, but operating 
expense decreases (Figure 3.3c and 3.3d). 
  
Figure 3.3a: Interaction Effect of Rate of 
Growth of CPM2 * PE on Pneumonia 
Readmission Rate 
Figure 3.3b: Interaction Effect of Rate of 
Growth of CPM2 * PE on Operating 
Expense 
  
Figure 3.3c: Interaction Effect of Rate of 
Growth of CPM2 * PE * PT on Pneumonia 
Readmission Rate 
Figure 3.3d: Interaction Effect of Rate of 
Growth of CPM2 * PE * PT on Operating 
Expense 
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3.6.5. Economic Significance 
In terms of economic significance, when PE is high and a hospital ramps up the extent of 
use of CPM from Low to High then pneumonia readmission rates will drop by 0.699%. While the 
percentage decrease may not seem large, in our sample hospitals have on average total admissions 
of 6,000 patients. With an average pneumonia readmission rate of 18%, that means that on average 
1,087 patients are readmitted per year. Therefore, a decrease of 0.699% in the pneumonia 
readmission rate translates into on average 1,038 readmitted patients, thus keeping 49 patients 
from being readmitted per hospital per year. When PE is high and a hospital ramps up the extent 
of use of CPM from Low to High then operating expense will increase by $60,164 (See Table 3.7). 
When we look at the three-way interactions, we find that increases in the extent of use of CPM 
with high extent of use of PE and PT increase operating expenses by $3,565 (See Table 3.8). 
Table 3.7: Economic Significant for Extent of Use of CPM and Patient Engagement 
 
Extent of Use of CPM (Low  High) 
High Extent of Use of PE Low Extent of Use of PE 
Pneumonia  
Readmission Rate 
- 0.699% - 0.468% 
Operating Expense (LN) $60,164 $44,791 
 
Table 3.8: Economic Significance for Extent of Use of CPM, Patient Engagement, and 
Patient Transition  
Extent of Use of CPM (Low  High)  
High Extent of Use of PE Low Extent of Use of PE  
High Extent of 
Use of PT 
Low Extent of Use 
of PT 
High Extent of 
Use of PT 
Low Extent of Use 
of PT 
Operating 
Expense 
 $3,565 - $2,138 - $3,423 $18,542 
 
For the rate of growth of use of CPM, when PE is high and a hospital ramps up the rate of 
growth of use of CPM from Low to High then pneumonia readmission rates will drop by 0.728%. 
This decrease of 0.728% in the pneumonia readmission rate translates into keeping 47 patients 
  
90 
from being readmitted per hospital per year. When PE is high and a hospital ramps up the rate of 
growth of use of CPM from Low to High then operating expense will increase by $5,393,388 (See 
Table 3.9). When we look at the three-way rate of growth interactions, we find high extent of use 
of PE and PT with increases in rate of growth of use of CPM increase pneumonia readmission 
rates by 0.408% (increasing 25 readmissions) and decrease operating expenses by $6,706,839 (See 
Table 3.10). 
Table 3.9: Economic Significant for Rate of Growth of Use of CPM and Patient 
Engagement 
 
Rate of Growth of Use of CPM (Low  High) 
High Extent of Use of PE Low Extent of Use of PE 
Pneumonia  
Readmission Rate 
-0.728% -0.437% 
Operating Expense (LN) $5,393,388 $6,877,687 
 
Table 3.10: Economic Significance for Rate of Growth of Use of CPM, Patient 
Engagement, and Patient Transition  
Rate of Growth of Use of CPM (Low  High)  
High Extent of Use of PE Low Extent of Use of PE  
High Extent of 
Use of PT 
Low Extent of Use 
of PT 
High Extent of 
Use of PT 
Low Extent of Use 
of PT 
Pneumonia 
Readmission 
Rate 
0.408% - 0.423% 0.779% - 0.272% 
Operating 
Expense (LN) 
- $6,706,839 $1,482,393 - $5,485,026 $7,405,633 
 
3.6.6. Robustness Tests 
Lag Effects: We evaluated the robustness of lagged effects using one and two-years out and found 
the models to be robust. In particular, CPM*PE and (Rate of Growth CPM)2*PE shows immediate, 
short-term and lag effects for both pneumonia readmission rates and operating expense. 
Furthermore, CPM*PE*PT and (Rate of Growth CPM)2*PE*PT shows an immediate, short-term 
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effect for pneumonia readmission rates and a lagged effect for operating expense (See Appendix 
3.A, Table 3.A1 and 3.A2). Table 3.11 provides a summary of (1) the fixed effects for the extent 
of use of CPM and rate of growth of use of CPM with clustered robust standard error results (Model 
1) and (2) the robustness results using lag effects for 1 and 2 years out (Model 2 and Model 3, 
respectively). 
Table 3.11: Summary of Extent of Use of CPM and Rate of Growth of Use of CPM Fixed 
Effects Results and Lag Effects 
  (a) Pneumonia Readmission Rate (b) Operating Expense 
  
Model 1 
Model 2 
– Lag 1 
Model 3 
– Lag 2 
Model 1 
Model 2 
– Lag 1 
Model 3 
– Lag 2 
H1: CPM *** *** *** *** *** *** 
H2a: CPM*PE * * *** *   * 
H2b: CPM*PT     **       
H2c: CPM*PE*PT   ** * * *   
H3: (RoG CPM)2             
H4a: (RoG CPM)2*PE *** * * ***   * 
H4b: (RoG CPM)2*PT             
H4c: (RoG CPM)2*PE*PT *     *** *** ** 
Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; RoG represents Rate of Growth 
 
Reverse Causality: We further evaluated reverse causality in our models, as pneumonia 
readmission rate or operating expense could influence the extent of use and rate of growth of use 
of CPM. We do not find that this is the case (See Appendix 3.A, Table 3.A3 and Table 3.A4).  
Quadratic Instrumental Variable: In addition to lagging forward our dependent variables to 
mitigate endogeneity concerns, we also evaluated our model using a quadratic instrumental 
variable specification. We identified the readmission reduction program of 2012 as an instrument. 
This instrument satisfies the prerequisites of being theoretically relevant and exogenous (Greene 
2007). The results indicate that our instrument is endogenous (p<0.01) and strong (Sargan 
Test=0.118, p=0.732) when evaluating pneumonia readmission rates. However, the instrument 
fails when evaluating operating expense (Sargan Test=6.013, p=0.015) (See Appendix 3.A, Table 
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3.A5). Using this instrumental variable specification, our results were robust. Thus, given the 
robustness of the additional analysis, we do not believe endogeneity to be an issue in our model. 
Falsification: We used propensity score matching as an approach to conduct falsification tests for 
pneumonia readmission rates and operating expense (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). This 
methodology aims to create matched pairs of treated and non-treated subjects, which only differ 
on the treatment variable and not any other observed characteristics. We created matching pairs of 
hospitals based on several important characteristics, such as extent of use of PE and PT, whether 
or not the hospital was in a system, non-profit status, hospital size (total admissions), and rural 
location. Furthermore, we were able to define a clean treatment group using the extent of use and 
rate of growth of use of CPM. We find a significant treatment effect for both pneumonia 
readmission rate and operating expense (See Appendix 3.B, Table 3.B1 and 3.B2). Thus, our 
approach is valid. 
Alternative Model Specification: We evaluated the robustness of the fixed effects estimation 
results. The Hausman test suggests that the fixed effect specification was appropriate for both the 
extent of use of CPM and rate of growth of use of CPM (See Appendix 3.B, Table 3.B3 and Table 
3.B4). The results for the random effect specification are also provided in Appendix 3.B, Table 
3.B5 and Table 3.B6 and are consistent with the fixed effects results. 
Higher Order Effects: Additionally, after careful disambiguation of higher order effects, we found 
that the rate of growth of use of CPM quadratic specification was preferred over a cubic or quartic 
specification (See Appendix 3.B, Table 3.B7). 
3.7. Discussion 
 Driven by the increasing focus on meeting conflicting goals of decreasing patient cost of 
care and increasing patient quality of care, HITs are becoming important aspects of the healthcare 
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process (Angst and Agarwal 2009). In developing our contributions, we were careful of the 
idiosyncrasies of healthcare by theorizing in this context. Though traditional research has focused 
on the improvement in clinical processes, such as the use of CPOE or clinical decision support 
systems, one cannot overlook the importance of patient engagement and patient transition in the 
healthcare process. Thus, this study sought to expand our scholarly understanding of how the 
impact of developing an IT capability is conditional on a portfolio of interdependent capabilities.  
Drawing on an extensive panel of approximately 5,000 U.S. hospitals from 2008-2014, our 
analysis revealed that hospitals 1) could see a reduction in their pneumonia readmission rate, but 
also an increase in their operating expense when their CPM capability increases, 2) should focus 
on attaining high CPM and PE capabilities to reduce pneumonia readmission rates, 3) should focus 
on attaining either high PE or high PT capabilities with high CPM capability to reduce operating 
expense, and 4) with respect to the rate of growth of a hospital’s CPM capability, should first 
decide where to prioritize their outcomes now and then evaluate their status of patient capabilities 
before deciding whether to slow down or ramp up their CPM capability. Our findings support our 
hypotheses that a hospital’s CPM capability should be conditioned on their Patient Engagement 
capability and that the rate of growth of use of CPM capability needs to be conditioned on both 
their PE and PT capabilities to extract non-linear complementarities for hospital performance. Of 
most interest are the economic implications of the rate of growth of use of CPM capability, as this 
is where hospitals see the biggest impacts. Our results have further implications for our 
understanding about the creation of business value from IT-enabled coordination capabilities, 
which we discuss below. 
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3.7.1. Theoretical Implications 
By surfacing how the interdependencies between both a hospital's CPM capability and the 
rate of growth of a CPM capability, conditioned on two patient capabilities, can either create or 
erode business value, we contribute to the IT business value and IT capabilities literatures 
(Bharadwaj 2000; Brynjolffson and Hitt 2000; Rai et al. 2012; Rai and Tang 2010). Additionally, 
by showing that hospital performance (pneumonia readmission rates and operating expense) is 
impacted by the interaction of (1) a hospital’s CPM capability and (2) rate of growth of a hospital’s 
CPM capability both conditioned on PE and PT capabilities, we contribute to our understanding 
of the complementary roles of coordination capabilities in explaining firm performance in the 
healthcare context. We elaborate on these theoretical contributions below.  
 We extend past work that has shown how capabilities create business value (Barua et al. 
2004; Bharadwaj et al. 2007; Rai et al. 2006) by surfacing that a firm’s performance is not just 
reflected in capabilities but also in the rate of growth. Our results reveal that firms realize 
significantly more increases in quality of care when hospitals ramp up their CPM capability in 
conjunction with a high PE capability. Therefore, our results demonstrate the importance of 
considering a non-linear, temporal perspective of returns to IT capabilities development. 
 Furthermore, our study extends prior work on the return to development of CPM by 
surfacing that the return to development of CPM is conditioned on a portfolio of patient 
capabilities. Our results reveal that a hospital realizes lower operating expenses when ramping up 
the rate of growth of use of CPM capability conditional on PE and PT capabilities. When a hospital 
is looking to target either pneumonia readmission rates and/or operating expense it is important 
for them to consider the impact of their IT capability, not just extent of use, but rate of growth 
conditional on a portfolio of interdependent IT capabilities. Thus, we extend the complementarities 
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literature and show how the impact of developing an IT capability is conditional on a portfolio of 
interdependent IT capabilities (Aral et al. 2012; Tambe et al. 2012). 
3.7.2. Implications for Practice 
Our study suggests that IT executives and managers in hospitals should not rely solely on 
their CPM capability, but should (1) determine where to prioritize their performance goals, (2) 
evaluate their patient engagement and transition capabilities, and (3) pace the growth of their CPM 
capability based on the current patient capabilities. Consequently, they should establish 
collaborative processes to dynamically align their rate of growth of use of CPM capability and 
patient capabilities for hospital performance. 
Given the potential to leverage HIT capabilities to influence patient quality and cost of 
care, hospitals need to allocate investments in patient capabilities while also considering the rate 
of growth of their CPM capability. They also need to recognize that there are significant cost and 
patient consequences to growing their CPM capability under the wrong patient engagement and 
transition conditions. On the one hand, ramping up CPM capability while in a high patient 
engagement and high patient transition capability environment is likely to decrease costs, but on 
the other hand, under these same conditions pneumonia readmission rates are likely to increase. 
By adjusting the rate of growth of use of CPM capability conditional on patient capabilities, 
hospitals can affect patient quality and cost of care.  
3.7.3. Conclusion 
Our study shows that a hospital’s Clinical Process Management capability affects hospital 
performance and that this effect is conditional on two patient capabilities – Patient Engagement 
and Patient Transition. It also suggests that not just the level of a capability but also the rate of 
growth of a capability that affects hospital performance and that the rate needs to be adjusted 
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upward or downward based on the level of complementary capabilities. Our findings advance our 
theoretical understanding about the business value to a firm’s IT resources directed at core business 
processes by: (1) interpreting capabilities for process management with a coordination focus and 
(2) combining the capabilities perspective with the complementarities perspective. The findings 
also advance theory about IT business value and IT capabilities by surfacing why it is not only the 
level of a capability but also the rate of its growth that affects business value and why the rate of 
growth can be too fast or too slow based on the level of complementary capabilities.  
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3.9. Appendix 3.A 
 
3.9.1. Robustness Checks for Endogeneity 
 
In addition to the Fixed Effects estimations that are reported in the paper, we estimated the 
models with lags using 1 and 2 years out. The year 1 and year 2 lag results, reported in Table 3.A1 
and 3.A2, for the extent of use and rate of growth of use of CPM, respectively, are consistent with 
the results and support our hypotheses.  
Furthermore, we tested for reverse causality to examine whether pneumonia readmission 
rate or operating expense influence the extent of use and the rate of growth of use of CPM and find 
that none of the coefficients are significant leading us to believe that reverse causality is not a 
problem. Table 3.A3 and 3.A4 reports the results. 
In addition to lagging forward our dependent variables to mitigate endogeneity concerns, 
we also evaluated our model using a quadratic instrumental variable specification for the rate of 
growth of use of CPM. The results are summarized in Table 3.A5. We briefly describe the process 
that we employed. We use the Readmission Reduction Program that was introduced in 2012 by 
the CMS as our instrument. This was a federally mandated program and unlikely to be correlated 
with the error term but is correlated to the regressors. This instrument satisfies the prerequisites of 
being relevant theoretically and exogenous (Greene 2007). We find that the readmission reduction 
program is a valid instrument for pneumonia readmission rate (Sargan Test=0.118, p=0.732), but 
not for operating expense (Sargan Test=6.013, p=0.015). 
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Table 3.A1: Extent of Use - Fixed Effects Estimation Results Lag 1 & 2 Years 
Variables 
Pneumonia Readmission Ratet+1 Operating Expenset+1 Pneumonia Readmission Ratet+2 Operating Expenset+2 
Model A Model B Model C Model A Model B Model C Model A Model B Model C Model A Model B Model C 
CPM 
-0.492*** -0.091 0.051 0.083*** 0.071*** 0.043** -0.440*** -0.138** -0.230* 0.046*** 0.027** -0.017 
(0.040) (0.057) (0.102) (0.006) (0.011) (0.020) (0.043) (0.057) (0.125) (0.006) (0.013) (0.026) 
PE 
0.057 -0.604* 0.386 -0.007 -0.080 0.111 -0.168* -0.883*** 0.803 -0.011 -0.118* -0.037 
(0.085) (0.318) (0.546) (0.012) (0.060) (0.131) (0.087) (0.304) (0.639) (0.013) (0.066) (0.125) 
PT 
0.452*** 0.055 0.735* -0.039*** -0.037*** 0.135* 0.306*** 0.050 1.764*** 0.007 0.010 0.064 
(0.084) (0.075) (0.441) (0.011) (0.011) (0.081) (0.093) (0.074) (0.486) (0.012) (0.0117) (0.096) 
CPM*PE 
 0.159* -0.197  0.022 -0.056  0.262*** -0.241  0.035* 0.029 
 (0.092) (0.187)  (0.018) (0.042)  (0.092) (0.239)  (0.020) (0.044) 
CPM*PT 
 0.060 -0.239  -0.009 -0.047*  -0.202** -0.436**  0.007 0.004 
 (0.092) (0.149)  (0.014) (0.027)  (0.102) (0.177)  (0.017) (0.033) 
PE*PT 
  -1.579**   -0.225   -2.100**   -0.108 
  (0.798)   (0.169)   (0.939)   (0.167) 
CPM*PE*PT 
  0.538**   0.088*   0.559*   0.008 
  (0.252)   (0.052)   (0.321)   (0.055) 
System 
-0.033 -0.032 -0.034 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 0.031 0.035 0.037 -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 
(0.081) (0.082) (0.081) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.079) (0.079) (0.079) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
Non-Profit 
0.016 0.013 0.007 0.267*** 0.267*** 0.266*** 0.085 0.084 0.084 0.281*** 0.281*** 0.279*** 
(0.138) (0.138) (0.138) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.142) (0.143) (0.143) (0.070) (0.070) (0.071) 
Trauma level 1 
0.336*** 0.335*** 0.337*** 0.140*** 0.140*** 0.141*** 0.415*** 0.409*** 0.406*** 0.203*** 0.203*** 0.201*** 
(0.095) (0.095) (0.095) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.105) (0.105) (0.105) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
Total Admissions 
(LN) 
0.236*** 0.237*** 0.236*** 0.737*** 0.737*** 0.738*** 0.228*** 0.231*** 0.231*** 0.747*** 0.747*** 0.747*** 
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Nursing Intensity (LN) 
-0.073 -0.071 -0.072 0.121*** 0.121*** 0.121*** -0.009 -0.002 -0.006 0.104*** 0.104*** 0.104*** 
(0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.058) (0.059) (0.060) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Percent Medicare 
Days 
0.485*** 0.484*** 0.476*** -0.078 -0.078 -0.079 -0.047 -0.062 -0.055 -0.111** -0.112** -0.111** 
(0.139) (0.140) (0.139) (0.054) (0.054) (0.055) (0.277) (0.280) (0.284) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) 
System 
0.396*** 0.395*** 0.397*** -0.285*** -0.285*** -0.284*** 0.326** 0.327** 0.330** -0.282*** -0.281*** -0.281*** 
(0.136) (0.136) (0.136) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.155) (0.155) (0.155) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) 
Year = 2012 
0.087** 0.085** 0.087** 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.058*** -0.956*** -0.961*** -0.958*** 0.034*** 0.033*** 0.034*** 
(0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Year = 2013 
-0.825*** -0.831*** -0.828*** 0.091*** 0.091*** 0.092*** -0.961*** -0.971*** -0.971*** 0.072*** 0.071*** 0.072*** 
(0.054) (0.055) (0.055) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.043) (0.044) (0.044) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Year = 2014 
-0.804*** -0.809*** -0.803*** 0.138*** 0.138*** 0.139*** 16.26*** 16.68*** 16.59*** 12.53*** 12.55*** 12.56*** 
(0.060) (0.061) (0.060) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.558) (0.575) (0.611) (0.216) (0.218) (0.224) 
Constant 
15.65*** 15.91*** 15.54*** 12.62*** 12.62*** 12.55*** -0.440*** -0.138** -0.230* 0.046*** 0.027** -0.017 
(0.432) (0.451) (0.504) (0.169) (0.170) (0.176) (0.043) (0.057) (0.125) (0.006) (0.013) (0.026) 
Number of Hospitals  3,302 3,302 3,302 3,646 3,646 3,646 3,185 3,185 3,185 3,495 3,495 3,495 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 3.A2: Rate of Growth Fixed Effects Estimation Results – Lag 1 and 2 Years 
Variables 
Pneumonia Readmission Ratet+1 Operating Expense t+1 Pneumonia Readmission Ratet+2 Operating Expense t+1 
Model A Model B Model C Model A Model B Model C Model A Model B Model C Model A Model B Model C 
Rate of Growth CPM 
-0.032 -0.025 -0.008 0.005 0.005 0.009 0.032 0.080 -0.157 -0.017 -0.139 -0.270*** 
(0.082) (0.080) (0.089) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.069) (0.286) (0.392) (0.015) (0.089) (0.077) 
PE 
-0.016 -0.103 -0.087 0.008 0.010 0.023 -0.043 0.208 0.257 -0.005 -0.122 -0.214*** 
(0.104) (0.102) (0.133) (0.007) (0.008) (0.014) (0.070) (0.320) (0.441) (0.012) (0.077) (0.075) 
PT 
-0.181* -0.184* -0.256** -0.017* -0.017* -0.011 -0.182* -0.223** -0.295 -0.022* -0.034*** -0.030 
(0.108) (0.108) (0.119) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.098) (0.102) (0.274) (0.012) (0.011) (0.027) 
(Rate of Growth CPM)2 
0.026 0.017 -0.030 -0.008 -0.008 -0.009 0.041 0.070 0.0164 0.029** 0.029*** 0.026 
(0.097) (0.096) (0.109) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.107) (0.110) (0.215) (0.012) (0.010) (0.021) 
(Rate of Growth 
CPM)*PE 
 1.028** 0.777  -0.031 -0.068  0.671* 1.467  0.107** 0.552*** 
 (0.462) (0.528)  (0.049) (0.057)  (0.345) (1.050)  (0.055) (0.162) 
(Rate of Growth 
CPM)*PT 
 -0.214 -0.178  0.007 -0.019  -0.500 -0.134  0.057 0.260*** 
 (0.407) (0.526)  (0.039) (0.045)  (0.434) (0.554)  (0.087) (0.095) 
(Rate of Growth 
CPM)2*PE 
 -0.717* -0.877*  0.019 0.018  -0.584* -0.616  0.086* 0.407*** 
 (0.422) (0.496)  (0.046) (0.052)  (0.326) (1.083)  (0.050) (0.147) 
(Rate of Growth 
CPM)2*PT 
 0.329 0.691  -0.023 0.036  0.150 0.072  0.051 0.162* 
 (0.431) (0.643)  (0.044) (0.057)  (0.438) (0.584)  (0.081) (0.087) 
PE*PT   
-0.073   0.000   0.101   -0.002 
  (0.062)   (0.008)   (0.359)   (0.035) 
(Rate of Growth 
CPM)*PE*PT 
  -0.529   -0.260   -1.026   -0.563*** 
  (1.723)   (0.158)   (1.093)   (0.171) 
(Rate of Growth 
CPM)2*PE*PT 
  0.676   0.349***   0.104   -0.344** 
  (1.395)   (0.134)   (1.117)   (0.152) 
System 
-0.077 -0.068 -0.052 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.086 0.069 0.066 0.006 0.005 0.005 
(0.176) (0.176) (0.187) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.158) (0.160) (0.161) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Non-Profit 
0.805 0.798 -0.401*** 0.090*** 0.091*** 0.016 0.585 0.658 0.660 0.156 0.156 0.151 
(0.527) (0.520) (0.122) (0.035) (0.035) (0.013) (0.398) (0.411) (0.410) (0.096) (0.097) (0.097) 
Trauma Level 1 
-0.435 -0.425 -0.177 0.025 0.025 0.032 -0.140 -0.115 -0.115 0.019 0.018 0.0144 
(0.310) (0.310) (0.312) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.176) (0.174) (0.176) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Total Admissions (LN) 
0.510 0.502 0.397 0.230*** 0.230*** 0.226*** 0.243 0.216 0.220 0.333*** 0.337*** 0.341*** 
(0.328) (0.327) (0.351) (0.060) (0.061) (0.068) (0.304) (0.304) (0.306) (0.076) (0.076) (0.075) 
Nursing Intensity (LN) 
0.195 0.204 0.091 0.020 0.020 0.024* 0.249** 0.207* 0.213* 0.010 0.006 0.004 
(0.131) (0.131) (0.138) (0.014) (0.014) (0.0148) (0.118) (0.118) (0.121) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) 
Percent Medicare Days 
0.008 -0.000 -0.047 0.048 0.049 0.111 0.157 0.203 0.208 0.003 -0.003 -0.012 
(0.209) (0.214) (0.338) (0.080) (0.080) (0.091) (0.486) (0.489) (0.490) (0.053) (0.051) (0.051) 
Rural 
0.120 0.121 0.171 0.019 0.018 0.022 0.087 0.070 0.065 0.022 0.025 0.027 
(0.239) (0.243) (0.264) (0.036) (0.036) (0.041) (0.138) (0.179) (0.180) (0.025) (0.023) (0.021) 
Year = 2012 
0.078 0.076 0.050 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.053***       
(0.049) (0.049) (0.054) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)       
Year = 2013 
-0.797*** -0.801*** -0.817*** 0.088*** 0.088*** 0.086*** -0.955*** -0.957*** -0.959*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.037*** 
(0.070) (0.070) (0.078) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Year = 2014 
-0.779*** -0.781*** -0.796*** 0.131*** 0.131*** 0.130*** -0.954*** -0.945*** -0.949*** 0.082*** 0.084*** 0.082*** 
(0.077) (0.077) (0.085) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) 
Constant 
14.44*** 14.57*** 16.10*** 16.83*** 16.82*** 16.98*** 17.09*** 17.03*** 17.06*** 15.91*** 15.86*** 15.83*** 
(2.861) (2.854) (3.042) (0.564) (0.567) (0.639) (2.548) (2.546) (2.541) (0.697) (0.696) (0.698) 
Number of Hospitals 2,172 2,172 1,845 2,353 2,353 1,993 1,484 1,484 1,484 1,603 1,603 1,603 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 3.A3: Reverse Causality – Extent of Use of CPM 
 Dependent Variable  CPM CPM*PE CPM*PT CPM*PE*PT CPM CPM*PE CPM*PT CPM*PE*PT 
Pneumonia 
Readmission Rate 
-0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002     
(0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)     
Operating Expense     
0.088*** -0.001 -0.018 -0.006 
    (0.025) (0.011) (0.012) (0.020) 
CPM  
0.506*** 0.655*** 0.327***  0.502*** 0.648*** 0.319*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.019)  (0.012) (0.013) (0.018) 
PE 
0.302*** 3.371*** 0.077*** 2.741*** 0.308*** 3.339*** 0.084*** 2.699*** 
(0.030) (0.017) (0.014) (0.028) (0.029) (0.018) (0.014) (0.028) 
PT 
0.850*** -0.104*** 2.854*** 1.374*** 0.864*** -0.099*** 2.822*** 1.363*** 
(0.037) (0.016) (0.026) (0.039) (0.035) (0.016) (0.025) (0.037) 
System 
0.053** 0.016** 0.006 0.035** 0.049** 0.016** 0.002 0.032** 
(0.021) (0.008) (0.009) (0.016) (0.020) (0.008) (0.009) (0.016) 
Non-Profit 
0.144*** 0.028** 0.028* 0.065*** 0.133*** 0.018 0.006 0.038 
(0.035) (0.013) (0.015) (0.024) (0.035) (0.016) (0.018) (0.027) 
Trauma level 1 
0.033 0.011 0.015 0.016 -0.006 0.011 0.023** 0.020 
(0.023) (0.008) (0.011) (0.018) (0.023) (0.008) (0.010) (0.016) 
Total Admissions 
(LN) 
0.073*** -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 0.004 -0.006 0.007 -0.005 
(0.009) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.023) (0.010) (0.012) (0.019) 
Nursing Intensity (LN) 
0.037** -0.013** -0.025*** -0.045*** 0.0340** -0.006 -0.011 -0.028** 
(0.015) (0.006) (0.007) (0.012) (0.015) (0.007) (0.007) (0.012) 
Percent Medicare 
Days 
-0.095* 0.009 0.031 0.043 -0.008 -0.0165 -0.001 0.003 
(0.056) (0.028) (0.027) (0.047) (0.052) (0.0253) (0.025) (0.041) 
Rural 
-0.076** 0.005 0.008 0.020 -0.066** -0.0121 0.010 0.001 
(0.034) (0.013) (0.015) (0.027) (0.033) (0.0145) (0.016) (0.026) 
Year 2011 
0.193*** 0.007 0.033*** 0.056*** 0.190*** 0.006 0.034*** 0.058*** 
(0.020) (0.008) (0.009) (0.015) (0.019) (0.008) (0.009) (0.015) 
Year 2012 
0.459*** 0.037*** 0.035*** 0.069*** 0.455*** 0.034*** 0.032*** 0.069*** 
(0.022) (0.011) (0.012) (0.020) (0.021) (0.010) (0.011) (0.019) 
Year 2013 
0.695*** 0.032*** -0.017 0.010 0.691*** 0.033*** -0.021* 0.011 
(0.022) (0.011) (0.012) (0.021) (0.022) (0.011) (0.012) (0.020) 
Year 2014 
0.658*** 0.103*** 0.117*** 0.243*** 0.644*** 0.107*** 0.120*** 0.248*** 
(0.022) (0.012) (0.013) (0.022) (0.022) (0.012) (0.013) (0.022) 
Constant 
1.512*** -1.705*** -1.987*** -2.486*** 0.374 -1.544*** -1.551*** -2.113*** 
(0.161) (0.069) (0.075) (0.124) (0.318) (0.141) (0.158) (0.262) 
Number of Hospitals  4,131 4,131 4,131 4,131 4,577 4,577 4,577 4,577 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 3.A4: Reverse Causality – Rate of Growth of Use of CPM  
Dependent Variable  (CPM)2 (CPM)2*PE (CPM)2*PT (CPM)2*PE*PT (CPM)2 (CPM)2*PE (CPM)2*PT (CPM)2*PE*PT 
Pneumonia 
Readmission Rate 
-0.006 -0.003 -0.002 0.000     
(0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000)     
Operating Expense     
0.014 0.002 -0.009 0.008 
    (0.063) (0.016) (0.016) (0.004) 
Rate of Growth CPM 
-0.022 -0.004 -0.010 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
(0.132) (0.034) (0.032) (0.007) (0.126) (0.031) (0.029) (0.006) 
PE 
-0.003 0.002 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
(0.025) (0.008) (0.009) (0.003) (0.025) (0.008) (0.009) (0.003) 
PT 
0.007 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
(0.034) (0.011) (0.012) (0.003) (0.034) (0.012) (0.012) (0.003) 
(Rate of Growth 
CPM)2 
 -0.159*** -0.084* -0.033***  -0.142*** -0.068 -0.029*** 
 (0.058) (0.045) (0.011)  (0.055) (0.043) (0.010) 
Rate of Growth 
CPM*PE 
 1.336***  0.077***  1.313***  0.077*** 
 (0.201)  (0.024)  (0.193)  (0.024) 
Rate of Growth 
CPM*PT 
  0.911*** 0.062*   0.894*** 0.054 
  (0.131) (0.035)   (0.126) (0.033) 
(Rate of Growth 
CPM)2*PE 
   -0.034    -0.029 
   (0.034)    (0.032) 
(Rate of Growth 
CPM)2*PT 
   -0.066    -0.060 
   (0.073)    (0.071) 
PE*PT    
-0.002*    -0.002** 
   (0.001)    (0.001) 
Rate of Growth 
CPM*PE*PT 
   1.038***    0.995*** 
   (0.188)    (0.168) 
System 
-0.007 0.003 -0.004 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
(0.024) (0.006) (0.005) (0.001) (0.024) (0.006) (0.005) (0.001) 
Non-Profit 
0.059 0.005 0.003 -0.004 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
(0.195) (0.028) (0.045) (0.016) (0.157) (0.020) (0.035) (0.012) 
Level 1 Trauma 
-0.014 0.004 0.006 -0.002 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
(0.027) (0.014) (0.015) (0.004) (0.026) (0.012) (0.014) (0.003) 
Total Admissions 
0.062 -0.003 0.023 -0.000 0.021 0.002 -0.001 -0.003 
(0.098) (0.097) (0.020) (0.022) (0.021) (0.023) (0.005) (0.006) 
Nursing Intensity 
-0.026 0.009 -0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.047) (0.009) (0.006) (0.002) (0.043) (0.009) (0.005) (0.003) 
Percent Medicare 
Days 
-0.023 0.013 0.008 0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
(0.086) (0.024) (0.023) (0.005) (0.087) (0.027) (0.024) (0.004) 
Rural 
0.007 0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(0.061) (0.019) (0.012) (0.004) (0.060) (0.019) (0.012) (0.003) 
Year=2011 
0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.014) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.015) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) 
Year=2012 
0.002 0.000 0.003 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 
(0.016) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.017) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) 
Year=2013 
-0.001 -0.004 -0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.000 0.001 -0.001 
(0.018) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.019) (0.005) (0.006) (0.001) 
Year=2014 
-0.008 -0.006 -0.003 0.001 -0.002 -0.000 0.002 0.001 
(0.020) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.021) (0.005) (0.006) (0.002) 
Constant 
-0.061 0.088 0.021 0.013 -0.266 -0.036 0.173 -0.146* 
(0.327) (0.061) (0.061) (0.019) (1.160) (0.317) (0.302) (0.076) 
Number of Hospitals 3,111 3,111 3,111 3,109 3,401 3,401 3,401 3,399 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 3.A5: Rate of Growth Quadratic Instrumental Variable Regression Results 
VARIABLES 
Pneumonia Readmission Rate Operating Expense 
Model A Model B Model C Model A Model B Model C 
Rate of Growth CPM 
1.303** 2.534*** -0.127 -0.331*** -0.828*** -0.459*** 
(0.525) (0.954) (0.653) (0.114) (0.229) (0.142) 
(Rate of Growth 
CPM)2 
-7.384** 0.096 -0.056 1.842*** -0.266 -0.257 
(3.012) (0.968) (0.753) (0.671) (0.215) (0.160) 
Rate of Growth CPM 
* PE 
 -13.640*** -0.508  3.027*** 0.385 
 (3.304) (2.329)  (0.729) (0.464) 
(Rate of Growth 
CPM)2 * PE 
 9.518*** -0.347  -2.201*** 0.400 
 (2.439) (1.729)  (0.562) (0.364) 
Rate of Growth CPM 
* PT 
 7.450*** -0.617  -1.716*** 0.129 
 (2.242) (1.303)  (0.492) (0.269) 
(Rate of Growth 
CPM)2 * PT 
 -7.632*** 0.617  2.039*** 0.341 
 (2.597) (1.072)  (0.604) (0.230) 
PE * PT 
  -0.453***   0.124*** 
  (0.066)   (0.015) 
Rate of Growth CPM 
* PE * PT 
  2.310   -0.493 
  (2.964)   (0.597) 
(Rate of Growth 
CPM)2 * PE * PT 
  -0.705   -0.479 
  (2.131)   (0.448) 
System 
0.127 -0.0489 -0.026 -0.139*** -0.078*** -0.083*** 
(0.133) (0.074) (0.065) (0.033) (0.016) (0.014) 
Non-Profit 
0.190 0.162 0.138 0.275*** 0.293*** 0.306*** 
(0.197) (0.127) (0.113) (0.046) (0.027) (0.024) 
Trauma Level 1 
0.498*** 0.476*** 0.496*** 0.193*** 0.225*** 0.224*** 
(0.128) (0.083) (0.073) (0.031) (0.017) (0.015) 
Total Admissions 
(LN) 
0.608*** 0.301*** 0.317*** 0.749*** 0.832*** 0.828*** 
(0.130) (0.051) (0.043) (0.028) (0.011) (0.009) 
Nursing Intensity (LN) 
0.283 -0.185*** -0.180*** 0.052 0.156*** 0.155*** 
(0.218) (0.068) (0.061) (0.040) (0.014) (0.012) 
Percent Medicare Day 
0.659** 0.767*** 0.773*** -0.762*** -0.676*** -0.668*** 
(0.332) (0.212) (0.188) (0.069) (0.039) (0.034) 
Rural 
1.185*** 0.299** 0.405*** -0.183** 0.055 0.034 
(0.370) (0.152) (0.132) (0.081) (0.034) (0.028) 
Constant 
13.270*** 13.900*** 14.030*** 12.630*** 12.280*** 12.220*** 
(0.764) (0.508) (0.452) (0.179) (0.0969) (0.0864) 
Number of Hospitals 3,111 3,111 3,109 3,401 3,401 3,399 
Wu-Hausman p=0.000 p=0.000 p=0.000 p=0.000 p=0.000 p=0.000 
Sargan Test p=0.440 p = 0.732 p = 0.183 p = 0.015 p = 0.000 p = 0.000 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Standard errors in parentheses 
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3.10. Appendix 3.B 
3.10.1. Further Robustness of Results 
We used propensity score matching as an approach to conduct falsification tests for 
pneumonia readmission rates and operating expense (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). This 
methodology aims to created matched pairs of treated and non-treated subjects, which only differ 
on the treatment variable and not any other observed characteristics. We created matching pairs of 
hospitals based on several important characteristics, such as extent of use of PE and PT, whether 
or not the hospital was in a system, non-profit status, hospital size based on total admissions, and 
whether or not the hospital was in a rural location. Furthermore, we were able to define a clean 
treatment group using the extent of use and rate of growth of use of CPM. We find a significant 
treatment effect for both pneumonia readmission rate and operating expense (See Appendix 3.B, 
Table 3.B1 and 3.B2).  
We first examined if Fixed Effect (FE) or Random Effects (RE) estimation is to be favored 
in our model specification. Table 3.B3 and 3.B4 reports the results of the Hausman test and support 
our decision to use fixed effect specification. The random effects estimation results are reported in 
Table 3.B5 and 3.B6 and we find the results to be mostly consistent with the main results reported 
in the paper. 
We also disambiguated higher order effects for the rate of growth of use of CPM by testing 
the relationship between linear and quadratic, quadratic and cubic, and cubic and quartic. Table 
3.B7 reports the results and support our decision to use quadratic terms in our model specification.  
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Table 3.B1: Falsification Test: Average Treatment Effects - 
Propensity Score Matching on Extent of Use of CPM  
Pneumonia 
Readmission Rate 
Operating Expense 
(1 vs 0) 
-0.317*** 0.285*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Robust Standard Errors in parentheses 
Table 3.B2: Falsification Test: Average Treatment Effects - 
Propensity Score Matching on Rate of Growth of Use of CPM  
Pneumonia 
Readmission Rate 
Operating Expense 
(1 vs 0) 
0.228** -0.172** 
(0.112) (0.071) 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Robust Standard Errors in parentheses 
Table 3.B3: Hausman Test: Extent of Use of CPM  
Pneumonia Readmission Rate Operating Expense  
Prob > χ2 
Model A 0.024 0.000 
Model B 0.030 0.000 
Model C 0.034 0.000 
Table 3.B4: Hausman Test: Rate of Growth of Use of CPM  
Pneumonia Readmission Rate Operating Expense  
Prob > χ2 
Model A 0.0003 0.0001 
Model B 0.0010 0.0000 
Model C 0.0217 0.0000 
  
111 
Table 3.B5: Extent of Use of CPM Random Effects Estimation Results 
 Pneumonia Readmission Rate Operating Expense 
  Model A Model B Model C Model A Model B Model C 
CPM 
0.009 -0.242*** 0.0472 0.0115** 0.078*** 0.068*** 
(0.040) (0.068) (0.123) (0.005) (0.008) (0.014) 
PE 
0.004 0.385 0.832 -0.001 -0.092** 0.286*** 
(0.072) (0.374) (0.689) (0.008) (0.045) (0.076) 
PT 
-0.136* 0.110 0.121 0.017* -0.024** 0.225*** 
(0.075) (0.079) (0.515) (0.009) (0.010) (0.059) 
CPM*PE 
 -0.193* -0.267  0.040*** -0.100*** 
 (0.108) (0.234)  (0.013) (0.026) 
CPM*PT 
 0.107 -0.072  -0.024** -0.075*** 
 (0.089) (0.173)  (0.010) (0.020) 
PE*PT 
  -1.245   -0.341*** 
  (0.969)   (0.108) 
CPM*PE*PT 
  0.384   0.118*** 
  (0.305)   (0.034) 
System 
-0.053 -0.053 -0.047 -0.021* -0.022* -0.022** 
(0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Non-Profit 
-0.053 -0.053 -0.096 0.215*** 0.214*** 0.211*** 
(0.115) (0.115) (0.114) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Trauma level 1 
0.392*** 0.392*** 0.253*** 0.108*** 0.108*** 0.109*** 
(0.084) (0.084) (0.088) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Total Admissions 
(LN) 
0.236*** 0.235*** 0.179*** 0.741*** 0.741*** 0.741*** 
(0.033) (0.033) (0.035) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Nursing Intensity 
(LN) 
-0.089* -0.088* -0.105** 0.097*** 0.097*** 0.096*** 
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Percent Medicare 
Days 
0.212 0.212 0.280* -0.055** -0.056** -0.056** 
(0.169) (0.169) (0.168) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) 
Rural 
0.423*** 0.423*** 0.362*** -0.128*** -0.127*** -0.127*** 
(0.118) (0.118) (0.117) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Year 2011 
0.089* 0.089* 0.088* 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.038*** 
(0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Year 2012 
0.208*** 0.207*** 0.212*** 0.102*** 0.103*** 0.104*** 
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Year 2013 
-0.702*** -0.702*** -0.693*** 0.147*** 0.148*** 0.149*** 
(0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Year 2014 
-0.651*** -0.653*** -0.658*** 0.200*** 0.203*** 0.203*** 
(0.056) (0.057) (0.058) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Constant 
15.70*** 15.74*** 16.54*** 12.46*** 12.41*** 12.30*** 
(0.423) (0.457) (0.556) (0.0787) (0.0810) (0.0863) 
Number of Hospitals 4,131 4,131 4,131 4,577 4,577 4,577 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 3.B6: Rate of Growth of Use of CPM Random Effects Estimation Results 
VARIABLES 
Pneumonia Readmission Rate Operating Expense 
Model A Model B Model C Model A Model B Model C 
Rate of Growth CPM 
0.060 -0.233 0.046 -0.015** 0.040 0.065 
(0.062) (0.222) (0.063) (0.007) (0.032) (0.050) 
PE 
-0.033 -0.025 -0.036 0.002 0.094*** 0.022 
(0.082) (0.086) (0.083) (0.010) (0.012) (0.027) 
PT 
-0.119 -0.153* -0.128 0.032*** 0.050*** 0.043** 
(0.081) (0.083) (0.082) (0.010) (0.012) (0.019) 
(Rate of Growth 
CPM)2 
-0.058 0.083 -0.175** 0.001 -0.014 0.116** 
(0.063) (0.230) (0.089) (0.007) (0.033) (0.055) 
Rate of Growth 
CPM*PE 
 -0.211 0.535  -0.051 -0.180* 
 (0.263) (0.437)  (0.038) (0.095) 
Rate of Growth 
CPM*PT 
 -0.513** -0.511*  0.129*** -0.183* 
 (0.256) (0.263)  (0.039) (0.097) 
(Rate of Growth 
CPM)2*PE 
 0.593* 0.436  -0.052 -0.081 
 (0.327) (0.404)  (0.047) (0.072) 
(Rate of Growth 
CPM)2*PT 
 0.223 0.061  -0.082* -0.177** 
 (0.334) (0.358)  (0.049) (0.078) 
PE*PT   
-0.040   -0.021 
  (0.072)   (0.033) 
Rate of Growth 
CPM*PE*PT 
  0.432   0.176 
  (1.441)   (0.117) 
(Rate of Growth 
CPM)2*PE*PT 
  -0.578   0.258** 
  (1.030)   (0.117) 
System 
-0.021 -0.022 -0.016 -0.032*** -0.001 -0.033*** 
(0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) 
Non-Profit 
0.102 0.103 0.114 0.222*** 0.212*** 0.220*** 
(0.148) (0.148) (0.149) (0.033) (0.035) (0.033) 
Trauma Level 1 
0.338*** 0.343*** 0.345*** 0.119*** 0.119*** 0.119*** 
(0.094) (0.094) (0.094) (0.015) (0.018) (0.015) 
Total Admissions 
(LN) 
0.262*** 0.264*** 0.235*** 0.771*** 0.761*** 0.771*** 
(0.040) (0.040) (0.045) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Nursing Intensity (LN) 
-0.100* -0.102* -0.099* 0.102*** 0.156*** 0.102*** 
(0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) 
Percent Medicare 
Days 
0.294 0.306 0.292 -0.082*** -0.149*** -0.080*** 
(0.193) (0.193) (0.193) (0.027) (0.032) (0.027) 
Rural 
0.445*** 0.446*** 0.451*** -0.107*** -0.109*** -0.106*** 
(0.134) (0.134) (0.135) (0.027) (0.030) (0.027) 
Year = 2011 
0.074 0.074 0.074 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 
(0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Year = 2012 
0.198*** 0.200*** 0.199*** 0.104*** 0.103*** 0.104*** 
(0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Year = 2013 
-0.689*** -0.682*** -0.691*** 0.148*** 0.147*** 0.148*** 
(0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Year = 2014 
-0.652*** -0.639*** -0.654*** 0.201*** 0.201*** 0.201*** 
(0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Constant 
15.240*** 15.210*** 15.480*** 12.250*** 12.640*** 12.240*** 
(0.508) (0.509) (0.535) (0.093) (0.100) (0.094) 
Number of Hospitals 3,111 3,111 3,109 3,401 3,401 3,401 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 3.B7: Rate of Growth of Use of CPM Higher Order Effects 
  H0: Linear  H0: Quadratic  H0: Cubic  
vs.  vs.  vs.  
Ha: Quadratic Ha: Cubic Ha: Quartic  
Prob > F 
Pneumonia Readmission Rate 0.000 0.477 0.907 
Operating Expense 0.020 0.392 0.796 
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4. How Do Aspiration Shortfalls Interact with Regulatory 
Incentives to Drive HIT Innovativeness in U.S. Hospitals? 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Hospitals are challenged to make strategic choices about technological innovation to meet 
the changing needs of the healthcare marketplace. Although the U.S. government has spent close 
to $30 billion in the past several years to promote electronic health records and other clinical 
process improvements (CMS 2015; Melville et al. 2004), U.S. hospitals still face significant 
tensions on where to allocate their limited resources for innovation. In particular, they must 
contend with a variety of continuing, sometimes conflicting, demands levied on them by diverse 
stakeholders (e.g., patients, internal board, system affiliates, and regulatory bodies). To address 
these demands effectively, hospitals have turned to the strategic deployment of information 
systems to influence various aspects of organizational performance (Fichman et al. 2011; Salge et 
al. 2015).   
 In particular, through the use of information technology (IT), there has been an increasing 
push for the redesign of healthcare processes aimed at making significant cost savings and/or 
efficiency gains in hospitals.  For example, the average length of stay for patients in U.S. hospitals 
has fallen by 33 percent as a result of the introduction of Information System(IS)-enabled clinical 
process management (Buescher et al. 2004).  Innovation in clinical process management can create 
value to a hospital, such as safer and more effective drugs are utilized, clinicians deliver more 
                                                 
 An earlier version was presented at ICIS 2016 – Dublin. Pye, J., and Rai, A. 2016. "How do 
Aspiration Shortfalls Interact with Regulatory Incentives and Controls to Drive Innovation in U.S. 
Hospitals?," Proceedings from 37th International Conference on Information Systems, Dublin, 
Ireland. 
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rapid, appropriate, and reliable care, unnecessary tests and therapies are eliminated, and/or supply-
chain costs are systematically lowered (Paulus et al. 2008). While past IS research has mainly 
focused on the consequences of specific health information technologies (HIT), for example, the 
effect of a computerized physician order entry (CPOE) (Ash et al. 2003; Campbell et al. 2006) on 
quality and financial performance (Agarwal et al. 2010; Jha et al. 2009) at various levels, such as 
hospital level (Bhargava and Mishra 2014; Salge et al. 2015), within hospital unit level, i.e., 
emergency departments or cardiac wards or intensive care units (Beatty et al. 2013; Carayon et al. 
2011; Porter et al. 2004), the drivers of innovation decisions related to IT for clinical process 
management have only recently garnered attention.   
In general, a major driver for innovation is an organization’s desire to improve its 
performance. In the healthcare context, hospitals are increasingly being confronted with the need 
to keep costs under control. Over ten years (1999 to 2009) U.S. healthcare expenditure as a percent 
of GDP rose from 12.9% to 16.99% (CMS 2015) until finally leveling off after 2009 to hover 
around 17%.  Given this increase in healthcare expenditure ($3.2 trillion in 2015 (CMS 2015)), 
hospitals, like other organizations, compare their performance with referents who are similar in 
key characteristics (such as teaching status, governance structure, location, and system affiliate) 
and determine their aspiration level through this comparison. Drawing on the Behavioral Theory 
of the Firm (Cyert and March 1963), if an organization experiences an aspiration shortfall (where 
performance falls below that of its referents), it will initiate a search for solutions to address this 
shortfall (Cyert and March 1963; Gavetti et al. 2012; Greve 1998; Greve 2003a). In the healthcare 
context, aspiration shortfalls have been shown to influence hospitals’ IT investment (Salge et al. 
2015). As the U.S. healthcare industry is a highly regulated marketplace (Field 2006), we are 
116 
 
motivated to go beyond the aspiration shortfall logic by considering the role of regulation along 
with aspiration shortfalls in affecting a hospital’s IT innovativeness.  
Drawing on Institutional Theory, an organization’s environment can influence its actions 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983).  Thus, the institutional layer could be manipulated through a 
targeted regulatory intervention designed to facilitate a particular goal or elicit a particular 
behavior from entities in the system.  For example, the Health Information Technology for 
Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act was designed to promote the adoption and 
meaningful use of HIT by incentivizing hospitals and professionals through Medicare 
reimbursements (HHS 2017) or the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) 
designed to protect the privacy of individual’s medical records by requiring safe guards for medical 
information.  Government regulatory interventions can interact with aspiration shortfalls as they 
can induce and/or coerce certain behavior.  These regulatory interventions are not static, but we 
suggest that they can be characterized to progress through phases, from Conceptualization to 
Enactment to Enforcement, with decreasing levels of uncertainty.  
All government regulatory interventions go through a formal process.  At their conception, 
they are just an idea.  For example, in the U.S., when an idea is formally proposed to Congress, it 
becomes a bill.  Bills are discussed and debated on whether it should be a law.  Most bills do not 
get this far, but if they survive, they go to the House of Representatives and Senate to be voted on, 
respectively, and if both pass the bill then it is off to the President to sign.  When the President 
signs the bill, it becomes a law. However, even though the regulatory intervention has been 
enacted, the rules and guidelines set forth take time to implement.  The final stage of this process 
is enforcement, where the law stipulates some compliance mechanism. As such, a piece of 
regulation can be conceived through a lens of level of uncertainty associated with its passage, with 
117 
 
the uncertainty level decreasing as it progresses from Conceptualization to Enactment to 
Enforcement.  This level of uncertainty decreases as organizations become more aware of the 
contents of the regulation as well as the likelihood of the regulation becoming law. 
As the healthcare industry is undergoing increasing regulatory interventions, it follows that 
an institutional consideration needs to be incorporated along with the aspiration shortfall logic to 
understand the innovativeness with which IT is deployed to reduce costs and improve efficiency.   
Thus, we integrate views from the Behavioral Theory of the Firm (Cyert and March 1963) and 
Institutional Theory (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) to better understand how a hospital’s aspiration 
shortfall and regulatory environment in which it operates can influence a hospital’s decision to 
innovatively use IT for clinical process management. 
Our research question is thus: 
How does a hospital’s cost aspiration shortfall interact with the progression of a 
regulatory intervention from Conceptualization through Enforcement to influence the hospital’s 
decision to innovatively use IT for clinical process management?  
Our empirical study is situated in the U.S. healthcare industry. We integrate multiple 
sources of data to construct a panel dataset of approximately 5,000 general and surgical hospitals 
spanning 2007–2014. Our research design enables us to examine how a hospital’s decision to 
innovatively use IT for clinical process management is collectively influenced by: (1) a key 
aspiration shortfall—Cost of Patient Care, and (2) phases of a major regulatory intervention (which 
represents a unique quasi-natural experiment as we can differentiate between the various phases 
of the intervention).  
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4.2. Theoretical Background 
4.2.1. Clinical Process Management 
It has recently become imperative for hospitals to redesign their healthcare services due to 
increasing demands of the patient population and economic challenges (i.e., rising cost of care and 
government interventions tied to reimbursements).  With the increasing efforts to reduce cost of 
patient care, clinical process models can enable monitoring and quality control in hospitals.  
Clinical processes are defined as what is done (i.e., what care is provided) and how it is done (i.e., 
when, where, and by whom care is delivered). As we have seen in other industries, being able to 
manage specific processes can streamline services and procedures, thus making the whole 
organization more cost efficient (Benner and Tushman 2002).  Thus, in healthcare, clinical process 
management (CPM) consists of a set of methods and tools used by clinicians for discovering, 
modeling, analyzing, measuring, improving, and optimizing direct and indirect care processes 
(Carter 2015).  Past research has shown that CPM can enhance effectiveness (i.e., doing the right 
thing for the patient in terms of diagnosis and treatment) and efficiency (i.e., delivering care 
competently in terms of cost of care) (Goldzweig et al. 2009; Hillestad et al. 2005; Kuperman and 
Gibson 2003).  Therefore, improving CPM should be an important strategic task for all healthcare 
providers. 
4.2.2. IT-Enabled Clinical Process Management 
We have seen in other industries that IT can be used to improve effectiveness and efficiency 
(Bharadwaj et al. 1999; Brynjolffson 1996; Devaraj and Kohli 2000; Devaraj and Kohli 2003; 
Dewan and Min 1997; Francalanci and Galal 1998; Hitt and Brynjolfsson 1996; Mukhopadhyay 
et al. 1995). As we saw in the previous section, there is evidence that supports the use of clinical 
process management as a way to lower costs, but going further, IT-enabled clinical process 
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management can help hospitals reduce expenses associated with patient records, improve or even 
automate workflows, which can enhance patient satisfaction while also reducing the need for some 
staff, and streamline diagnostic decision making, which can improve productivity by eliminating 
excessive use of hospital resources, such as supplies.  For example, the introduction of a 
computerized physician order entry system (CPOE) was found to improve patient safety 
(Goldzweig et al. 2009); the implementation of an electronic health record was found to decrease 
patient mortality and nurse staffing levels (Pollak and Lorch 2007); and the use of a clinical 
decision support system reduced unnecessary blood transfusions and the costs associated with it 
(Perez et al. 2007). Thus, we define IT-enabled CPM defined as “systems that are formed through 
relationships between IT assets and [hospital] resources” (Nevo and Wade 2010) and are used by 
clinicians for discovering, modeling, analyzing, measuring, improving, and optimizing direct and 
indirect care processes. 
4.2.3. Innovativeness of IT-enabled Clinical Process Management  
The ability to innovate has been considered a major competitive advantage that can 
enhance effectiveness and efficiency within an organization and can thus lead to long term 
sustainability.  Indeed, innovation has progressed from a focus on products and artifacts (Bates 
and Flynn 1995) to a much broader focus on processes (Davenport 1993).  Moreover, innovation 
has been used as a means to change an organization or respond to changes in the internal or external 
environment (Barrett et al. 2015). Therefore, the notion of innovation should occupy a core 
position within the policy framework of the healthcare agenda. 
A hospital’s IT-enabled innovativeness implies that they are more willing to search for new 
technologies and/or apply new methods to achieve a particular goal, such as reducing cost of care.  
For example, a hospital might choose to adopt RFID tags on prescriptions to track medication 
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distribution. Hence, we conceptualize a hospital’s IT-enabled innovativeness as a deliberate effort 
to use IT with the goal of benefiting patients and highlighting the relative novelty of the processes. 
With this approach, hospitals can be differentiated not just with respect to what technologies they 
have adopted but also with respect to when they are adopting these technologies relative to others 
as hospitals do view themselves relative to others based on characteristics such as mission, 
governance structure, or location.  As such, hospitals can be differentiated based on the 
innovativeness of their IT-enabled CPM by considering not only the extent to which IT is being 
used to enable CPM but also by the novelty of the usage in comparison to their reference group.  
Thus, we define IT-enabled CPM Innovativeness as the development (addition, redesign, or 
replacement) of existing IT-enabled clinical processes within or between a hospital and other 
service or support providers relative to that of their reference group.   
4.2.4. Role of Aspiration Shortfall and Problemistic Search in Innovativeness 
The Behavioral Theory of the Firm proposes that a firm will aim at satisficing (i.e., does 
not aim to maximize, but rather seek “good enough” results) (Cyert and March 1963). In particular, 
this theory proposes that managers in an organization define aspiration level on some measurable 
outcome variable, such as patient cost of care. This aspiration level is the threshold that the 
organization sets for itself to evaluate its performance. Hospitals can look at multiple reference 
groups based on a variety of characteristics such as the hospital’s mission, governance structure, 
or location.  Based on the reference group of choice, hospitals will monitor their actual 
performance against the performance of those in the reference group.  For example, a non-profit 
hospital that may be lagging in performance might benchmark their future performance on the cost 
of patient care relative to all other non-profit hospitals (called social aspiration level). As another 
example, a teaching hospital which is doing better in terms of cost than the average of all other 
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teaching hospitals might benchmark against themselves from the previous year (called historical 
aspiration level). Thus, hospitals can and will shift their attention among social and historical 
aspiration levels depending on their performance (Bromiley and Harris 2014; Park 2007).  
When performance falls below the aspiration level, this shortfall triggers problemistic 
search activities to identify solutions that will raise performance. Motivated to close the gap 
between performance and aspiration level, hospitals are more willing to take risks, such as 
investing in IT (Salge et al. 2015) or innovatively using IT for clinical process management. Thus, 
a hospital could use its innovativeness as a method to achieve their goal of raising performance, 
such as reducing cost of care. 
4.2.5. Role of Institutional Regulation in Innovativeness 
Given the heavily regulated nature of healthcare, we must not overlook elements in the 
institutional environment that could facilitate or constrain IT-related decisions (Chiasson and 
Davidson 2005) as these decisions to strategically pursue IT do not happen independently. 
Institutional Theory demonstrates how an organization’s environment can influence organizational 
actions (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Meyer and Rowan 1977; Oliver 1991; Scott 1995). Thus, 
government regulation, which establishes the regulatory environment, can be designed to induce 
certain behaviors either by incentivizing or penalizing organizations for lack of compliance (Levy 
and Spiller 1994; Scott 2008; Williamson 1985). Elaborating on this idea, we suggest that 
government regulation plays a critical part on an organization’s decision to adopt IT.   It is also 
important to recognize that the development of regulations progress over time.  First, there is the 
conceptualization of the regulation where politicians and/or policy makers put forth suggestions.  
This phase, which we define as the Conceptualization Phase, has a lot of indefiniteness associated 
with it, as there are many points where the idea could be defeated or killed.  For example, in the 
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U.S., a proposed bill could stall in committee where debates drag on or it could be defeated at 
either the House of Representatives or the Senate or it could even make it to the President’s desk 
only to be vetoed at the last minute. Thus, in this phase there is still high uncertainty associated 
with the proposed regulation (Hoffmann et al. 2009; Milliken 1987). Now, assume the regulation 
did pass all the usual hurdles and was signed into law or enacted.  We define this period as the 
Enactment Phase, where the regulation is enacted but not yet enforced.  New laws take time to 
implement, sometimes years, so while organizations affected by the legislation are aware of the 
contents of the law, they are not yet subject to its terms.  The last phase is the implementation of 
the law.  This is defined as the Enforcement Phase, where the regulation is now fully executed 
either with incentives or penalties. All regulatory interventions go through a formal process; 
therefore, the institutional environment is not static but dynamic with each of these phases 
decreasing in the level of uncertainty associated with them. Table 4.1 provides definitions of the 
key constructs. 
Table 4.1: Definition of Key Constructs 
IT-enabled CPM 
Innovativeness  
(Dependent Variable, Hospital 
Level) 
The development (addition, redesign, or replacement) of 
existing IT-enabled clinical processes within or between a 
hospital and other service or support providers relative to that 
of their reference group 
Cost Aspiration Shortfall 
(Independent Variable, 
Hospital Level) 
When organizational cost falls below the aspiration level 
which is based on the reference group’s cost of patient care 
Regulation Phases (Moderator, Institutional Level) 
Conceptualization Phase 
 
Conceptualization of the regulation (politicians and/or policy 
makers put forth suggestions on policy which are heavily 
debated) 
Enactment Phase 
Legislation of the regulation (the policy/regulation is passed, 
but not yet implemented) 
Enforcement Phase 
Implementation of the regulation (the policy/regulation is 
executed) 
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4.3. Hypothesis Development 
Using the theoretical foundations above, we developed our research model (Figure 4.1) 
showing the moderating influence of the institutional environment on the relationship between a 
cost aspiration shortfall and IT-enabled CPM Innovativeness.  We further developed the following 
hypotheses grounded in the healthcare context. 
 
Figure 4.1: Research Model 
 
4.3.1. IT-enabled Clinical Process Management Innovativeness as 
Problemistic Search 
 Behavioral Theory of the Firm asserts that problemistic search is triggered when an 
organization experiences an aspiration shortfall.  So, when a hospital experiences an aspiration 
shortfall with respect to patient cost of care, it triggers a problemistic search to address this 
shortfall.  Motivated to close this cost shortfall gap, hospitals may look to innovate in their clinical 
processes as they are core to the value creation of a hospital. Past studies have shown how process 
management can be used to streamline services and processes, thus making it more cost efficient 
(Benner and Tushman 2002; Benner and Tushman 2015; Ittner and Larcker 1997; Samsona and 
IT-enabled Clinical  
Process Management 
Innovativeness 
Cost Aspiration 
Shortfall 
Hospital Level 
Regulatory Institutional Level 
Regulatory Environment 
Regulatory Phases 
• Conceptualization Phase 
• Enactment Phase 
• Enforcement Phase 
H1 
H2 
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Terziovskib 1999; Sitkin and Stickel 1996). IT-enabled CPM Innovativeness can enable hospitals 
to implement new technologies to deliver more rapid and reliable care, as well as eliminate 
unnecessary testing, and systematically streamline delivery of care, all of which have the potential 
to reduce patient cost of care.  For example, clinical reports reviewing can save time by locating 
lab reports more readily and/or exchanging patient information quickly or how a clinical decision 
support system can save time by standardizing treatment plans for particular conditions or how a 
CPOE system can reduce costly errors when prescribing medication. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
H1: When a hospital experiences a cost aspiration shortfall, it will lead to increases in IT-enabled 
Clinical Process Management Innovativeness. 
4.3.2. Moderating Role of Regulatory Intervention 
We also claim that the influence of aspiration shortfall on IT-enabled CPM Innovativeness 
is conditional on regulatory uncertainty in the institutional environment.   A hospital may choose 
to increase their IT-enabled CPM Innovativeness when experiencing a higher cost aspiration 
shortfall but their decision must also be positioned in the institutional environment. Given that 
policy/regulation does not happen overnight and the varying amounts of uncertainty during the 
progression of a regulatory intervention (Doh and Pearce 2004; Hoffmann et al. 2009; Milliken 
1987), it follows that the institutional environment can influence how a hospital approaches a cost 
aspiration shortfall. In sum, a higher/lower level of regulatory uncertainty associated with a phase 
of the regulatory intervention, the positive effect of a cost aspiration shortfall on IT-enabled CPM 
Innovativeness will be attenuated to a greater/lesser extent.  
During the Conceptualization Phase, when there is much uncertainty stemming from the 
ambiguity of the contents of the regulation as well as the possibly of the regulation stalling or even 
failing in legislative committee (Milliken 1987), hospitals are more likely to be mimetic. Imitation, 
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in this instance, is used to maintain organizational legitimacy (Oliver 1991). So, hospitals 
experiencing a cost aspiration shortfall during this period of uncertainty will be more influenced 
to innovate in IT-enabled CPM that are more like that of their peers.  For example, an electronic 
clinical documentation system that captures patient demographic information might exhibit less 
novelty than a clinical decision support system that facilitates clinical guidelines, because there 
are more hospitals that have adopted an electronic clinical documentation system than a clinical 
decision support system. Thus, during the Conceptualization Phase, a hospital may mimic other 
hospitals in their reference group due to the uncertainty in this phase and thereby constrain their 
level of IT-enabled CPM Innovativeness to address cost aspiration shortfalls.    
During the Enactment Phase, where hospitals have knowledge of the contents of the 
regulation, but there are not yet incentives, hospitals now face the looming threat to the legitimacy 
of their past IT-enabled clinical process practices, as the regulation would explicitly state rules, 
monitoring, rewards, and eventually penalties for the level of IT-enabled CPM. Thus, if a hospital 
experiences a cost aspiration shortfall during the Enactment Phase, they may again mimic the 
behavior of other hospitals in their reference group due to the environmental uncertainty and not 
wanting to be perceived as “left behind”, but they may also be coerced, due to the awareness of 
the regulation, into using IT-enabled CPM as a means to address their cost aspiration shortfall.  
We expect the marginal return to IT-enabled CPM Innovativeness under a cost aspiration shortfall 
will be increased to a greater extent than in the Conceptualization Phase.   
The last phase of the regulation is the Enforcement Phase, where the regulation is fully 
known and hospitals are now formally incentivized for the implementation and use of IT-enabled 
CPM. During this phase, if a hospital experiences a cost aspiration shortfall, its decision to pursue 
IT-enabled CPM innovations is reinforced by the regulatory incentive program.  Therefore, the 
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problemistic search could be directed at greater risk-taking, novel or rather less tried and true, IT-
enabled CPM solutions to address the cost aspiration shortfall. In this phase, the regulatory 
incentive may further promote the IT-enabled CPM innovativeness of a hospital to offset the cost 
aspiration shortfall. Given the progression of the regulation, we hypothesize  
H2: The marginal gain to IT-enabled Clinical Process Management increases more when moving 
from the regulatory (a) Conceptualization Phase to the (b) Enactment Phase and to the (c) 
Enforcement Phase when there are increases in a hospital’s cost aspiration shortfall. 
4.4. Empirical Study 
4.4.1. Panel Data Construction 
 Data for this study covering 2007-2014 was obtained from multiple sources: The American 
Hospital Association (AHA) Annual Survey, AHA IT Survey, and the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid. This comprehensive dataset contains information on the various IT services offered by 
the hospital, as well as financial and demographic information. Taken together, our data spans 
before and after a major federal government intervention. We also performed various consistency 
checks within the data to ensure that any changes or variations were not out of the ordinary. We 
also eliminated any observations with inaccurate information. The final unbalanced dataset 
contains information on approximately 5,000 hospitals from 2007-2014. 
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Table 4.2: Operationalization of Measures  
Variable Level Description Source 
IT-enabled 
Clinical Process 
Management 
Innovativeness 
Hospital 
Level – 
DV 
Saidin Index of 36 IT-enabled Clinical Process 
Management technologies 
AHA 
Cost Aspiration 
Shortfall  
Hospital 
Level – 
IV 
Ratio between a hospital’s total facility expense in year t 
and either the average total facility expense of its 
reference group in year t or 0.95 times total facility 
expense in year t-1 
CMS 
Regulation 
Phases 
Regulatory 
Institutional 
Level – 
IV 
Binary, 0/1 = not in phase/in phase: Conceptualization 
Phase (2007-2008) 
Enactment Phase (2009-2010) 
Enforcement Phase (2011-2014) 
HHS 
Teaching Status 
Hospital 
Level – 
Control 
Binary, 0/1 = non-teaching/teaching in a given year 
AHA 
Ownership Binary, 0/1 = for profit/non-profit in a given year 
System Affiliate Binary, 0/1=not in a system/in a system in a given year 
Rural 
Binary, 0/1 = urban location/rural location in a given 
year 
Percent 
Medicare Days 
Total Medicaid days per total inpatient days in a given 
year 
Size Number of Beds (Log) in a given year 
Case Load 
Number of annual inpatient admissions per full-time 
equivalent employee in a given year 
Slack Resources 
Ratio of Cash on Hand to Current Liabilities in a given 
year 
CMS 
 
4.4.2. Measures 
Table 4.2 presents the operationalization of measures. We further elaborate below. 
IT-enabled Clinical Process Management Innovativeness: Our dependent variable is a Saidin 
index which measures the innovativeness of each hospital. Instead of simply summing the number 
of IT-enabled clinical process management functionalities to count the number implemented, this 
index uses the weighted sums of the number of technologies available in the hospital (from a list 
of possible technologies or services provided by the AHA Annual Survey), with the weights being 
the percentage of hospitals in the sample that do not possess the technology (Spetz and Maiuro 
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2004). Thus, the Saidin index will increase with the addition of new technologies and increase 
more with the addition of technologies that are relatively rare. Rarer technologies are usually more 
expensive, new, or difficult to implement, and thus should have more weight in the Saidin Index 
(Spetz and Baker 1999). Therefore, technologies that are more common receive lower weights. 
This weighing allows the Saidin index to account for not just the quantity of technology but also 
the innovativeness of a given hospital. To create the Saidin index for hospital i in reference group 
z in year t, we used a list of technologies (k=1…K) in the base year (2007). For each technology, 
we assign a weight ak,z,t, where  
ak,z,t = 1 − (
1
Nz,t
)∑τi,k,z,t
Nz,t
i=1
     (1) 
Nz,t is the total number of hospitals in reference group z at time t, τi,k,z,t takes the value of 1 if 
hospital i has technology k in reference group z in year t and 0 otherwise (Spetz and Maiuro 2004). 
We then use these weights to compute the Saidin index si,z,t for hospital i in group z in year t: 
si,z,t = ∑ ak,z,tτi,k,z,t
K
k=1
 (2) 
Cost Aspiration Shortfall: Given that the rising cost of healthcare is of great concern as well as 
the touted cost savings of HIT (Agha 2014; Sharma et al. 2016), we measure the actual 
performance level of a hospital as the total facility expense. Total facility expense has six 
components and Table 4.3 lists them along with their average share across the panel for all 
hospitals in our sample. We focus on the aggregated facility expense as IT-enabled CPM can 
reasonably reduce all major categories of expenses in a hospital, such as optimizing staff with 
clinical decision support systems or reducing supplies by maintaining an electronic medical record 
instead of paper. 
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Table 4.3: Total Facility Expense Categories 
Category Description Percentage (%) 
Payroll Expense 
Include payroll for all personnel including 
medical and dental residents/interns and 
trainees. 
41 
Employee Benefits 
Includes social security, group insurance, 
retirement benefits, workman’s compensation, 
unemployment insurance, etc. 
11 
Depreciation Expense 
Report only the depreciation expense 
applicable to the reporting period 
5 
Interest Expense 
Report interest expense for the reporting period 
only. 
1 
Supply Expense 
The net cost of all tangible items that are 
expensed including freight, standard 
distribution cost, and sales and use tax minus 
rebates. 
15 
All Other Expenses 
All other expenses. Any total facility expenses 
not included above. 
27 
Note: Source – AHA Annual Survey; Pooled across approximately 5,000 hospitals from 2007-
2014 
 
To determine the aspiration level of each hospital, we follow Bromiley & Harris (2014) 
and use the switching mechanism in our model.  This approach suggests that an aspiration level 
should be equal to industry performance for firms below the industry average and switch to a 
slightly better aspiration measure of prior performance for those firms above the industry average.  
The argument being that firms with performance below the average would benchmark to the 
industry average and firms with performance above the average would not tolerate lower 
performance than the previous year even though they remained above the industry average 
(Bromiley 1991; Deephouse and Wiseman 2000; Park 2007). Bromiley (1991) used 1.05 times 
prior performance and found the results to be insensitive to moderate variations in this parameter. 
Drawing on Bromiley (1991), we used 0.95 to represent a 5% reduction in costs and varied this to 
0.90, 0.85, and 0.80.  Thus, the measure of cost aspiration is as follows: 
Cost Aspiration Leveli,z,t = IndustryPerformancez,t−1 if Pi,t−1 > Industry Performancez,t−1 (3) 
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Cost Aspiration Leveli,z,t = 0.95 ∗ Pi,t−1 if Pi,t−1 ≤ Industry Performancez,t−1 (4) 
 
where Cost Aspiration Leveli,z,t is the Aspiration Level of hospital i in reference group z at time t, 
Pi,t-1 is total facility expense for hospital i at time t-1, and Industry Performance is the average total 
facility expense for all other hospitals in the reference group z at time t-1. We used multiple 
reference groups as aspiration shortfalls can change based on this choice. The reference groups are 
defined based on whether the hospital is a Teaching hospital, Non-Profit, Rural, or System 
affiliated. Thus, the cost aspiration shortfall of a hospital is the ratio of the actual cost performance 
(total facility expense) of the hospital to their cost aspiration level. 
Cost Aspiration Shortfalli,t,z =
Pi,t
Cost Aspiration Leveli,t,z
 (5) 
 
Regulatory Environment: We focus on the HITECH Act as the regulatory intervention (See Figure 
4.2 for a timeline of the HITECH Act), which was a provision of the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009, and started out as part of a campaign promise by then Presidential 
Candidate Barack Obama (2007).  During his campaign as well as his inaugural address, he 
pledged to improve the quality of patient care and reduce inefficiencies in the healthcare process 
by investing in health information technology (Obama 2009). He fulfilled his pledge when the bill 
was introduced to the House of Representatives in early January 2009 (2009). This can be seen as 
the Conceptualization Phase of the HITECH Act. In this phase, we saw the bill composed, 
introduced to Congress, vigorously debated, and repeatedly amended. At the time, it seemed likely 
that the bill would pass, but there was still much uncertainty around the requirements for healthcare 
professionals and organizations. The next step for the HITECH Act was to be enacted, which it 
was in February 2009 (2009). Although the Act was passed into law and now incentivized hospitals 
to adopt and use certain technologies, incentive payments would not start until 2011. We define 
this period as the Enactment phase, as the policy was passed into law but hospitals could not yet 
131 
 
directly benefit from it. Post-2011, hospitals could start receiving incentive payments from 
demonstrating a pre-determined level of usage.  We view this post-2011 period as the Enforcement 
Phase, as the policy was now in full-force. 
 
Control Variables: We specified several variables pertaining to hospital characteristics as controls 
and measured them as follows. First, we control for the four types of hospitals. We captured the 
teaching status (whether the hospital is a teaching hospital) (Jha et al. 2005), non-profit status 
(whether the hospital is non-profit or for-profit) (Jha et al. 2005), location (whether the hospital is 
in a rural or urban location) (Goldman and Dudley 2008), and system affiliate status (whether the 
hospital is affiliated with a system or not affiliated with a system) (Goldman and Dudley 2008). 
We also controlled for several organizational characteristics. First, percent Medicare days 
measured as total Medicare days per total inpatient days (Reiter et al. 2012). Second, we control 
for hospital size measured as the natural log of the total number of general hospital beds (Goodstein 
et al. 1994). Third, case load defined as total admissions per full time personnel (Bly et al. 1986). 
Fourth, financial slack defined as current cash on hand per total current liabilities (Greve 2003a). 
Fifth, year-fixed effects were added to control for any other industry-wide shocks that might affect 
all hospitals. 
HITECH Act 
passed 
Incentive 
Payments Take 
Effect 
      
Conceptualization 
Phase 
Enactment 
Phase 
Enforcement 
Phase 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Figure 4.2: Timeline of the HITECH Act 
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4.5. Analysis and Results 
4.5.1. Analysis Procedure and Model Specification 
 We specify and estimate the following panel model specifications: 
CPM Saidin Indexi,z,t = Cost Aspiration Shortfalli,z,t + Controlsi,t + αi + εi,t (6) 
CPM Saidin Indexi,z,t = Cost Aspiration Shortfalli,z,t ∗ Conceputalization Phasei,t + Controlsi,t + αi + εi,t  (7) 
CPM Saidin Indexi,z,t = Cost Aspiration Shortfalli,z,t ∗ Enactment Phasei,t + Controlsi,t + αi + εi,t  (8) 
CPM Saidin Indexi,z,t = Cost Aspiration Shortfalli,z,t ∗ Enforcement Phasei,t + Controlsi,t + αi + εi,t  (9) 
 
where CPM Saidin Index represents the Saidin Index of IT-enabled CPM, Cost Aspiration 
Shortfall represents the cost aspiration shortfall of a hospital, Controls represents a vector of 
control variables, i represents the hospital, z represents the reference group, t represents the year, 
αi represents unobserved fixed factors associated with a hospital, and ε represents the error term.  
Equation 1 represents Hypothesis 1 and Equations 2-4 represents Hypotheses 2a-c, respectively. 
We chose a fixed effects specification to control for any differences across hospitals that 
are not observed. All variance inflation factors (VIF) and condition indices were well below their 
respective recommended thresholds of 10 and 30 (Greene 2007), with the highest inflation factor 
observed to be 2.31. 
4.5.2. Descriptive Statistics 
We present the descriptive statistics in Table 4.4 and pairwise correlation matrix in Table 
4.5. There is considerable variation in the CPM Saidin Index with the top 10% of hospitals 
having an index twice as much as the mean. Moreover, there this substantial variation in the cost 
aspiration shortfall between hospitals and between reference groups. We also see variation in the 
control variables. Teaching status and location are negatively correlated with CPM Saidin Index, 
whereas cost aspiration shortfall, non-profit status, system affiliate, percent Medicare days, 
hospital beds, and case load are positively correlated with CPM Saidin Index. 
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Table 4.4: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Hospital-Year Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
CPM Saidin Index 3,454 5.157 3.261 0.000 14.596 
CPM Saidin Index 
(Teaching) 
3,087 5.768 3.500 0.000 16.074 
CPM Saidin Index  
(Non-Profit) 
1,969 4.858 2.998 0.000 14.010 
CPM Saidin Index 
(System) 
1,854 5.485 3.210 0.000 14.655 
CPM Saidin Index (Rural) 709 5.771 4.082 0.000 19.412 
Cost Aspiration Shortfall 4,767 1.120 1.975 0.002 35.732 
Cost Aspiration Shortfall 
(Teaching) 
4,766 1.728 1.893 0.031 26.239 
Cost Aspiration Shortfall 
(Non-Profit) 
4,767 1.588 1.191 0.035 29.763 
Cost Aspiration Shortfall 
(System) 
4,766 1.584 1.448 0.035 26.305 
Cost Aspiration Shortfall 
(Rural) 
4,767 1.604 1.525 0.021 29.334 
Teaching 5,565 0.949 0.220 0.000 1.000 
Non-Profit 4,304 0.678 0.467 0.000 1.000 
Rural 5,565 0.206 0.404 0.000 1.000 
System 5,583 0.574 0.494 0.000 1.000 
Percent Medicare Days 5,565 0.488 0.223 0.000 5.893 
General Beds (LN) 4,408 3.400 1.722 0.000 7.084 
Case Load 5,565 8.607 5.560 0.003 167.429 
Financial Slack 4,644 0.071 2.461 -492.843 294.574 
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Table 4.5: Correlation Matrix 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 CPM Saidin 1          
2 Cost Aspiration Shortfall 0.264* 1         
3 Teaching -0.174* -0.655* 1        
4 Non-Profit 0.243* 0.239* -0.138* 1       
5 Rural -0.117* -0.239* 0.118* 0.149* 1      
6 System 0.050* 0.090* -0.028* -0.168* -0.200* 1     
7 Percent Medicare Days 0.022* -0.115* 0.118* -0.117* 0.030* 0.088* 1    
8 General Beds (LN) 0.365* 0.482* -0.268* 0.324* -0.134* 0.068* 0.096* 1   
9 Case Load 0.101* 0.053* 0.039* -0.125* -0.234* 0.199* 0.053* 0.220* 1  
10 Financial Slack 0.005 -0.005 0.001 0.010 0.010 -0.010 -0.006 0.008 -0.005 1 
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4.5.3. Regression Results 
 We present the summary of results in Table 4.6.  Table 4.7 presents the fixed effects 
estimation results with Model A which corresponds to H1 for all reference groups and Table 4.8 
presents the fixed effects estimation results with Models B-D which corresponds to H2a-c for all 
reference groups, respectively. CPM Saidin Index is the dependent variable in all models. We first 
conducted our analysis by references groups, starting from All Hospitals in our sample to 
Teaching, Non-Profit, Rural, and System hospitals. Table 4.6 presents the summary of results for 
Cost Aspiration Shortfall on CPM Saidin Index and compares the reference groups.  With respect 
to H1 (cost aspiration shortfall having a positive effect on IT-enabled CPM Innovativeness), we 
find supporting evidence for System Hospitals (β=0.210, p<0.001), but not for the other reference 
groups. We speculate that the non-significant coefficient on All hospitals may be due to hospitals 
using a type of “cognitive shortcut” to bring down the number of referents to a manageable 
number, i.e., they are likely to use distinctive attributes (in our context, teaching, non-profit, rural, 
and system affiliate status) to define a smaller reference groups rather than look at the industry as 
a whole (Greve 2003b; Miller et al. 1988). With respect to H2 (the moderation by regulation 
phase), in line with our hypothesis we see a significant increase in the interaction coefficient size 
when moving from the Conceptualization Phase to Enactment Phase for all reference groups.  
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Table 4.6: Summary of Results 
 All Teaching Non-Profit Rural System Conclusion 
H1: Cost Aspiration 
Shortfall 
(+) NS (+) NS (-) NS (+) NS (+) S 
Partially 
Supported  
H2a: Cost Aspiration 
Shortfall * 
Conceptualization 
Phase 
(+) S (+) S (+) S (+) S (+) S Supported 
H2b: Cost Aspiration 
Shortfall * Enactment 
Phase  
(+) S (+) S (+) S (+) S (+) S Supported 
H2c: Cost Aspiration 
Shortfall * 
Enforcement Phase 
(-) S (-) S (-) S (-) S (-) S Not Supported 
Notes: S indicates significant coefficient, NS indicates nonsignificant coefficient, coefficient sign shown in parentheses 
 
Table 4.7: Fixed Effects Regression Results for Cost Aspiration Shortfall on CPM 
Saidin Index 
VARIABLES 
All Teaching Non-Profit Rural System 
Model A Model A Model A Model A Model A 
Cost Aspiration Shortfall 
0.010 0.012 -0.150 0.279 0.210*** 
(0.067) (0.070) (0.097) (0.406) (0.071) 
Teaching 
-1.008**  -0.841** - -0.757 
(0.420)  (0.408)  (0.654) 
Non-profit 
0.289 0.382  1.581 1.228*** 
(0.388) (0.436)  (1.861) (0.439) 
Rural 
-0.642** -0.696* -0.678**  -0.334 
(0.321) (0.363) (0.315)  (0.487) 
System 
-0.067 -0.081 -0.037 0.119  
(0.142) (0.162) (0.143) (0.545)  
Percent Medicare Days 
-0.019 -0.043 -0.113 -0.220 0.227 
(0.308) (0.345) (0.313) (0.610) (0.371) 
General Beds 
-0.429*** -0.421*** -0.335*** -0.082 -0.420*** 
(0.108) (0.120) (0.117) (0.395) (0.123) 
Case Load 
-0.026** -0.026* -0.041** -0.086 -0.025* 
(0.013) (0.014) (0.016) (0.062) (0.015) 
Financial Slack 
0.012 0.027 0.018 0.361 0.009 
(0.042) (0.051) (0.042) (0.238) (0.042) 
Constant 
9.473*** 8.965*** 9.678*** 6.241*** 8.926*** 
(0.698) (0.633) (0.665) (2.295) (0.885) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.374 0.309 0.485 0.218 0.357 
Number of Hospitals 3,846 3,647 2,861 616 2,740 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Robust standard errors in parentheses  
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Table 4.8: Fixed Effects Regression Results for Cost Aspiration Shortfall Interactions Comparison of Reference Groups 
Variables 
All Teaching Non-Profit Rural System 
Model B Model C Model D Model B Model C Model D Model B Model C Model D Model B Model C Model D Model B Model C Model D 
Cost Aspiration Shortfall 
-0.116 0.030 0.172** -0.077 -0.047 0.314** -0.153* -0.076 0.402*** 0.281 0.231 0.901** -0.283*** -0.141* 0.0999 
(0.073) (0.068) (0.086) (0.089) (0.063) (0.123) (0.091) (0.084) (0.103) (0.355) (0.329) (0.371) (0.080) (0.072) (0.127) 
Conceptualization Phase 
3.595***   3.271***   4.105***   3.178***   3.425***   
(0.109)   (0.157)   (0.124)   (0.496)   (0.136)   
Enactment Phase 
 -1.026***   -1.217***   -1.359***   -1.357***   -0.990***  
 (0.123)   (0.155)   (0.130)   (0.475)   (0.161)  
Enforcement Phase 
  -3.348***   -2.785***   -3.883***   -2.737***   -3.160*** 
  (0.111)   (0.141)   (0.122)   (0.446)   (0.140) 
Cost Aspiration Shortfall * 
Conceptualization Phase 
0.222***   0.289***   0.360***   0.441**   0.225***   
(0.025)   (0.060)   (0.043)   (0.196)   (0.036)   
Cost Aspiration Shortfall * 
Enactment Phase  
 0.270***   0.478***   0.358***   0.567***   0.310***  
 (0.025)   (0.043)   (0.038)   (0.169)   (0.040)  
Cost Aspiration Shortfall * 
Enforcement Phase 
  -0.321***   -0.534***   -0.461***   -0.676***   -0.345*** 
  (0.027)   (0.047)   (0.0423)   (0.155)   (0.041) 
Teaching 
-0.895** -0.839** -0.644*    -0.706* -0.709* -0.497 - - - -0.658 -0.603 -0.434 
(0.404) (0.404) (0.387)    (0.395) (0.395) (0.387)    (0.639) (0.632) (0.614) 
Non-Profit 
0.338 0.288 0.360 0.389 0.352 0.361    1.703 1.646 1.845 1.252*** 1.222*** 1.259*** 
(0.385) (0.384) (0.381) (0.431) (0.425) (0.418)    (1.868) (1.871) (1.883) (0.437) (0.437) (0.435) 
Rural 
-0.633** -0.649** -0.638** -0.687* -0.701* -0.685* -0.670** -0.683** -0.674**    -0.329 -0.358 -0.354 
(0.323) (0.321) (0.323) (0.364) (0.364) (0.367) (0.314) (0.314) (0.313)    (0.487) (0.488) (0.490) 
System 
-0.061 -0.095 -0.092 -0.048 -0.068 -0.004 -0.045 -0.075 -0.0952 0.169 0.199 0.290    
(0.139) (0.139) (0.135) (0.160) (0.158) (0.155) (0.140) (0.140) (0.137) (0.540) (0.540) (0.535)    
Percent Medicare Days 
-0.043 -0.046 -0.086 -0.065 -0.093 -0.140 -0.138 -0.134 -0.172 -0.251 -0.259 -0.315 0.218 0.221 0.206 
(0.308) (0.303) (0.303) (0.346) (0.337) (0.338) (0.313) (0.308) (0.307) (0.611) (0.610) (0.611) (0.369) (0.367) (0.364) 
General Bed 
-0.403*** -0.405*** -0.363*** -0.402*** -0.386*** -0.345*** -0.320*** -0.317*** -0.293*** -0.090 -0.060 -0.069 -0.409*** -0.409*** -0.391*** 
(0.107) (0.106) (0.105) (0.120) (0.119) (0.119) (0.116) (0.115) (0.113) (0.394) (0.399) (0.399) (0.123) (0.122) (0.121) 
Case Load 
-0.025** -0.022* -0.020 -0.025* -0.022 -0.021 -0.038** -0.035** -0.030* -0.081 -0.076 -0.065 -0.024 -0.024 -0.023 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.062) (0.061) (0.060) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Financial Slack 
0.011 0.012 0.010 0.025 0.028 0.025 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.378 0.338 0.360 0.008 0.009 0.008 
(0.040) (0.044) (0.042) (0.049) (0.054) (0.051) (0.040) (0.044) (0.043) (0.234) (0.235) (0.228) (0.041) (0.045) (0.043) 
Constant 
5.423*** 9.168*** 8.455*** 5.227*** 8.947*** 8.081*** 4.752*** 9.326*** 8.173*** 2.200 6.096*** 4.746** 5.047*** 8.600*** 7.870*** 
(0.678) (0.683) (0.679) (0.620) (0.619) (0.638) (0.645) (0.648) (0.642) (2.218) (2.270) (2.315) (0.865) (0.866) (0.869) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.381 0.386 0.398 0.313 0.322 0.329 0.492 0.494 0.506 0.221 0.225 0.230 0.361 0.368 0.376 
Number of Hospitals 3,846 3,846 3,846 3,647 3,647 3,647 2,861 2,861 2,861 616 616 616 2,740 2,740 2,740 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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4.5.4. Interaction Plots and Economic Significance 
 To better understand and interpret the interaction effects, we plotted the significant 
interactions (See Figure 4.3a-e) for All Hospitals and then the four reference groups when they 
were in the Conceptualization, Enactment, and Enforcement Phases. 
4.5.4.1. All Hospitals in our Sample 
 For All Hospitals, we observe increases in cost aspiration shortfall positively impacts CPM 
Saidin Index when in the Conceptualization and Enactment Phases, but not in the Enforcement 
Phase. Furthermore, for All Hospitals the impact of cost aspiration shortfall on CPM Saidin Index 
increases when moving from the Conceptualization Phase to the Enactment Phase. We also 
observe that the impact of cost aspiration shortfall on CPM Saidin Index decreases when moving 
from the Enactment Phase to the Enforcement Phase. 
4.5.4.2. Reference Groups 
 For all four reference groups, we observe a similar pattern as with the All Hospital analysis. 
We also observe that increases in cost aspiration shortfall positively impacts CPM Saidin Index 
when in the Conceptualization and Enactment Phases.  We also note that the impact of cost 
aspiration shortfall on CPM Saidin Index increases when moving from the Conceptualization to 
the Enactment Phase for all reference groups.  However, when moving from the Enactment Phase 
to the Enforcement Phase, we see that the impact of cost aspiration shortfall on CPM Saidin Index 
decreases for Teaching and Non-Profit Hospitals and increases for Rural and System hospitals 
(although to a lesser degree than when moving from the Conceptualization to Enactment Phase).  
 In the main and interaction effects, we see the greatest explained variance in the non-profit 
hospital models. Furthermore, when hospital i is one standard deviation above the industry mean 
in its cost aspiration shortfall and is during the Enactment Phase of regulation then there is an 
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increase in hospital innovativeness, i.e., an increase of 0.978 or 18.9% in the CPM Saidin Index.  
When hospital i is one standard deviation above the industry mean in its cost aspiration shortfall 
and is during the Enforcement Phase of the regulation then there is a decrease in hospital 
innovativeness, i.e., a decrease of 1.162 or 22.5% in the CPM Saidin Index. 
 
  
Figure 4.3a: Interaction Plot of CPM Saidin on 
Cost Aspiration Shortfall - All Hospitals 
Figure 4.3b: Interaction Plot of CPM Saidin on 
Cost Aspiration Shortfall - Teaching Hospitals 
  
Figure 4.3c: Interaction Plot of CPM Saidin on 
Cost Aspiration Shortfall - Non-Profit Hospitals 
Figure 4.3d: Interaction Plot of CPM Saidin on 
Cost Aspiration Shortfall - Rural Hospitals 
 
 
Figure 4.3e: Interaction Plot of CPM Saidin on 
Cost Aspiration Shortfall - System Hospitals 
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4.5.5. Robustness Tests 
We conducted a variety of robustness checks for further exploration of our results. These 
analyses can provide insights to our assumptions as well as the reliability of our empirical results.  
Variation in Prior Performance: Drawing on Bromiley (1991), for firms performing below the 
industry average of their respective reference group (i.e., costs are below the industry average), we 
varied the prior performance parameter.  We constructed multiple versions of aspiration level by 
changing the parameter of 0.95 (i.e., aspiration level to reduce hospital costs by 5%) to 0.90, 0.85, 
and 0.80 (i.e., aspiration level to reduce hospital costs by 10%, 15%, and 20%, respectively) (See 
Appendix 4.A, Table 4.A1-Table 4.A6).  We find the results were insensitive to moderate 
variations in this parameter. 
Clustered Standard Errors: We redefined how the standard errors were clustered as there may 
still be some unexplained variation in our dependent variable that could be correlated across 
observations (Wooldridge 2002): across time within a hospital and across hospitals in the same 
geographic area. In the supplemental analysis, we clustered around hospital service areas (HSA), 
which were originally defined by the National Center for Health Statistics. An HSA is a single 
county or cluster of contiguous counties which are relatively self-contained with respect to hospital 
care. We find the results to be consistent (See Appendix 4.B, Table 4.B1 and Table 4.B2) 
Comparison Above and Below Mean: We also compared cost aspiration shortfall above and below 
the mean (See Appendix 4.B, Table 4.B3-4.B6). Interestingly, we found that hospitals below the 
mean tend to have an order of magnitude higher coefficient than hospitals above the mean for all 
models (main effects and interactions across all hospitals and sub-groups). 
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Lag Effects: We then lagged the dependent variable from one year (See Appendix 4.B, Table 4.B7 
and 4.B8). The parameters are statistically significant, yet just slightly smaller than in the original 
model. This indicates that hospitals exhibit temporal stability over time. 
Top Performers: We also modeled mimicry of organizational search. We set the average to that 
of the 90th percentile of the specified reference group. This assumes that hospitals imitate the 
behavior of the top performers in their reference group. We find that setting the average of the 
reference group to the top performers produces more pronounced increases in the coefficients (See 
Appendix 4.B, Table 4.B9 and 4.B10). 
Alternative Model Specification: We evaluated the robustness of the fixed effects estimation 
results. The Hausman test suggests that the fixed effect specification was appropriate (See 
Appendix 4.B, Table 4.B11). The results for the random effect specification are provided in 
Appendix 4.B, Table 4.B12 and Table 4.B13 and are relatively consistent with the fixed effects 
results. 
 Sub-Group Analysis: We also created hospital profiles based on their teaching status, non-profit 
status, rural location, and system affiliate status. We first looked at the frequency table of all 
possible sub-groups (See Appendix 4.C, Table 4.C1). We identified six main groups with enough 
observations (frequency greater than 2000). The results are reported in Appendix 4.C, Table 4.C2-
4.C4. We observe negative and statistically significant coefficients when a hospital is a Teaching, 
For-Profit, Urban, and Non-System affiliated as well as when a hospital is Teaching, Non-Profit, 
Rural, and Non-System affiliated. Interestingly, we find that when a hospital is Teaching, Non-
Profit, Urban, and System affiliated that they have the largest, statistically significant coefficient 
in the interaction model. For all other interaction effects models, we find five of the six sub-groups 
exhibit a similar pattern of results that were seen in the main analysis, albeit larger coefficients. 
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4.6. Discussion 
Our findings partially support our hypotheses that when a hospital experiences a cost 
aspiration shortfall and moves from the Conceptualization through Enforcement Phase, there is an 
increase in IT-enabled CPM Innovativeness.  Our results have implications for our understanding 
in creating business value from innovating in IT-enabled CPM especially in a changing regulatory 
environment. See Table 4.9 for a summary of key findings and contributions 
4.6.1. Theoretical Implications 
By surfacing how an aspiration shortfall can motivate a hospital to innovate in IT-enabled 
CPM, we contribute to the IT business value and HIT literatures (Angst et al. 2014; Aral and Weill 
2007; Devaraj and Kohli 2003; Hitt and Brynjolfsson 1996; Salge et al. 2015). Additionally, by 
showing how the decision to innovate in IT-enabled CPM can change depending on the regulatory 
environment, we contribute to our understanding of the role of the institutional environment in 
explaining a firm’s decision-making process. We elaborate our contributions below. 
We extend past research that has looked at various mechanisms that are expected to 
influence investment decisions in IS, such as search (Salge et al. 2015) and the institutional 
environment (Chiasson and Davidson 2005), by uncovering how problemistic search influences a 
hospital’s innovativeness and how this relationship is contingent on the regulatory environment in 
which the hospital operates. Our results reveal that innovativeness in IT is triggered by aspirations 
to address performance shortfalls.  Furthermore, our study shows that cost aspiration shortfall 
triggers innovativeness with respect to IT innovativeness for CPM.  We contribute to the BTOF 
literature (Cyert and March 1963; Gavetti et al. 2012; Greve 2003a) by showing that a key type of 
aspiration shortfall which is particularly relevant to hospitals, triggers search for innovations to 
improve processes. 
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Our study also reveals that when a hospital experiences a cost aspiration shortfall its 
innovativeness in IT-enabled CPM changes based on the institutional environment.  Specifically, 
we find that as the regulatory environment shifts from the Conceptualization Phase to the 
Enactment Phase, hospital innovativeness increases more so when there is a high cost aspiration 
shortfall than a low cost aspiration shortfall. When the Conceptualization Phase changes to the 
Enactment Phase, uncertainty surrounding the regulation diminishes as the contents of the law are 
revealed.  As such, hospitals may increase their innovativeness to not be perceived as “left behind” 
within their reference group and to preemptively prepare for the Enforcement Phase.  This finding 
contributes to our emerging understanding of how the relationship between an aspiration shortfall 
in patient cost of care and IT-enabled CPM changes based on the progression of a regulatory 
intervention. Interestingly, we also find that when a hospital experiences a cost aspiration shortfall 
and the regulatory environment moves from the Enactment Phase to the Enforcement Phase 
innovativeness decreases for all reference groups.  A hospital experiencing a cost aspiration 
shortfall in the Enforcement Phase may choose to be more risk averse and invest in more 
standardized, common IT-enabled CPM, which are now incentivized under the regulation, as the 
perceived returns (i.e., incentive payments) are more guaranteed. Thus, a firm’s decision for IT-
enabled CPM Innovativeness to meet a cost aspiration shortfall is highly contingent on the 
institutional environment.  
Collectively, our findings reveal how the changing regulatory landscape interacts with a 
hospital’s cost aspiration shortfall to explain the hospital’s IT-enabled CPM Innovativeness.  By 
integrating the problemistic search mechanism from Behavioral Theory of the Firm (Cyert and 
March 1963) where hospitals are motivated to close an aspiration shortfall gap via innovating in 
their clinical processes with the institutional environment (Chen and Miller 2007; Oliver 1991; 
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Salge et al. 2015) where regulations are enacted to promote health information technology , we 
show that a firm’s decision to innovatively use IT for clinical process management based on its 
level of aspiration shortfall is contingent on the uncertainty during the progression of a regulatory 
intervention at the institutional level.  Our findings support Salge, Kohli, & Barrett’s (2015) 
assertion that greater attention needs to be devoted to the resource allocation stage of IT adoption 
and use. Only once we understand the motivations that trigger decisions to innovatively use IT for 
clinical process management – cost aspiration shortfall and the regulatory environment – and how 
they interact, can we gain a more complete understanding on why firms differ in their 
innovativeness with respect to HIT and consequently the value created from HIT.  In sum, our 
study elaborates the theoretical explanations from the BTOF (Bromiley and Harris 2014; Greve 
1998; Park 2007) and Institutional (Melville et al. 2004; Salge et al. 2015) perspectives on how an 
aspiration shortfall initiates a search to close the gap under a changing regulatory environment.  
Specifically, we focused on how innovatively using IT for clinical process management can 
address a cost aspiration shortfall while undergoing the progression of a regulatory intervention 
from Conceptualization through Enforcement. 
4.6.2. Implications for Practice 
Insights into the institutional environment and how it interacts with a cost aspiration 
shortfall is critical to IS professionals who are increasingly being called upon to implement and 
improve a hospital’s IS systems for enhanced efficiency and reduced costs.  In particular, IS 
professionals can shape their IS strategies by taking into account the regulatory environment and 
how IT can be innovatively used for clinical process management to address a cost aspiration 
shortfall. 
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Furthermore, these insights into how the decision to innovatively use IT for clinical process 
management changes based on the regulatory environment are likely to interest health policy 
makers at the federal and even state level, as well as IS professionals working in the healthcare 
industry. Health policy makers need to recognize that the response by hospitals will vary as a 
function of two conditions: (1) the phase of the regulatory environment and (2) the extent of an 
aspiration shortfall.  In particular, hospitals are sensitive to the uncertainty in the regulatory 
environment especially when experiencing an aspiration shortfall and can alter their IT decisions 
even prior to when legislation is formally signed into a law.  Consequently, health policy makers 
should incorporate considerations of uncertainty into policy development, such as promoting key 
successful hospitals as role models for other hospitals (Angst et al. 2014) especially during the 
phases of more uncertainty which might deter some hospitals from innovatively using HIT. 
4.6.3. Conclusion 
 We set out to integrate the BTOF and Institutional perspectives to show how the 
progression of the regulatory environment can change the nature of the relationship between an 
aspiration shortfall and the deployment of information systems.  As a result, two key contributions 
emerged. First, drawing on BTOF, we offered theoretical insights into the connection between a 
cost aspiration shortfall and a hospital’s decision to innovatively use IT for clinical process 
management. Second, integrating Behavioral Theory of the Firm and Institutional Theory we were 
able to identify how this relationship changed based on phases of institutional regulation. More 
broadly, we expect these insights to expand our understanding of how an aspiration shortfall can 
influence a firm’s strategic choices with respect to innovation as well as how this relationship can 
be influenced through incentives in the regulatory environment. 
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Table 4.9: Summary of Key Findings and Contributions 
Hypotheses Findings Implications 
H1:  
Cost aspiration 
shortfall   increases 
in IT-enabled Clinical 
Process Management 
Innovativeness 
When a hospital experiences a 
cost aspiration shortfall there is 
an increase in IT-enabled 
Clinical Process Management 
Innovativeness for system 
hospitals. 
When a hospital experiences a 
cost aspiration shortfall, it 
triggers problemistic search 
activities (IT-enabled Clinical 
Process Management 
Innovation) to rectify the 
performance problem. In 
particular, the reference groups a 
hospital chooses to associate 
itself with is extremely 
important and could change 
behaviors. 
H2a-c: 
Increase in cost 
aspiration shortfall  
increase in marginal 
return to IT-enabled 
Clinical Process 
Management 
Innovativeness, more 
so when moving from 
the (a) 
Conceptualization 
Phase to the (b) 
Enactment Phase to the 
(c) Enforcement Phase 
When a hospital experiences an 
increase in their cost aspiration 
shortfall and moves from the 
Conceptualization Phase to the 
Enactment Phase there is an 
increase in IT-enabled Clinical 
Process Management 
Innovativeness. 
BTOF asserts that search will 
occur to address any 
performance shortfalls, while 
institutional theory says that 
search may be constrained or 
enabled by the environment. We 
integrate both together to show 
that search for innovatively 
using IT for Clinical Process 
Management is not just a 
function of one or the other but 
both. In particular, under more 
uncertainty, hospitals may 
increase their innovativeness to 
not be “left-behind” and 
preemptively prepare for the 
next stage of regulation. 
However, when the regulation 
has been fully implemented and 
uncertainty has been eliminated, 
hospitals may curb their 
innovativeness to take advantage 
of the guaranteed returns of the 
subsidized HIT. 
When a hospital experiences an 
increase in their cost aspiration 
shortfall and moves from the 
Enactment Phase to the 
Enforcement Phase there is a 
decrease in IT-enabled Clinical 
Process Management 
Innovativeness. 
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4.8. Appendix 4.A 
Table 4.A1: Fixed Effects Regression Results for Cost Aspiration Shortfall on CPM Saidin Index 
(Aspiration Level to Reduce Hospital Cost by 10%) 
 VARIABLES 
All Teaching Non-Profit Rural System 
Model A Model A Model A Model A Model A 
Cost Aspiration Shortfall 
0.005 0.007 -0.141 0.260 -0.206*** 
(0.064) (0.068) (0.093) (0.390) (0.067) 
Teaching 
-1.008**  -0.841** - -0.757 
(0.420)  (0.408)  (0.654) 
Non-profit 
0.289 0.382  1.583 1.225*** 
(0.388) (0.436)  (1.861) (0.439) 
Rural 
-0.641** -0.696* -0.678**  -0.334 
(0.322) (0.363) (0.315)  (0.487) 
System 
-0.067 -0.081 -0.037 0.119  
(0.142) (0.162) (0.143) (0.545)  
Percent Medicare Days 
-0.019 -0.043 -0.113 -0.221 0.226 
(0.308) (0.345) (0.313) (0.610) (0.371) 
General Beds 
-0.429*** -0.421*** -0.336*** -0.081 -0.421*** 
(0.108) (0.120) (0.117) (0.395) (0.123) 
Case Load 
-0.026** -0.026* -0.041** -0.087 -0.025* 
(0.013) (0.014) (0.016) (0.062) (0.015) 
Financial Slack 
0.012 0.027 0.018 0.360 0.009 
(0.042) (0.051) (0.042) (0.238) (0.042) 
Constant 
9.483*** 8.975*** 9.669*** 6.258*** 8.930*** 
(0.698) (0.633) (0.665) (2.293) (0.885) 
R-squared 0.374 0.309 0.485 0.218 0.357 
Number of Hospitals 3,846 3,647 2,861 616 2,740 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 4.A2: Fixed Effects Regression Results for Cost Aspiration Shortfall Interactions Comparison of Reference Group on CPM Saidin 
Index (Aspiration Level to Reduce Hospital Cost by 10%) 
 VARIABLES 
All Teaching Non-Profit Rural System 
Model B Model C Model D Model B Model C Model D Model B Model C Model D Model B Model C Model D Model B Model C Model D 
Cost Aspiration Shortfall 
-0.118* 0.022 0.166* -0.084 -0.051 0.304** -0.145* -0.075 0.398*** 0.261 0.209 0.868** -0.284*** -0.142** 0.087 
(0.071) (0.065) (0.085) (0.088) (0.061) (0.124) (0.087) (0.081) (0.099) (0.344) (0.318) (0.364) (0.077) (0.068) (0.123) 
Conceptualization Phase 
3.592***   3.274***   4.092***   3.175***   3.419***   
(0.110)   (0.160)   (0.126)   (0.503)   (0.137)   
Enactment Phase  
-1.034***   -1.235***   -1.369***   -1.370***   -0.999***  
 (0.123)   (0.156)   (0.131)   (0.480)   (0.162)  
Enforcement Phase   
-3.343***   -2.777***   -3.870***   -2.732***   -3.155*** 
  (0.111)   (0.144)   (0.123)   (0.451)   (0.141) 
Cost Aspiration Shortfall * 
Conceptualization Phase 
0.221***   0.283***   0.359***   0.435**   0.224***   
(0.025)   (0.061)   (0.043)   (0.197)   (0.036)   
Cost Aspiration Shortfall * 
Enactment Phase  
 0.269***   0.480***   0.357***   0.563***   0.309***  
 (0.026)   (0.043)   (0.038)   (0.171)   (0.040)  
Cost Aspiration Shortfall * 
Enforcement Phase 
  -0.319***   -0.530***   -0.459***   -0.668***   -0.342*** 
  (0.027)   (0.048)   (0.042)   (0.156)   (0.041) 
Teaching 
-0.897** -0.841** -0.650*    -0.707* -0.712* -0.504 - - - -0.660 -0.606 -0.442 
(0.404) (0.404) (0.387)    (0.396) (0.395) (0.387)    (0.640) (0.632) (0.614) 
Non-Profit 
0.338 0.289 0.360 0.389 0.353 0.363    1.702 1.651 1.846 1.250*** 1.222*** 1.259*** 
(0.385) (0.385) (0.381) (0.431) (0.425) (0.418)    (1.867) (1.871) (1.882) (0.438) (0.437) (0.436) 
Rural 
-0.633** -0.648** -0.638** -0.687* -0.701* -0.684* -0.670** -0.683** -0.674**    -0.329 -0.358 -0.353 
(0.323) (0.321) (0.323) (0.364) (0.364) (0.367) (0.314) (0.314) (0.313)    (0.488) (0.488) (0.490) 
System 
-0.061 -0.095 -0.092 -0.049 -0.068 -0.007 -0.045 -0.075 -0.096 0.165 0.198 0.283    
(0.139) (0.139) (0.136) (0.160) (0.158) (0.155) (0.140) (0.140) (0.137) (0.540) (0.540) (0.535)    
Percent Medicare Days 
-0.042 -0.046 -0.083 -0.063 -0.093 -0.135 -0.137 -0.133 -0.170 -0.250 -0.260 -0.313 0.219 0.220 0.208 
(0.308) (0.303) (0.303) (0.346) (0.337) (0.338) (0.313) (0.308) (0.307) (0.611) (0.610) (0.611) (0.369) (0.367) (0.364) 
General Bed 
-0.403*** -0.405*** -0.364*** -0.402*** -0.386*** -0.346*** -0.321*** -0.318*** -0.294*** -0.088 -0.060 -0.067 -0.409*** -0.409*** -0.391*** 
(0.107) (0.106) (0.105) (0.120) (0.119) (0.119) (0.116) (0.115) (0.113) (0.394) (0.399) (0.399) (0.123) (0.122) (0.121) 
Case Load 
-0.025** -0.022* -0.021 -0.026* -0.022 -0.022 -0.039** -0.035** -0.300* -0.081 -0.077 -0.066 -0.025 -0.024 -0.023 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.062) (0.061) (0.060) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Financial Slack 
0.011 0.012 0.010 0.025 0.028 0.024 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.377 0.338 0.360 0.008 0.009 0.008 
(0.040) (0.044) (0.042) (0.049) (0.054) (0.051) (0.040) (0.044) (0.043) (0.234) (0.235) (0.228) (0.041) (0.045) (0.043) 
Constant 
5.435*** 9.186*** 8.472*** 5.242*** 8.958*** 8.097*** 4.749*** 9.333*** 8.178*** 2.220 6.123*** 4.773** 5.063*** 8.614*** 7.898*** 
(0.678) (0.683) (0.680) (0.620) (0.619) (0.641) (0.645) (0.648) (0.642) (2.218) (2.270) (2.317) (0.865) (0.866) (0.869) 
R-squared 0.381 0.386 0.397 0.312 0.321 0.329 0.492 0.494 0.505 0.220 0.224 0.230 0.361 0.368 0.375 
Number of Hospitals 3,846 3,846 3,846 3,647 3,647 3,647 2,861 2,861 2,861 616 616 616 2,740 2,740 2,740 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 4.A3: Fixed Effects Regression Results for Cost Aspiration Shortfall on CPM Saidin Index 
(Aspiration Level to Reduce Hospital Cost by 15%) 
 VARIABLES 
All Teaching Non-Profit Rural System 
Model A Model A Model A Model A Model A 
Cost Aspiration Shortfall 
-0.000 0.001 -0.130 0.240 -0.200*** 
(0.061) (0.065) (0.089) (0.372) (0.064) 
Teaching 
-1.009**  -0.841** - -0.757 
(0.419)  (0.408)  (0.654) 
Non-profit 
0.290 0.383  1.586 1.223*** 
(0.388) (0.437)  (1.861) (0.439) 
Rural 
-0.641** -0.696* -0.678**  -0.334 
(0.322) (0.363) (0.315)  (0.487) 
System 
-0.067 -0.081 -0.037 0.120  
(0.142) (0.162) (0.143) (0.545)  
Percent Medicare Days 
-0.020 -0.043 -0.113 -0.222 0.225 
(0.308) (0.345) (0.313) (0.610) (0.371) 
General Beds 
-0.428*** -0.420*** -0.337*** -0.080 -0.421*** 
(0.108) (0.120) (0.117) (0.395) (0.123) 
Case Load 
-0.026** -0.026* -0.041** -0.087 -0.025* 
(0.013) (0.014) (0.016) (0.062) (0.015) 
Financial Slack 
0.012 0.027 0.018 0.360 0.009 
(0.042) (0.051) (0.042) (0.238) (0.042) 
Constant 
9.494*** 8.985*** 9.659*** 6.278*** 8.934*** 
(0.697) (0.633) (0.665) (2.291) (0.885) 
R-squared 0.374 0.309 0.485 0.218 0.357 
Number of Hospitals 3,846 3,647 2,861 616 2,740 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 4.A4: Fixed Effects Regression Results for Cost Aspiration Shortfall Interactions Comparison of Reference Group on CPM Saidin 
Index (Aspiration Level to Reduce Hospital Cost by 15%) 
 VARIABLES 
All Teaching Non-Profit Rural System 
Model B Model C Model D Model B Model C Model D Model B Model C Model D Model B Model C Model D Model B Model C Model D 
Cost Aspiration Shortfall 
-0.120* 0.015 0.160* -0.090 -0.054 0.293** -0.136 -0.073 0.393*** 0.239 0.184 0.830** -0.283*** -0.143** 0.0751 
(0.070) (0.062) (0.084) (0.085) (0.058) (0.125) (0.083) (0.077) (0.095) (0.331) (0.307) (0.355) (0.073) (0.064) (0.117) 
Conceptualization Phase 
3.588***   3.280***   4.078***   3.176***   3.414***   
(0.111)   (0.164)   (0.127)   (0.510)   (0.138)   
Enactment Phase  
-1.043***   -1.254***   -1.380***   -1.382***   -1.007***  
 (0.124)   (0.157)   (0.131)   (0.485)   (0.163)  
Enforcement Phase   
-3.338***   -2.770***   -3.857***   -2.730***   -3.150*** 
  (0.112)   (0.147)   (0.124)   (0.456)   (0.141) 
Cost Aspiration Shortfall * 
Conceptualization Phase 
0.219***   0.275***   0.358***   0.427**   0.223***   
(0.025)   (0.062)   (0.043)   (0.198)   (0.036)   
Cost Aspiration Shortfall * 
Enactment Phase  
 0.268***   0.480***   0.355***   0.557***   0.307***  
 (0.026)   (0.044)   (0.038)   (0.173)   (0.040)  
Cost Aspiration Shortfall * 
Enforcement Phase 
  -0.317***   -0.525***   -0.456***   -0.657***   -0.338*** 
  (0.027)   (0.049)   (0.043)   (0.156)   (0.040) 
Teaching 
-0.899** -0.845** -0.656*    -0.709* -0.715* -0.512 - - - -0.663 -0.609 -0.450 
(0.404) (0.404) (0.388)    (0.396) (0.396) (0.388)    (0.640) (0.633) (0.615) 
Non-Profit 
0.338 0.291 0.361 0.390 0.353 0.364    1.700 1.656 1.845 1.247*** 1.221*** 1.258*** 
(0.386) (0.385) (0.382) (0.432) (0.426) (0.419)    (1.867) (1.870) (1.880) (0.438) (0.437) (0.436) 
Rural 
-0.633** -0.648** -0.637** -0.687* -0.700* -0.684* -0.671** -0.683** -0.675**    -0.329 -0.357 -0.352 
(0.323) (0.321) (0.323) (0.364) (0.364) (0.367) (0.314) (0.314) (0.313)    (0.488) (0.488) (0.490) 
System 
-0.061 -0.095 -0.093 -0.050 -0.069 -0.010 -0.046 -0.075 -0.096 0.162 0.197 0.276    
(0.140) (0.139) (0.136) (0.160) (0.158) (0.155) (0.140) (0.141) (0.137) (0.541) (0.540) (0.536)    
Percent Medicare Days 
-0.040 -0.046 -0.080 -0.060 -0.094 -0.130 -0.135 -0.133 -0.166 -0.249 -0.260 -0.309 0.220 0.219 0.209 
(0.308) (0.303) (0.303) (0.346) (0.337) (0.338) (0.313) (0.308) (0.307) (0.611) (0.610) (0.611) (0.369) (0.367) (0.364) 
General Bed 
-0.404*** -0.404*** -0.364*** -0.402*** -0.386*** -0.347*** -0.322*** -0.319*** -0.295*** -0.086 -0.060 -0.066 -0.410*** -0.410*** -0.391*** 
(0.107) (0.106) (0.105) (0.120) (0.119) (0.119) (0.116) (0.115) (0.113) (0.394) (0.399) (0.399) (0.123) (0.122) (0.121) 
Case Load 
-0.026** -0.022* -0.021* -0.026* -0.022 -0.022 -0.039** -0.035** -0.031* -0.081 -0.077 -0.067 -0.025 -0.024 -0.023 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.062) (0.061) (0.060) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Financial Slack 
0.011 0.012 0.010 0.025 0.028 0.024 0.017 0.018 0.017 0.375 0.339 0.359 0.008 0.009 0.008 
(0.040) (0.044) (0.042) (0.049) (0.054) (0.051) (0.040) (0.044) (0.043) (0.235) (0.234) (0.228) (0.041) (0.045) (0.043) 
Constant 
5.448*** 9.205*** 8.491*** 5.257*** 8.970*** 8.115*** 4.745*** 9.341*** 8.186*** 2.244 6.155*** 4.811** 5.080*** 8.629*** 7.929*** 
(0.679) (0.683) (0.681) (0.621) (0.619) (0.644) (0.645) (0.648) (0.643) (2.218) (2.270) (2.320) (0.866) (0.866) (0.870) 
R-squared 0.380 0.386 0.397 0.312 0.321 0.328 0.492 0.494 0.505 0.220 0.224 0.229 0.361 0.367 0.375 
Number of Hospitals 3,846 3,846 3,846 3,647 3,647 3,647 2,861 2,861 2,861 616 616 616 2,740 2,740 2,740 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 4.A5: Fixed Effects Regression Results for Cost Aspiration Shortfall on CPM Saidin Index 
(Aspiration Level to Reduce Hospital Cost by 20%) 
 VARIABLES 
All Teaching Non-Profit Rural System 
Model A Model A Model A Model A Model A 
Cost Aspiration Shortfall 
-0.005 -0.005 -0.120 0.218 -0.194*** 
(0.058) (0.062) (0.084) (0.353) (0.061) 
Teaching 
-1.009**  -0.840** - -0.758 
(0.419)  (0.408)  (0.654) 
Non-profit 
0.290 0.384  1.587 1.220*** 
(0.388) (0.437)  (1.861) (0.439) 
Rural 
-0.641** -0.696* -0.678**  -0.334 
(0.322) (0.363) (0.315)  (0.487) 
System 
-0.067 -0.081 -0.037 0.120  
(0.142) (0.162) (0.143) (0.545)  
Percent Medicare Days 
-0.020 -0.044 -0.113 -0.223 0.225 
(0.308) (0.345) (0.313) (0.610) (0.371) 
General Beds 
-0.428*** -0.420*** -0.338*** -0.079 -0.422*** 
(0.108) (0.120) (0.117) (0.395) (0.123) 
Case Load 
-0.026** -0.026* -0.041** -0.087 -0.025* 
(0.013) (0.014) (0.016) (0.062) (0.015) 
Financial Slack 
0.012 0.027 0.018 0.359 0.009 
(0.042) (0.051) (0.042) (0.238) (0.042) 
Constant 
9.505*** 8.995*** 9.648*** 6.302*** 8.938*** 
(0.697) (0.632) (0.664) (2.288) (0.885) 
R-squared 0.374 0.309 0.485 0.218 0.357 
Number of Hospitals 3,846 3,647 2,861 616 2,740 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 4.A6: Fixed Effects Regression Results for Cost Aspiration Shortfall Interactions Comparison of Reference Group on CPM Saidin 
Index (Aspiration Level to Reduce Hospital Cost by 20%) 
 VARIABLES 
All Teaching Non-Profit Rural System 
Model B Model C Model D Model B Model C Model D Model B Model C Model D Model B Model C Model D Model B Model C Model D 
Cost Aspiration Shortfall 
-0.122* 0.007 0.154* -0.095 -0.058 0.280** -0.127 -0.071 0.387*** 0.215 0.159 0.786** -0.282*** -0.143** 0.063 
(0.068) (0.059) (0.083) (0.082) (0.055) (0.125) (0.079) (0.073) (0.090) (0.318) (0.295) (0.346) (0.070) (0.060) (0.111) 
Conceptualization Phase 
3.585***   3.288***   4.064***   3.180***   3.408***   
(0.111)   (0.167)   (0.129)   (0.518)   (0.138)   
Enactment Phase  
-1.052***   -1.274***   -1.391***   -1.392***   -1.016***  
 (0.125)   (0.159)   (0.133)   (0.491)   (0.164)  
Enforcement Phase   
-3.333***   -2.765***   -3.844***   -2.733***   -3.145*** 
  (0.113)   (0.150)   (0.126)   (0.462)   (0.142) 
Cost Aspiration Shortfall * 
Conceptualization Phase 
0.217***   0.266***   0.357***   0.415**   0.221***   
(0.025)   (0.063)   (0.044)   (0.200)   (0.0355)   
Cost Aspiration Shortfall * 
Enactment Phase  
 0.267***   0.480***   0.352***   0.549***   0.304***  
 (0.026)   (0.045)   (0.038)   (0.175)   (0.040)  
Cost Aspiration Shortfall * 
Enforcement Phase 
  -0.314***   -0.517***   -0.453***   -0.643***   -0.334*** 
  (0.027)   (0.050)   (0.043)   (0.157)   (0.040) 
Teaching 
-0.901** -0.849** -0.664*    -0.711* -0.719* -0.521 - - - -0.666 -0.612 -0.459 
(0.404) (0.404) (0.388)    (0.397) (0.396) (0.389)    (0.641) (0.634) (0.617) 
Non-Profit 
0.338 0.292 0.361 0.391 0.354 0.366    1.696 1.661 1.842 1.244*** 1.221*** 1.258*** 
(0.386) (0.385) (0.382) (0.432) (0.426) (0.420)    (1.867) (1.870) (1.879) (0.438) (0.437) (0.437) 
Rural 
-0.633* -0.648** -0.637** -0.687* -0.700* -0.684* -0.671** -0.683** -0.675**    -0.329 -0.355 -0.351 
(0.323) (0.321) (0.324) (0.364) (0.364) (0.367) (0.314) (0.314) (0.313)    (0.488) (0.488) (0.490) 
System 
-0.062 -0.095 -0.093 -0.052 -0.070 -0.0140 -0.046 -0.074 -0.097 0.158 0.196 0.268    
(0.140) (0.139) (0.136) (0.160) (0.158) (0.156) (0.140) (0.141) (0.137) (0.541) (0.541) (0.536)    
Percent Medicare Days 
-0.038 -0.046 -0.077 -0.057 -0.094 -0.124 -0.133 -0.132 -0.163 -0.248 -0.260 -0.306 0.221 0.217 0.211 
(0.308) (0.303) (0.303) (0.345) (0.337) (0.338) (0.313) (0.309) (0.307) (0.611) (0.611) (0.612) (0.369) (0.367) (0.365) 
General Bed 
-0.404*** -0.404*** -0.365*** -0.402*** -0.386*** -0.349*** -0.324*** -0.320*** -0.297*** -0.083 -0.061 -0.065 -0.410*** -0.410*** -0.391*** 
(0.107) (0.106) (0.105) (0.120) (0.119) (0.119) (0.116) (0.115) (0.114) (0.395) (0.399) (0.400) (0.123) (0.122) (0.121) 
Case Load 
-0.026** -0.022* -0.021* -0.026* -0.023 -0.023 -0.039** -0.036** -0.031** -0.082 -0.077 -0.068 -0.025 -0.024 -0.023 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.062) (0.061) (0.060) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Financial Slack 
0.011 0.012 0.010 0.025 0.027 0.024 0.017 0.018 0.017 0.373 0.340 0.358 0.008 0.009 0.008 
(0.040) (0.044) (0.042) (0.049) (0.054) (0.051) (0.040) (0.044) (0.043) (0.235) (0.234) (0.229) (0.041) (0.045) (0.043) 
Constant 
5.461*** 9.226*** 8.512*** 5.273*** 8.983*** 8.138*** 4.741*** 9.351*** 8.197*** 2.273 6.193*** 4.862** 5.098*** 8.645*** 7.962*** 
(0.679) (0.682) (0.683) (0.621) (0.619) (0.647) (0.644) (0.647) (0.643) (2.218) (2.269) (2.322) (0.866) (0.866) (0.870) 
R-squared 0.380 0.385 0.396 0.312 0.321 0.327 0.492 0.493 0.504 0.220 0.224 0.228 0.361 0.367 0.374 
Number of Hospitals 3,846 3,846 3,846 3,647 3,647 3,647 2,861 2,861 2,861 616 616 616 2,740 2,740 2,740 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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4.9. Appendix 4.B 
Table 4.B1: Fixed Effects Regression Results for Cost Aspiration Shortfall on CPM Saidin Index 
(Clustered SE by HSA) 
 VARIABLES 
All Teaching Non-Profit Rural System 
Model A Model A Model A Model A Model A 
Cost Aspiration Shortfall 
0.002 0.008 -0.161 0.276 -0.220*** 
(0.069) (0.076) (0.102) (0.407) (0.074) 
Teaching 
-0.988**  -0.820** - -0.755 
(0.415)  (0.402)  (0.658) 
Non-profit 
0.301 0.396  1.578 1.252** 
(0.511) (0.537)  (1.867) (0.563) 
Rural 
-0.642** -0.697* -0.678**  -0.333 
(0.321) (0.362) (0.315)  (0.487) 
System 
-0.063 -0.078 -0.035 0.125  
(0.142) (0.161) (0.144) (0.544)  
Percent Medicare Days 
-0.028 -0.035 -0.119 -0.188 0.197 
(0.305) (0.344) (0.314) (0.615) (0.362) 
General Beds 
-0.421*** -0.413*** -0.334*** -0.075 -0.408*** 
(0.112) (0.125) (0.119) (0.416) (0.129) 
Case Load 
-0.025* -0.025* -0.042*** -0.087 -0.024 
(0.013) (0.014) (0.016) (0.061) (0.015) 
Financial Slack 
0.017 0.027 0.022 0.361 0.014 
(0.039) (0.048) (0.039) (0.238) (0.043) 
Constant 
9.445*** 8.937*** 9.693*** 6.223*** 8.884*** 
(0.758) (0.713) (0.669) (2.325) (0.954) 
R-squared 0.375 0.310 0.486 0.219 0.358 
Number of Hospitals 3,815 3,616 2,843 613 2,732 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 4.B2: Fixed Effects Regression Results for Cost Aspiration Shortfall Interactions Comparison of Reference Group on CPM Saidin 
Index (Clustered SE - HSA) 
 VARIABLES 
All Teaching Non-Profit Rural System 
Model B Model C Model D Model B Model C Model D Model B Model C Model D Model B Model C Model D Model B Model C Model D 
Cost Aspiration Shortfall 
-0.124* 0.023 0.165** -0.083 -0.052 0.313** -0.164* -0.086 0.392*** 0.278 0.228 0.895** -0.294*** -0.150** 0.090 
(0.073) (0.068) (0.084) (0.092) (0.066) (0.122) (0.095) (0.087) (0.104) (0.357) (0.331) (0.372) (0.082) (0.075) (0.128) 
Conceptualization Phase 
-   -   -   -0.326   -   
         (0.530)      
Enactment Phase  
-   -   -   -1.314***   -  
          (0.475)     
Enforcement Phase   
-   -   -   -2.745***   - 
           (0.444)    
Cost Aspiration Shortfall * 
Conceptualization Phase 
0.223***   0.293***   0.361***   0.441**   0.226***   
(0.025)   (0.061)   (0.042)   (0.196)   (0.038)   
Cost Aspiration Shortfall * 
Enactment Phase  
 0.270***   0.483***   0.357***   0.562***   0.309***  
 (0.026)   (0.042)   (0.039)   (0.167)   (0.041)  
Cost Aspiration Shortfall * 
Enforcement Phase 
  -0.321***   -0.538***   -0.461***   -0.672***   -0.344*** 
  (0.028)   (0.046)   (0.042)   (0.153)   (0.042) 
Teaching 
-0.871** -0.817** -0.617    -0.681* -0.688* -0.472 - - - -0.655 -0.603 -0.433 
(0.399) (0.399) (0.382)    (0.387) (0.389) (0.377)    (0.643) (0.635) (0.616) 
Non-Profit 
0.350 0.300 0.371 0.402 0.366 0.374    1.700 1.642 1.842 1.276** 1.247** 1.282** 
(0.503) (0.497) (0.485) (0.520) (0.506) (0.475)    (1.874) (1.877) (1.889) (0.556) (0.549) (0.537) 
Rural 
-0.634** -0.649** -0.639** -0.688* -0.702* -0.685* -0.670** -0.683** -0.674**    -0.328 -0.357 -0.353 
(0.322) (0.321) (0.323) (0.363) (0.364) (0.367) (0.314) (0.314) (0.313)    (0.488) (0.489) (0.491) 
System 
-0.056 -0.092 -0.089 -0.044 -0.066 -0.002 -0.042 -0.073 -0.093 0.175 0.203 0.294    
(0.139) (0.139) (0.135) (0.159) (0.158) (0.156) (0.140) (0.141) (0.137) (0.540) (0.540) (0.535)    
Percent Medicare Days 
-0.052 -0.052 -0.091 -0.058 -0.083 -0.130 -0.145 -0.138 -0.176 -0.220 -0.228 -0.284 0.188 0.197 0.183 
(0.305) (0.301) (0.301) (0.345) (0.337) (0.338) (0.314) (0.309) (0.308) (0.616) (0.614) (0.615) (0.360) (0.358) (0.355) 
General Bed 
-0.395*** -0.397*** -0.355*** -0.393*** -0.377*** -0.336*** -0.319*** -0.316*** -0.293** -0.088 -0.050 -0.065 -0.396*** -0.397*** -0.378*** 
(0.111) (0.110) (0.110) (0.125) (0.124) (0.124) (0.118) (0.117) (0.116) (0.416) (0.421) (0.422) (0.128) (0.128) (0.128) 
Case Load 
-0.025* -0.021* -0.020 -0.025* -0.021 -0.020 -0.039** -0.036** -0.030* -0.081 -0.077 -0.066 -0.023 -0.022 -0.021 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.060) (0.060) (0.059) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Financial Slack 
0.015 0.016 0.014 0.025 0.029 0.025 0.021 0.021 0.020 0.378 0.338 0.360 0.013 0.014 0.013 
(0.038) (0.042) (0.040) (0.046) (0.051) (0.048) (0.038) (0.042) (0.041) (0.234) (0.235) (0.227) (0.041) (0.046) (0.044) 
Constant 
8.987*** 9.136*** 8.419*** 8.464*** 8.914*** 8.044*** 8.869*** 9.338*** 8.184*** 5.699** 6.067*** 4.742** 8.427*** 8.555*** 7.823*** 
(0.740) (0.740) (0.724) (0.716) (0.689) (0.686) (0.659) (0.655) (0.652) (2.279) (2.302) (2.346) (0.938) (0.933) (0.928) 
R-squared 0.382 0.387 0.399 0.313 0.322 0.330 0.493 0.495 0.506 0.222 0.225 0.231 0.362 0.368 0.377 
Number of Hospitals 3,815 3,815 3,815 3,616 3,616 3,616 2,843 2,843 2,843 613 613 613 2,732 2,732 2,732 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 4.B3: Fixed Effects Regression Results for Cost Aspiration Shortfall (Above and Below Mean) Comparison of Reference Group 
 VARIABLES 
All Teaching Non-Profit Rural System 
Below 
Mean 
Above 
Mean 
Below 
Mean 
Above 
Mean 
Below 
Mean 
Above 
Mean 
Below 
Mean 
Above 
Mean 
Below 
Mean 
Above 
Mean 
Cost Aspiration Shortfall 
-0.083 -0.169* 4.208** 0.010 3.236 -0.226* 15.49* 0.292 3.997* -0.229*** 
(0.075) (0.086) (2.096) (0.079) (2.412) (0.125) (8.012) (0.482) (2.306) (0.071) 
Teaching 
-0.006 -0.496    -0.831** - -  -0.717 
(0.662) (0.379)    (0.403)    (0.643) 
Non-profit 
0.369 0.119 1.468 0.410    2.670 -1.611*** 1.017** 
(0.550) (0.481) (2.500) (0.462)    (2.176) (0.444) (0.479) 
Rural 
-0.520 -1.993***  -0.969***  -0.937***    -0.736* 
(0.352) (0.054)  (0.332)  (0.285)    (0.417) 
System 
0.010 0.001 -0.431 -0.132 -1.595 -0.062 -6.003 -0.157   
(0.184) (0.192) (1.159) (0.169) (1.092) (0.147) (4.929) (0.563)   
Percent Medicare Days 
-0.068 -1.361** -0.969 -0.221 -0.625 -0.273 -0.872 -0.590 -1.174* -0.135 
(0.352) (0.637) (0.880) (0.371) (0.732) (0.330) (1.197) (0.786) (0.648) (0.457) 
General Beds 
-0.136 -0.679*** -0.574 -0.410*** -1.010* -0.331*** -12.38*** -0.0521 -1.744 -0.448*** 
(0.130) (0.212) (0.992) (0.123) (0.548) (0.122) (3.864) (0.379) (1.198) (0.131) 
Case Load 
-0.013 -0.006 0.047 -0.039** 0.041 -0.053*** -0.175 -0.151** -0.071 -0.033* 
(0.017) (0.016) (0.046) (0.017) (0.055) (0.018) (0.311) (0.073) (0.081) (0.017) 
Financial Slack 
0.077 0.002 -0.236 0.008 -0.172 0.009 -7.093 0.329 0.094 0.0008 
(0.087) (0.015) (0.395) (0.045) (0.235) (0.041) (4.438) (0.263) (0.322) (0.039) 
Constant 
6.004*** 13.470*** 3.760 9.337*** 7.723** 10.110*** 29.760** 6.032** 9.808** 9.629*** 
(0.924) (1.214) (3.218) (0.672) (2.991) (0.700) (11.77) (2.542) (3.956) (0.931) 
R-squared 0.216 0.587 0.215 0.328 0.411 0.498 0.831 0.240 0.249 0.376 
Number of Hospitals 2,600 1,420 745 3,537 593 2,794 113 603 611 2,642 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 4.B4: Fixed Effects Regression Results for Cost Aspiration Shortfall (Above and Below Mean) * Conceptualization Phase 
Comparison of Reference Group 
 VARIABLES 
All Teaching Non-Profit Rural System 
Below 
Mean 
Above 
Mean 
Below 
Mean 
Above 
Mean 
Below 
Mean 
Above 
Mean 
Below 
Mean 
Above 
Mean 
Below 
Mean 
Above 
Mean 
Cost Aspiration Shortfall 
0.074 0.064*** 2.778 -0.095 1.768 -0.221* -10.540*** 0.313 1.373 -0.307*** 
(0.088) (0.019) (2.025) (0.103) (2.315) (0.118) (3.762) (0.412) (2.207) (0.080) 
Conceptualization Phase 
3.244*** 4.699*** -2.323 3.281*** -2.157 4.148*** -77.110*** 3.405*** -10.020 3.452*** 
(0.177) (0.120) (4.056) (0.162) (5.076) (0.127) (8.182) (0.505) (6.400) (0.140) 
Cost Aspiration Shortfall * 
Conceptualization Phase 
-0.288** 0.146*** 7.032 0.306*** 7.637 0.363*** 80.550*** 0.428** 15.660** 0.232*** 
(0.135) (0.022) (4.864) (0.061) (6.117) (0.043) (9.205) (0.193) (7.659) (0.036) 
Teaching 
2.597* -0.327**    -0.691* - -  -0.617 
(1.327) (0.138)    (0.391)    (0.629) 
Non-profit 
1.142*** 0.129 1.594 0.413    2.738 -1.672*** 1.042** 
(0.095) (0.145) (2.641) (0.457)    (2.207) (0.456) (0.478) 
Rural 
-0.382*** -0.846  -0.963***  -0.931***    -0.736* 
(0.099) (0.566)  (0.332)  (0.282)    (0.413) 
System 
0.447*** 0.001 -0.378 -0.092 -1.627 -0.070 4.453* -0.098   
(0.081) (0.090) (1.217) (0.166) (1.121) (0.143) (2.356) (0.560)   
Percent Medicare Days 
0.013 -0.791** -1.014 -0.235 -0.469 -0.295 1.211*** -0.619 -1.156* -0.124 
(0.150) (0.330) (0.900) (0.373) (0.732) (0.331) (0.404) (0.788) (0.634) (0.453) 
General Beds 
0.564*** 0.036 -0.677 -0.390*** -0.968 -0.318*** -17.17*** -0.072 -1.779 -0.440*** 
(0.028) (0.048) (1.081) (0.123) (0.591) (0.121) (1.992) (0.378) (1.206) (0.130) 
Case Load 
-0.009 0.021* -0.004 -0.038** -0.041 -0.049*** -0.016 -0.142* -0.096 -0.032* 
(0.007) (0.011) (0.073) (0.017) (0.097) (0.018) (0.161) (0.072) (0.087) (0.017) 
Financial Slack 
0.012 -0.009 -0.386 0.004 -0.332 0.007 -3.830** 0.348 -0.124 -0.0007 
(0.009) (0.052) (0.425) (0.043) (0.301) (0.039) (1.653) (0.257) (0.343) (0.037) 
Constant 
-2.673** 3.096*** 1.991 5.551*** 5.139* 5.094*** 65.410*** 1.789 8.974** 5.707*** 
(1.340) (0.299) (3.191) (0.658) (2.660) (0.677) (6.353) (2.476) (3.926) (0.910) 
R-squared   0.230 0.332 0.427 0.506 0.978 0.243 0.302 0.381 
Number of Hospitals 2,600 1,420 745 3,537 593 2,794 113 603 611 2,642 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 4.B5: Fixed Effects Regression Results for Cost Aspiration Shortfall (Above and Below Mean) * Enactment Phase Comparison of 
Reference Group 
 VARIABLES 
All Teaching Non-Profit Rural System 
Below 
Mean 
Above 
Mean 
Below 
Mean 
Above 
Mean 
Below 
Mean 
Above 
Mean 
Below 
Mean 
Above 
Mean 
Below 
Mean 
Above 
Mean 
Cost Aspiration Shortfall 
-0.141** -0.132 3.096 -0.047 2.658 -0.114 14.820 0.277 2.650 -0.155** 
(0.066) (0.086) (2.155) (0.071) (2.657) (0.114) (10.320) (0.385) (2.298) (0.074) 
Enactment Phase 
-1.336*** -1.083*** -5.574 -1.151*** -4.156 -1.302*** 5.685 -1.409*** -5.415 -0.873*** 
(0.413) (0.176) (3.671) (0.161) (3.682) (0.133) (13.090) (0.488) (4.187) (0.166) 
Cost Aspiration Shortfall * 
Enactment Phase 
0.866** 0.130*** 3.785 0.448*** 1.964 0.336*** 1.684 0.517*** 4.108 0.286*** 
(0.343) (0.025) (3.874) (0.043) (4.401) (0.038) (14.280) (0.166) (3.641) (0.039) 
Teaching 
0.006 -0.450    -0.708* - -  -0.581 
(0.673) (0.376)    (0.392)    (0.625) 
Non-profit 
0.373 0.123 1.450 0.387    2.772 -1.593*** 1.018** 
(0.551) (0.482) (2.426) (0.450)    (2.182) (0.441) (0.476) 
Rural 
-0.525 -1.975***  -0.984***  -0.947***    -0.770* 
(0.351) (0.054)  (0.330)  (0.281)    (0.411) 
System 
0.006 -0.033 -0.359 -0.123 -1.568 -0.100 -5.802 -0.080   
(0.185) (0.189) (1.155) (0.164) (1.092) (0.144) (5.832) (0.558)   
Percent Medicare Days 
-0.082 -1.390** -0.857 -0.267 -0.627 -0.291 -0.846 -0.630 -1.081 -0.123 
(0.350) (0.632) (0.894) (0.362) (0.700) (0.326) (1.158) (0.788) (0.674) (0.453) 
General Beds 
-0.139 -0.666*** -0.563 -0.375*** -0.956* -0.318*** -12.25*** -0.030 -1.575 -0.436*** 
(0.130) (0.208) (0.960) (0.121) (0.570) (0.120) (3.828) (0.385) (1.227) (0.128) 
Case Load 
-0.014 -0.006 0.071 -0.035** 0.055 -0.047*** -0.148 -0.138* -0.055 -0.030* 
(0.017) (0.016) (0.056) (0.017) (0.068) (0.018) (0.413) (0.072) (0.082) (0.017) 
Financial Slack 
0.082 -0.005 -0.197 0.006 -0.144 0.006 -6.920 0.315 0.104 -0.000 
(0.087) (0.014) (0.397) (0.048) (0.258) (0.043) (5.161) (0.260) (0.327) (0.042) 
Constant 
6.086*** 13.25*** 4.323 9.304*** 7.858*** 9.714*** 29.58** 5.781** 10.24*** 9.277*** 
(0.931) (1.199) (3.239) (0.655) (2.948) (0.685) (11.64) (2.508) (3.869) (0.914) 
R-squared 0.217 0.591 0.220 0.339 0.412 0.507 0.831 0.246 0.254 0.386 
Number of Hospitals 2,600 1,420 745 3,537 593 2,794 113 603 611 2,642 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 4.B6: Fixed Effects Regression Results for Cost Aspiration Shortfall (Above and Below Mean) * Enforcement Phase Comparison of 
Reference Group 
 VARIABLES 
All Teaching Non-Profit Rural System 
Below 
Mean 
Above 
Mean 
Below 
Mean 
Above 
Mean 
Below 
Mean 
Above 
Mean 
Below 
Mean 
Above 
Mean 
Below 
Mean 
Above 
Mean 
Cost Aspiration Shortfall 
-0.242*** -0.025 8.933*** 0.286** 7.686* 0.377*** 22.31*** 0.938** 9.595*** 0.077 
(0.068) (0.092) (3.407) (0.133) (4.100) (0.137) (7.111) (0.418) (3.427) (0.129) 
Enforcement Phase 
-3.257*** -4.794*** 4.627 -2.835*** 3.451 -3.945*** 27.41*** -2.989*** 6.454* -3.218*** 
(0.167) (0.162) (3.694) (0.146) (4.969) (0.125) (8.827) (0.460) (3.452) (0.144) 
Cost Aspiration Shortfall * 
Enforcement Phase 
0.302*** -0.178*** -9.397** -0.522*** -8.664 -0.448*** -24.410** -0.634*** -11.100*** -0.331*** 
(0.099) (0.025) (4.295) (0.048) (5.482) (0.042) (10.750) (0.151) (4.172) (0.040) 
Teaching 
0.009 -0.363    -0.495 - -  -0.417 
(0.663) (0.373)    (0.385)    (0.608) 
Non-profit 
0.364 0.212 1.592 0.387    2.895 -1.606*** 1.053** 
(0.548) (0.479) (2.493) (0.444)    (2.228) (0.445) (0.475) 
Rural 
-0.524 -1.990***  -0.975***  -0.943***    -0.776* 
(0.351) (0.054)  (0.330)  (0.276)    (0.405) 
System 
0.010 -0.070 -0.184 -0.052 -1.509 -0.123 0.0795 0.024   
(0.184) (0.185) (1.247) (0.160) (1.157) (0.140) (5.174) (0.554)   
Percent Medicare Days 
-0.077 -1.356** -0.749 -0.298 -0.457 -0.324 0.134 -0.682 -0.910 -0.104 
(0.352) (0.630) (0.906) (0.365) (0.643) (0.325) (0.721) (0.791) (0.755) (0.449) 
General Beds 
-0.138 -0.642*** -0.684 -0.335*** -0.723 -0.297** -11.890*** -0.054 -1.313 -0.422*** 
(0.130) (0.204) (1.030) (0.121) (0.640) (0.118) (2.552) (0.385) (1.244) (0.128) 
Case Load 
-0.011 -0.005 0.040 -0.031* 0.011 -0.040** 0.263 -0.121* -0.047 -0.029* 
(0.017) (0.016) (0.051) (0.016) (0.057) (0.018) (0.324) (0.071) (0.077) (0.017) 
Financial Slack 
0.077 -0.006 -0.339 0.001 -0.228 0.003 -3.589 0.339 -0.031 -0.003 
(0.087) (0.014) (0.415) (0.044) (0.248) (0.041) (3.825) (0.255) (0.345) (0.039) 
Constant 
6.167*** 12.59*** -0.308 8.438*** 2.942 8.515*** 14.53 4.484* 3.277 8.553*** 
(0.925) (1.190) (3.861) (0.674) (4.516) (0.679) (13.39) (2.560) (4.731) (0.917) 
R-squared 0.216 0.598 0.246 0.348 0.434 0.518 0.878 0.252 0.300 0.395 
Number of Hospitals 2,600 1,420 745 3,537 593 2,794 113 603 611 2,642 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 4.B7 Fixed Effects Regression Results for Cost Aspiration Shortfall on CPM Saidin Index (Lag 1 
Year) 
 VARIABLES 
All Teaching Non-Profit Rural System 
Model A Model A Model A Model A Model A 
Cost Aspiration Shortfall 
0.128* 0.064 0.065 0.002 -0.099 
(0.072) (0.070) (0.109) (0.428) (0.108) 
Teaching 
-1.137***  -0.941*** - -1.024** 
(0.329)  (0.319)  (0.479) 
Non-profit 
0.289 0.360  1.937 0.920* 
(0.446) (0.509)  (1.862) (0.486) 
Rural 
-0.518 -0.567 -0.527*  -0.303 
(0.319) (0.364) (0.303)  (0.480) 
System 
-0.023 -0.065 0.009 0.135  
(0.154) (0.181) (0.153) (0.646)  
Percent Medicare Days 
0.002 0.065 -0.053 -0.538 0.284 
(0.305) (0.344) (0.317) (0.648) (0.374) 
General Beds 
-0.451*** -0.438*** -0.315*** -0.147 -0.457*** 
(0.107) (0.120) (0.112) (0.324) (0.125) 
Case Load 
-0.006 -0.002 -0.012 -0.022 -0.013 
(0.014) (0.016) (0.015) (0.060) (0.018) 
Financial Slack 
-0.032 -0.027 -0.030 0.553*** -0.040 
(0.026) (0.027) (0.023) (0.207) (0.025) 
Constant 
9.307*** 8.904*** 9.008*** 6.386*** 9.553*** 
(0.674) (0.663) (0.609) (2.142) (0.827) 
R-squared 0.430 0.364 0.537 0.270 0.417 
Number of Hospitals 3,631 3,432 2,711 586 2,574 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 4.B8: Fixed Effects Regression Results for Cost Aspiration Shortfall Interactions Comparison of Reference Group on CPM Saidin 
Index (Lag 1 Year) 
 VARIABLES 
All Teaching Non-Profit Rural System 
Model B Model C Model D Model B Model C Model D Model B Model C Model D Model B Model C Model D Model B Model C Model D 
Cost Aspiration Shortfall 
0.128* -0.077 0.240*** 0.064 -0.101 0.464*** 0.065 0.009 0.452*** 0.002 -0.046 0.641 -0.099 -0.063 0.301*** 
(0.072) (0.064) (0.068) (0.070) (0.064) (0.078) (0.109) (0.095) (0.104) (0.428) (0.382) (0.446) (0.108) (0.087) (0.103) 
Conceptualization Phase 
               
               
Enactment Phase  
3.443***   2.949***   3.917***   2.888***   3.460***  
 (0.106)   (0.142)   (0.117)   (0.464)   (0.142)  
Enforcement Phase 
  -3.443***   -2.949***   -3.917***   -2.888***   -3.460*** 
  (0.106)   (0.142)   (0.117)   (0.464)   (0.142) 
Cost Aspiration Shortfall * 
Conceptualization Phase 
               
               
Cost Aspiration Shortfall * 
Enactment Phase  
 0.317***   0.566***   0.443***   0.687***   0.365***  
 (0.028)   (0.048)   (0.0416)   (0.194)   (0.043)  
Cost Aspiration Shortfall * 
Enforcement Phase 
  -0.317***   -0.566***   -0.443***   -0.687***   -0.365*** 
  (0.028)   (0.048)   (0.042)   (0.194)   (0.043) 
Teaching 
-1.137*** -0.821*** -0.821***    -0.941*** -0.664** -0.664** - - - -1.024** -0.764* -0.764* 
(0.329) (0.290) (0.290)    (0.319) (0.290) (0.290)    (0.479) (0.428) (0.428) 
Non-Profit 
0.289 0.333 0.333 0.360 0.282 0.282    1.937 2.206 2.206 0.920* 0.919* 0.919* 
(0.446) (0.434) (0.434) (0.509) (0.476) (0.476)    (1.862) (1.897) (1.897) (0.486) (0.472) (0.472) 
Rural 
-0.518 -0.527 -0.527 -0.567 -0.573 -0.573 -0.527* -0.527* -0.527*    -0.303 -0.329 -0.329 
(0.319) (0.321) (0.321) (0.364) (0.367) (0.367) (0.303) (0.302) (0.302)    (0.480) (0.481) (0.481) 
System 
-0.023 -0.070 -0.070 -0.065 -0.010 -0.0101 0.009 -0.059 -0.059 0.135 0.334 0.334    
(0.154) (0.148) (0.148) (0.181) (0.174) (0.174) (0.153) (0.147) (0.147) (0.646) (0.640) (0.640)    
Percent Medicare Days 
0.002 -0.054 -0.054 0.065 -0.032 -0.032 -0.053 -0.090 -0.090 -0.538 -0.621 -0.621 0.284 0.265 0.265 
(0.305) (0.299) (0.299) (0.344) (0.337) (0.337) (0.317) (0.310) (0.310) (0.648) (0.643) (0.643) (0.374) (0.365) (0.365) 
General Bed 
-0.451*** -0.379*** -0.379*** -0.438*** -0.354*** -0.354*** -0.315*** -0.261** -0.261** -0.147 -0.134 -0.134 -0.457*** -0.416*** -0.416*** 
(0.107) (0.102) (0.102) (0.120) (0.114) (0.114) (0.112) (0.106) (0.106) (0.324) (0.330) (0.330) (0.125) (0.121) (0.121) 
Case Load 
-0.006 0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.005 0.005 -0.012 -0.004 -0.004 -0.022 -0.007 -0.007 -0.013 -0.011 -0.011 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.060) (0.059) (0.059) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Financial Slack 
-0.032 -0.032 -0.032 -0.027 -0.026 -0.026 -0.030 -0.032 -0.032 0.553*** 0.546*** 0.546*** -0.040 -0.041* -0.041* 
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.207) (0.203) (0.203) (0.025) (0.023) (0.023) 
Constant 
9.307*** 4.994*** 8.438*** 8.904*** 4.885*** 7.834*** 9.008*** 3.915*** 7.832*** 6.386*** 2.018 4.906** 9.553*** 4.891*** 8.351*** 
(0.674) (0.626) (0.639) (0.663) (0.614) (0.634) (0.609) (0.561) (0.575) (2.142) (2.090) (2.195) (0.827) (0.764) (0.786) 
R-squared 0.430 0.453 0.453 0.364 0.386 0.386 0.537 0.556 0.556 0.270 0.283 0.283 0.417 0.437 0.437 
Number of Hospitals 3,631 3,631 3,631 3,432 3,432 3,432 2,711 2,711 2,711 586 586 586 2,574 2,574 2,574 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 4.B9: Fixed Effects Regression Results for Cost Aspiration Shortfall on CPM Saidin Index (90th 
Percentile) 
 VARIABLES 
All Teaching Non-Profit Rural System 
Model A Model A Model A Model A Model A 
Cost Aspiration Shortfall 
0.010 0.012 -0.150 0.279 -0.210*** 
(0.067) (0.070) (0.097) (0.406) (0.071) 
Teaching 
-1.008**  -0.841** - -0.757 
(0.420)  (0.408)  (0.654) 
Non-profit 
0.289 0.382  1.581 1.228*** 
(0.388) (0.436)  (1.861) (0.439) 
Rural 
-0.642** -0.696* -0.678**  -0.334 
(0.321) (0.363) (0.315)  (0.487) 
System 
-0.067 -0.081 -0.037 0.119  
(0.142) (0.162) (0.143) (0.545)  
Percent Medicare Days 
-0.019 -0.043 -0.113 -0.220 0.227 
(0.308) (0.345) (0.313) (0.610) (0.371) 
General Beds 
-0.429*** -0.421*** -0.335*** -0.082 -0.420*** 
(0.108) (0.120) (0.117) (0.395) (0.123) 
Case Load 
-0.026** -0.026* -0.041** -0.086 -0.025* 
(0.013) (0.014) (0.016) (0.062) (0.015) 
Financial Slack 
0.012 0.027 0.018 0.361 0.009 
(0.042) (0.051) (0.042) (0.238) (0.042) 
Constant 
9.473*** 8.965*** 9.678*** 6.241*** 8.926*** 
(0.698) (0.633) (0.665) (2.295) (0.885) 
R-squared 0.374 0.309 0.485 0.218 0.357 
Number of Hospitals 3,846 3,647 2,861 616 2,740 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 4.B10: Fixed Effects Regression Results for Cost Aspiration Shortfall Interactions Comparison of Reference Group on CPM Saidin 
Index (90th Percentile) 
 VARIABLES 
All Teaching Non-Profit Rural System 
Model B Model C Model D Model B Model C Model D Model B Model C Model D Model B Model C Model D Model B Model C Model D 
Cost Aspiration Shortfall 
-0.116 0.030 0.172** -0.077 -0.047 0.314** -0.153* -0.076 0.402*** 0.281 0.231 0.901** -0.283*** -0.141* 0.100 
(0.073) (0.068) (0.086) (0.089) (0.063) (0.123) (0.091) (0.084) (0.103) (0.355) (0.329) (0.371) (0.080) (0.072) (0.127) 
Conceptualization Phase 
3.595***   3.271***   4.105***   3.178***   3.425***   
(0.109)   (0.157)   (0.124)   (0.496)   (0.136)   
Enactment Phase  
-1.026***   -1.217***  0.360***    -1.357***   -0.990***  
 (0.123)   (0.155)  (0.043)    (0.475)   (0.161)  
Enforcement Phase   
-3.348***   -2.785***  -1.359***    -2.737***   -3.160*** 
  (0.111)   (0.141)  (0.130)    (0.446)   (0.140) 
Cost Aspiration Shortfall * 
Conceptualization Phase 
0.222***   0.289***    0.358***  0.441**   0.225***   
(0.025)   (0.060)    (0.038)  (0.196)   (0.036)   
Cost Aspiration Shortfall * 
Enactment Phase  
 0.270***   0.478***    -3.883***  0.567***   0.310***  
 (0.025)   (0.043)    (0.122)  (0.169)   (0.040)  
Cost Aspiration Shortfall * 
Enforcement Phase 
  -0.321***   -0.534***   -0.461***   -0.676***   -0.345*** 
  (0.027)   (0.047)   (0.0423)   (0.155)   (0.041) 
Teaching 
-0.895** -0.839** -0.644*    -0.706* -0.709* -0.497 - - - -0.658 -0.603 -0.434 
(0.404) (0.404) (0.387)    (0.395) (0.395) (0.387)    (0.639) (0.632) (0.614) 
Non-Profit 
0.338 0.288 0.360 0.389 0.352 0.361    1.703 1.646 1.845 1.252*** 1.222*** 1.259*** 
(0.385) (0.384) (0.381) (0.431) (0.425) (0.418)    (1.868) (1.871) (1.883) (0.437) (0.437) (0.435) 
Rural 
-0.633** -0.649** -0.638** -0.687* -0.701* -0.685* -0.670** -0.683** -0.674**    -0.329 -0.358 -0.354 
(0.323) (0.321) (0.323) (0.364) (0.364) (0.367) (0.314) (0.314) (0.313)    (0.487) (0.488) (0.490) 
System 
-0.061 -0.095 -0.092 -0.048 -0.068 -0.004 -0.045 -0.075 -0.095 0.169 0.199 0.290    
(0.139) (0.139) (0.135) (0.160) (0.158) (0.155) (0.140) (0.140) (0.137) (0.540) (0.540) (0.535)    
Percent Medicare Days 
-0.043 -0.046 -0.086 -0.065 -0.093 -0.140 -0.138 -0.134 -0.172 -0.251 -0.259 -0.315 0.218 0.221 0.206 
(0.308) (0.303) (0.303) (0.346) (0.337) (0.338) (0.313) (0.308) (0.307) (0.611) (0.610) (0.611) (0.369) (0.367) (0.364) 
General Bed 
-0.403*** -0.405*** -0.363*** -0.402*** -0.386*** -0.345*** -0.320*** -0.317*** -0.293*** -0.090 -0.060 -0.069 -0.409*** -0.409*** -0.391*** 
(0.107) (0.106) (0.105) (0.120) (0.119) (0.119) (0.116) (0.115) (0.113) (0.394) (0.399) (0.399) (0.123) (0.122) (0.121) 
Case Load 
-0.025** -0.022* -0.020 -0.025* -0.022 -0.021 -0.038** -0.035** -0.030* -0.081 -0.076 -0.065 -0.024 -0.024 -0.023 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.062) (0.061) (0.060) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Financial Slack 
0.011 0.012 0.010 0.025 0.028 0.025 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.378 0.338 0.360 0.008 0.009 0.008 
(0.040) (0.044) (0.042) (0.049) (0.054) (0.051) (0.040) (0.044) (0.043) (0.234) (0.235) (0.228) (0.041) (0.045) (0.043) 
Constant 
5.423*** 9.168*** 8.455*** 5.227*** 8.947*** 8.081*** 4.752*** 9.326*** 8.173*** 2.200 6.096*** 4.746** 5.047*** 8.600*** 7.870*** 
(0.678) (0.683) (0.679) (0.620) (0.619) (0.638) (0.645) (0.648) (0.642) (2.218) (2.270) (2.315) (0.865) (0.866) (0.869) 
R-squared 0.381 0.386 0.398 0.313 0.322 0.329 0.492 0.494 0.506 0.221 0.225 0.230 0.361 0.368 0.376 
Number of Hospitals 3,846 3,846 3,846 3,647 3,647 3,647 2,861 2,861 2,861 616 616 616 2,740 2,740 2,740 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 4.B11: Hausman Test: Cost Aspiration Shortfall 
 
Cost Aspiration Shortfall 
Prob > 2 
Model A 0.0001 
Model B 0.0001 
Model C 0.0001 
Model D 0.0001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.B12: Random Effects Regression Results for Cost Aspiration Shortfall on CPM Saidin Index 
 VARIABLES 
All Teaching Non-Profit Rural System 
Model A Model A Model A Model A Model A 
Cost Aspiration Shortfall 
0.056*** 0.117*** 0.084*** 0.372*** -0.022 
(0.019) (0.029) (0.028) (0.114) (0.026) 
Teaching 
-0.478***  -0.610*** - -0.395** 
(0.156)  (0.146)  (0.180) 
Non-profit 
1.060*** 1.171***  1.805*** 0.937*** 
(0.082) (0.093)  (0.378) (0.092) 
Rural 
-0.553*** -0.542*** -0.597***  -0.450*** 
(0.092) (0.105) (0.091)  (0.118) 
System 
0.255*** 0.337*** 0.167*** 0.475**  
(0.063) (0.073) (0.063) (0.221)  
Percent Medicare Days 
-0.249* -0.159 -0.351** -0.190 -0.408** 
(0.136) (0.154) (0.142) (0.372) (0.179) 
General Beds 
0.513*** 0.602*** 0.313*** 0.624*** 0.593*** 
(0.022) (0.026) (0.026) (0.173) (0.025) 
Case Load 
-0.005 -0.008 0.003 -0.006 -0.005 
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.030) (0.007) 
Financial Slack 
0.013 0.014 0.011 0.201 0.014 
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.339) (0.008) 
Constant 
4.368*** 3.983*** 5.965*** 2.957*** 4.705*** 
(0.214) (0.161) (0.207) (0.706) (0.255) 
Number of Hospitals 3,846 3,647 2,861 616 2,740 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 4.B13: Random Effects Regression Results for Cost Aspiration Shortfall Interactions Comparison of Reference Group on CPM 
Saidin Index  
 VARIABLES 
All Teaching Non-Profit Rural System 
Model B Model C Model D Model B Model C Model D Model B Model C Model D Model B Model C Model D Model B Model C Model D 
Cost Aspiration Shortfall 
0.012 0.0130 0.276*** 0.062** 0.015 0.445*** 0.043 0.032 0.452*** 0.314*** 0.240** 0.901*** -0.054** -0.061** 0.244*** 
(0.020) (0.019) (0.022) (0.030) (0.029) (0.034) (0.028) (0.028) (0.033) (0.116) (0.117) (0.144) (0.026) (0.026) (0.031) 
Conceptualization Phase 
3.470***   3.207***   3.945***   2.998***   3.361***   
(0.081)   (0.108)   (0.090)   (0.385)   (0.104)   
Enactment Phase 
 -1.081***   -1.319***   -1.402***   -1.590***   -1.105***  
 (0.099)   (0.126)   (0.103)   (0.396)   (0.125)  
Enforcement Phase   
-3.215***   -2.675***   -3.731***   -2.518***   -3.061*** 
  (0.074)   (0.096)   (0.081)   (0.329)   (0.095) 
Cost Aspiration Shortfall * 
Conceptualization Phase 
0.219***   0.268***   0.371***   0.482***   0.210***   
(0.021)   (0.041)   (0.033)   (0.179)   (0.033)   
Cost Aspiration Shortfall * 
Enactment Phase  
 0.294***   0.524***   0.398***   0.688***   0.350***  
 (0.019)   (0.036)   (0.029)   (0.149)   (0.029)  
Cost Aspiration Shortfall * 
Enforcement Phase 
  -0.336***   -0.548***   -0.486***   -0.770***   -0.363*** 
  (0.016)   (0.031)   (0.024)   (0.129)   (0.024) 
Teaching 
-0.507*** -0.371** -0.400**    -0.560*** -0.509*** -0.420*** - - - -0.403** -0.263 -0.272 
(0.156) (0.156) (0.155)    (0.146) (0.145) (0.145)    (0.180) (0.180) (0.180) 
Non-Profit 
1.062*** 1.052*** 1.055*** 1.176*** 1.159*** 1.168***    1.812*** 1.812*** 1.823*** 0.937*** 0.923*** 0.923*** 
(0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.093) (0.092) (0.093)    (0.377) (0.375) (0.374) (0.092) (0.091) (0.092) 
Rural 
-0.554*** -0.533*** -0.532*** -0.546*** -0.517*** -0.524*** -0.592*** -0.582*** -0.572***    -0.451*** -0.434*** -0.434*** 
(0.092) (0.092) (0.092) (0.105) (0.104) (0.104) (0.091) (0.090) (0.090)    (0.118) (0.118) (0.118) 
System 
0.254*** 0.241*** 0.238*** 0.343*** 0.334*** 0.346*** 0.161** 0.148** 0.135** 0.485** 0.508** 0.528**    
(0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.221) (0.220) (0.220)    
Percent Medicare Days 
-0.262* -0.250* -0.269** -0.174 -0.177 -0.209 -0.352** -0.347** -0.347** -0.208 -0.226 -0.258 -0.407** -0.402** -0.400** 
(0.136) (0.135) (0.135) (0.154) (0.153) (0.153) (0.142) (0.141) (0.140) (0.371) (0.370) (0.369) (0.179) (0.178) (0.178) 
General Bed 
0.516*** 0.507*** 0.510*** 0.606*** 0.596*** 0.603*** 0.308*** 0.306*** 0.298*** 0.608*** 0.610*** 0.584*** 0.594*** 0.585*** 0.587*** 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.173) (0.172) (0.172) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Case Load 
-0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.008 -0.007 -0.007 0.0040 0.006 0.007 -0.004 -0.002 0.001 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Financial Slack 
0.013 0.014 0.013 0.014 0.015 0.013 0.010 0.011 0.010 0.218 0.173 0.197 0.013 0.014* 0.013 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.338) (0.337) (0.336) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Constant 
0.543** 4.379*** 3.836*** 0.363** 4.200*** 3.368*** 1.419*** 5.977*** 5.193*** -0.690 3.179*** 2.170*** 1.013*** 4.684*** 4.110*** 
(0.213) (0.213) (0.214) (0.161) (0.161) (0.164) (0.208) (0.206) (0.209) (0.702) (0.703) (0.712) (0.255) (0.254) (0.257) 
Number of Hospitals 3,846 3,846 3,846 3,647 3,647 3,647 2,861 2,861 2,861 616 616 616 2,740 2,740 2,740 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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4.10. Appendix 4.C 
Table 4.C1: Sub-Group Frequency Table 
  Rural 
  0 1 
  Non- Profit 
System Teaching 0 1 0 1 
0 
0 2 526  0 0  
1 2197 6513 311 2207 
1 
0 75 1158  0  0 
1 8026 10817 485 2115 
 
Table 4.C2: Fixed Effects Regression Results for Cost Aspiration Shortfall on CPM Saidin Index Sub-Group Analysis 
Variables 
Teaching=1, 
Non-Profit=0, 
Rural=0, 
System=0 
Teaching=1, 
Non-Profit=1, 
Rural=0, 
System=0 
Teaching=1, 
Non-Profit=1, 
Rural=1, 
System=0 
Teaching=1, 
Non-Profit=0, 
Rural=0, 
System=1 
Teaching=1, 
Non-Profit=1, 
Rural=0, 
System=1 
Teaching=1, 
Non-Profit=1, 
Rural=1, 
System=1 
Cost Aspiration Shortfall 
-0.020 0.011 -0.014 -0.054 -0.038 -0.023 
(0.062) (0.061) (0.064) (0.061) (0.063) (0.063) 
Percent Medicare Days 
-0.090 -0.089 -0.090 -0.091 -0.091 -0.091 
(0.248) (0.248) (0.248) (0.248) (0.248) (0.248) 
General Beds 
-0.377*** -0.378*** -0.377*** -0.376*** -0.376*** -0.377*** 
(0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.099) 
Case Load 
-0.016 -0.016 -0.016 -0.016* -0.016* -0.016 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Financial Slack 
-0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
Constant 
8.124*** 8.086*** 8.118*** 8.165*** 8.147*** 8.129*** 
(0.400) (0.400) (0.400) (0.399) (0.402) (0.400) 
R-squared 0.342 0.342 0.342 0.342 0.342 0.342 
Number of firms 4,826 4,826 4,826 4,826 4,826 4,826 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Robust standard errors in parentheses   
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Table 4.C3: Fixed Effects Regression Results for Cost Aspiration Shortfall Interactions on CPM Saidin Index - Sub-Group Analysis  
Variables 
Teaching=1, Non-Profit=0, 
Rural=0, System=0 
Teaching=1, Non-Profit=1, Rural=0, 
System=0 
Teaching=1, Non-Profit=1, 
Rural=1, System=0 
Model B Model C Model D Model B Model C Model D Model B Model C Model D 
Cost Aspiration Shortfall 
0.117* -0.025 -0.190*** -0.000 -0.033 0.212 0.105 -0.027 -0.116 
(0.066) (0.062) (0.070) (0.059) (0.057) (0.130) (0.074) (0.063) (0.086) 
Conceptualization Phase 
4.307***   3.780***   4.251***   
(0.142)   (0.156)   (0.170)   
Enactment Phase 
 -0.435**   -0.934***   -0.626***  
 (0.200)   (0.145)   (0.181)  
Enforcement Phase 
  -4.157***   -3.415***   -4.017*** 
  (0.128)   (0.157)   (0.146) 
Cost Aspiration Shortfall * 
Conceptualization Phase 
-0.421***   0.0371   -0.367***   
(0.104)   (0.107)   (0.133)   
Cost Aspiration Shortfall * 
Enactment Phase 
 0.066   0.480***   0.234*  
 (0.161)   (0.095)   (0.139)  
Cost Aspiration Shortfall * 
Enforcement Phase 
  0.290***   -0.334***   0.164 
  (0.088)   (0.107)   (0.106) 
Percent Medicare Days 
-0.105 -0.091 -0.098 -0.088 -0.110 -0.091 -0.104 -0.093 -0.094 
(0.248) (0.248) (0.248) (0.248) (0.247) (0.248) (0.248) (0.248) (0.248) 
General Bed 
-0.382*** -0.378*** -0.378*** -0.377*** -0.375*** -0.369*** -0.380*** -0.376*** -0.379*** 
(0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.098) (0.098) (0.099) (0.099) (0.099) 
Case Load 
-0.015 -0.016* -0.015 -0.016 -0.016* -0.017* -0.015 -0.016* -0.015 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Financial Slack 
-0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.013 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 
(0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037) 
Constant 
4.166*** 8.134*** 8.320*** 4.271*** 8.147*** 7.815*** 4.166*** 8.132*** 8.242*** 
(0.391) (0.401) (0.400) (0.391) (0.398) (0.423) (0.392) (0.400) (0.406) 
R-squared 0.343 0.342 0.343 0.342 0.344 0.344 0.343 0.343 0.343 
Number of firms 4,826 4,826 4,826 4,826 4,826 4,826 4,826 4,826 4,826 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 4.C4: Fixed Effects Regression Results for Cost Aspiration Shortfall Interactions on CPM Saidin Index - Sub-Group Analysis  
Variables 
Teaching=1, Non-Profit=0, 
Rural=0, System=1 
Teaching=1, Non-Profit=1, Rural=0, 
System=1 
Teaching=1, Non-Profit=1, 
Rural=1, System=1 
Model B Model C Model D Model B Model C Model D Model B Model C Model D 
Cost Aspiration Shortfall 
-0.063 -0.060 0.019 -0.122* -0.089 0.305** 0.123* -0.031 -0.215*** 
(0.061) (0.060) (0.092) (0.073) (0.063) (0.146) (0.066) (0.063) (0.074) 
Conceptualization Phase 
3.787***   3.538***   4.315***   
(0.127)   (0.175)   (0.146)   
Enactment Phase 
 -0.513***   -1.315***   -0.498**  
 (0.117)   (0.143)   (0.233)  
Enforcement Phase 
  -3.701***   -3.086***   -4.201*** 
  (0.108)   (0.167)   (0.137) 
Cost Aspiration Shortfall * 
Conceptualization Phase 
0.036   0.235*   -0.425***   
(0.082)   (0.128)   (0.107)   
Cost Aspiration Shortfall * 
Enactment Phase 
 0.129**   0.787***   0.122  
 (0.064)   (0.088)   (0.193)  
Cost Aspiration Shortfall * 
Enforcement Phase 
  -0.106*   -0.596***   0.325*** 
  (0.058)   (0.117)   (0.097) 
Percent Medicare Days 
-0.090 -0.093 -0.089 -0.089 -0.103 -0.095 -0.107 -0.092 -0.100 
(0.248) (0.248) (0.248) (0.248) (0.247) (0.248) (0.248) (0.248) (0.248) 
General Bed 
-0.375*** -0.374*** -0.372*** -0.374*** -0.357*** -0.355*** -0.381*** -0.376*** -0.382*** 
(0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.098) (0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.099) 
Case Load 
-0.016* -0.016 -0.016* -0.016* -0.016* -0.017* -0.015 -0.016* -0.015 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Financial Slack 
-0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.013 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.0375) (0.037) (0.037) 
Constant 
4.343*** 8.165*** 8.060*** 4.414*** 8.142*** 7.647*** 4.152*** 8.136*** 8.368*** 
(0.391) (0.399) (0.410) (0.395) (0.401) (0.433) (0.391) (0.400) (0.403) 
R-squared 0.342 0.343 0.343 0.343 0.346 0.346 0.343 0.342 0.343 
Number of firms 4,826 4,826 4,826 4,826 4,826 4,826 4,826 4,826 4,826 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 
